The charge was not cowardice but "unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders." It was not corps commanders alone who were censured. Admitting that there was discontent and freedom of speech on the part of some of the high officers, shall we count their exposure in battle for nothing? Shall we denounce them as unpatriotic? If so, what shall be said of Greene, Sullivan, and Knox, who in the dark days of 1777 threatened to resign because Congress proposed to overslaugh them by the appointment of a French officer, Du Coudray, as a major-general of artillery?

As a people who love our institutions, we should reflect that, as a rule, governments are overthrown only when enemies are thundering at the gates of their capitals. This being admitted, what shall be said of all the general officers who in 1776, without the definite authority of Congress, pressed upon Washington the immediate organization of more troops? What, too, shall be said of Washington and Greene, bosom friends, who, after frequent consultation, wrote to Congressthe former on the 20th of December, the latter on the 21st-urging that Washington be made a dictator."

According to the Father of his Country, subordination and discipline were the best pledge of devotion an army could give to its government, but in armies, as among the people, abuses can only be checked by discipline. Had the officers of the Army of the Potomac been reduced to the slavish subjection of Turkish pashas, they might have said anarchy is the best field for the ambition of a soldier, it matters little what becomes of the government. But their conduct was the reverse. They denounced the faults that had been committed, and by their indignation helped to save the Government and people from their further repetition.

The two army commanders, who, before the movement from the Peninsula, gave the Government opposite advice, at last coincided in opinion.

They both recommended that the two armies be drawn back to the defenses. In the attempt to execute an impossible plan both had been duped. General McClellan was led to believe that he would have the command of the combined armies, while General Pope was informed that after their junction, the General in Chief would take command in

person.

Later, according to the Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers, in the case of General Porter:

It appears that General Pope was notified, on the 25th of August, that an active campaign was soon to be commenced, without waiting for a union of all the forces, and under some commander other than either of those before named. But this information appears to have been of a secret character, afterwards suppressed, and not made known to General McClellan and his subordinates until five days later, when the order appeared from the War Department, depriving McClellan of the command of all his troops then between the Potomac and the Rappahannock, although leaving him in nominal command of the Army of the Potomac.b

When the armies were finally united, the question still remained open, Who should command? By an order from the Executive Mansion, General McClellan had been relieved as General in Chief. By a communication from the War Department, signed by an Assistant Adjutant

a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4.

Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers, in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. 2, p. 1803.

General, and said to be the order of the Secretary of War, he had practically been relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac. This order had been ratified by the General in Chief as late as the 31st of August, who explained it by telegraphing General McClellan:

You will retain command of everything in the vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field.a

To reinstate the deposed commander, was to confess that the whole campaign was a failure; yet something had to be done. A double peril confronted the Government. Bragg, in the West, had begun his march toward the Ohio River, while Lee, with renewed confidence, was crossing into Maryland. For two or three days the President consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