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justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offences. The National Government in such cases will not be affected by this pride; but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.

Besides, it is well known, that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations, are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory, if offered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the State of Genoa having offended Louis XIV. endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their Senators, to France, to ask his pardon, and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it, for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain or Britain, or any other powerful nation?

PUBLIUS..

NUMBER IV.

BY MR. JAY.

The same subject continued.

My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by just causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated by a National Government, than either by the State Governments, or the proposed Confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign force, depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult for it need not be observed, that there are pretended as well as just causes of war.

It s tom true, howager disgraceful it may be to human nature, that n shions in general will make war whenever they have a prospret of getting anything by it: nay, that absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it; but for purpemon and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for milihrry gelony, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compreta for aggggrandize or support their particular families, or partigi」 「」rt Then, and a variety of motives, which affect only the mind of the morverenggn, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctioned Fry juntion, or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are most prevalent in aleudute morchios, but which well deserve our attention, there new others which affect nations, as often as kings; and some of them will, on examination, be found to grow out of our relative nitortion and circumstances.

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the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters, which are between them and us, to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

From these, and like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations; and that we are not to expect they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence, by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present; and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretences to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely therefore do they consider union and a good National Government, as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation, as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defence, and necessarily depends on the Government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without Government, either one or more, or many, let us inquire whether one good Government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

One Government can collect and avail itself of the talents and' experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interest of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defence of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State Governments, or separate Confederacies, can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will in a manner consolidate them into one corps,

and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen, or into three or four distinct independent bodies.

What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the Government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the Government of Wales? Suppose an invasion: would those three Governments (if they agreed at all), be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single Government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain; and if we are wise, the time may come, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one National Government had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen-if one National Government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet; let Scotland have its navigation and fleet; let Wales have its navigation and fleet; let Ireland have its navigation and fleet; let those four of the constituent parts of the British Empire be under four independent Governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen, or, if you please, into three or four independent Governments, what armies could they raise and pay, what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would nevertheless be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abound with such instances; and it is not improbable that what has so often happened, would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or Confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion, shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the

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allied armies, and from which of the associates shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace? And in case of disputes, what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas, one Government, watching over the general and common interests, combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one National Government, or split into a number of confederacies. certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act towards us accordingly. If they see that our National Government is efficient and well administered—our trade prudently regulated-our militia properly organized and disciplined -our resources and finances discreetly managed-our credit reestablished our people free, contented, and united; they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than to provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual Government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent, and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become, not only to their contempt, but to their outrage; and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim, that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.

PUBLIUS.

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