Messuage and tenement, Doe v. Plowman, 1 East's R. 441. (9) Messuage garden and tenement, Goodtitle v. Walton,

Str. 834.

Messuage or tenement, Goodright on d, Welch v. Flood, 3 Wils. 23.

Messuage, situate in Coventry", in the parishes of A. and B. or one of them. Holden bad for uncertainty, after verdict, and that the words," or one of them," could not be rejected.

De peciâ terræ, Moor, 702. pl. 976.

De castro, villâ et terris, Yelv. 118.

Ejectment will not lie for things that lie merely in grant, which are not in their nature capable of being delivered in execution, as an advowson, common in gross, Cro. Jac. 146.

An ejectment will not lie for a pischary, Cro. Jac. 146, Cro. Car. 492. 8 Mod. 277. 1 Brownl. 142. contra per Ashhurst J. 1 T. R. 361.

Nor pro quodam rivulo sive aquæ cursu, called D. Yelv, 143. nor for Pannage, 1 Lev. 212.

IV. In what Cases an Entry must be made on the Land before Ejectment brought.

In some cases before an ejectment can be brought, some previous steps must be taken, in order to entitle the plaintiff to the action; as an entry must be made on the lands in question, or notice to quit must be given, &c. Under what circumstances these proceedings will be necessary, will appear from the following remarks:

An actual entry is necessary, to avoid a fine levied with proclamations, according to the stat. 4 H. 7. c. 24.; and an ejectment cannot be brought until such entry has been made. And by stat. 4 Ann, c. 16. s. 16. the action must

n Goodright d. Griffin, v. Fawson, 7 o Berrington v. Parkhurst, Str. 1986. Mod: 457. 8vo. edit. 1 Barn. 150. Compere v. Hicks, 7 T. R. 727.

- S. C.

(9) But after verdict the court will give leave (even pending a rule to arrest the judgment on this ground) to enter the verdict ac cording to the judge's notes for the messuage only. Goodtitle d. Wright v. Otway, 8 East, 357,

be commenced within one year next after the making such entry, and prosecuted with effect.

N. The plaintiff must lay his demise on a day subsequent to the day of the entry.

But an actual entry is not necessary to avoid a fine at common law, without proclamations; nor a fine, with proclamations, if all the proclamations were not made at the time when the ejectment was brought; nor to maintain an ejectment on a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent' (10).

Where tenant for life levies a fine with proclamations, although it is not any bar to those in remainder, yet a remainder man must make an actual entry, in order to avoid it, before he can maintain ejectment'.

An entry upon an estate generally, is an entry for the whole; if it be for less, it should be so defined at the time.

In a case, where a party had a right of entry upon condi tion broken, and a stranger entered, and afterwards the plaintiff assented to such entry, and brought an ejectment laying the demise after the assent, it was holden sufficient.

Where an ejectment is brought by a corporation aggregate, they must execute a letter of attorney to some person, empowering him to enter on the land; but a verbal notice to quit given by the steward of a corporation is sufficient".

Where lands are in the possession of a receiver2, under an appointment of the Court of Chancery, an ejectment cannot be brought for the recovery of such lands, without leave of the court.

(10) "To avoid a fine [i. e. a fine with proclamations, where all the proclamations have been made at the time when the ejectment is brought] there must be an actual entry. In all other cases, the confession of lease, entry, and ouster, is sufficient." Per Lord Mansfield C. J. in Oates d. Wigfall v. Brydon, 3 Burr. 1897.

V. In what Cases a Notice to quit must be given before Ejectment brought.-Requisites of Notice.Waver of Notice.-Where Notice is not required,

THE old tenancy at will being attended with many inconveniences, the inclination of the courts has of late been against the construing demises, where there is not any certain term mentioned, to be tenancies at will; and it has been considered as more advantageous to the parties, that such demises should be construed to be tenancies from year to year, so long as it shall please both parties; in which case one party cannot determine the tenancy, without giving a reasonable notice to quit to the other; with respect to which it may be laid down as a general rule, that half a year's (11) notice, expiring with the year of the tenancy, is a reasona ble notice in all cases, except where a different period is established, either by express agreement or the custom" of particular places (12).

If the tenant die, his personal representative, having the same interest in the land which the tenant had, will be entitled to the same notice; that is, half a year's notice ending with the year. So if an infant becomes entitled to the reversion of lands leased to a tenant from year to year, he cannot maintain an ejectment, unless he lias given the te nant a proper notice to quit.

There is not any distinction between houses and land, in this respect. Half a year's notice to quit, ending with the

a 13 H. 8. 15. b.

b Roe d. Brown v. Wilkinson, Harg. & But. Co. Litt. 270 b. n. 1. Roe d. Henderson v. Charnock, Peake's N. P. C. 4, 5.

c Doe d. Shore v. Porter, 3 T. R. 13.
See also 3 Wils. 25. and Lawrence
J. in R. v. Stone, 6 T. R. 298.
d Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159.

(11) By legal computation half a year contains 182 days; for the odd hours are rejected. 1 Inst. 135. b. But a notice served on the 28th of September to quit on the 25th of March, although the period contain only 179 days, has been holden to be a good notice. Doe d. Harrop v. Green, 4 Esp. N. P. C. 199. And Lord Ellenborough in the same case said, that a notice on the 29th of September to quit at Lady-day following had been holden good. (12) By the custom of London, a tenant at will, under 40s. rent, shall not be turned out without a quarter's warning. Dethik v Saunders, 2 Sidf. 20, See also Tyley v. Seed, Skin. 649.

year of the tenancy, must be given in both cases. Neither will the circumstance of the rent being reserved quarterly vary the case, if the tenancy be from year to year (13). So if an house be let from year to year, to quit at a quarter's notice, the notice must be given to quit at the end of a quar ter expiring with a year of the tenancy. But if the demise be for one year only, and then to continue tenant afterwards, and to quit at a quarter's notice, a quarter's notice ending at any time will be sufficient".

A demise, "not for one year only, but from year to year," inures as a demise for two years at least; and, consequently, the tenant cannot be ejected after a notice to quit at the expiration of the first year'.

But where furnished apartments were taken "for 12 months certain, and six months notice afterwards," it was contended, that the defendant, under the above taking, was not at liberty to quit till six months' notice had been given after the expiration of the first year; but Lord Ellenborough was clearly of opinion, that the defendant was only bound to remain the 12 months certain, and that he was at liberty to quit at the end of that period, by giving six months' previous notice. His lordship laid considerable stress upon the word certain, applied to the first twelve months, which shewed that every thing afterwards was uncertain, and depended on the notice.

If a lessee, after the expiration of the lease, holds over and pays rent, the law presumes an agreement between the parties, that the tenant shall continue the possession according to the terms of the original demise, as far as those terms. are consistent with a tenancy from year to year; in which case, if the landlord means to determine the tenancy, he must give the tenant half a years' notice to quit, corres ponding with the time of the original taking. In this case the tenancy from year to year coinmences at the same time when the lease began1; and if the tenant assign the premises, the assignee will be tenant from year to year from

(13) But where a house is taken by the month, a month's notice will be sufficient. Doe d. Parry v. Hazell, 1 Esp. N. P. C.

the same time, and notice to quit must be given accordingly e. g. if the original term began from Michaelmas, the. notice must be to quit at Michaelmas.

The receipt of rent is evidence to be left to a jury that a tenancy was subsisting during the period for which that rent was paid; and if no other tenancy appear, the presumption is, that that tenancy was from year to year.

A., being tenant for life", with remainder to the lessor of the plaintiff in fee, on 22d June, 1785, demised to defendant for twenty-one years, to commence from old Lady Day then past. On 30th September, 1785, A. died; defendant continued in possession, and paid rent to the lessor of the plaintiff for two years, on old Lady Day and old Michaelmas Day; before old Michaelmas Day, 1787, lessor of plaintiff gave defendant notice to quit on old Lady Day then next. Adjudged, per cur., that the notice was good, on the ground, that payment of rent on the 5th of April was evidence of an agreement for a tenancy from year to year to hold from that day; although it was objected, that the interest of the tenant for life having expired on the 30th of September, the notice ought to have been to quit at the end of the year from that time.

In January, 1790, A. let a farm to defendant for seven years by parol. Defendant was to enter at old Lady Day on the land, and on the house on the 25th of May, and he was to quit at Candlemas. On the 22d of September, 1792, a notice to quit at Lady Day next was served on defendant. The court held, that this notice was improper, Lord Kenyon C. J. observing, that though the agreement be void by the statute of frauds, as to the duration of the lease, yet it must regulate the terms, on which the tenancy subsisted, in other respects, i. e. as to the rent, the time of year when the tenant was to quit, &c. The agreement was, that defendant should quit at Candlemas. If the lessor, therefore, chose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven years, he could put an end to it at Candlemas only.

Where the in-coming tenant enters upon different parts of the demised premises, at different times, half a year's notice to quit, with reference to the substantial time of entry, that is, with reference to the original time of entry on the substantial part of the premises demised (14) is sufficient, the whole being demised at one entire rent.

m Doe d. Jordan v. Ward, 1 H. Bl. 97. o Doe v Spence, 6 East, 120. Doe v. n Doe d. Rigge v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471. Watkins, 7 East, 551.

(14) It is not necessary, that the notice to quit should be given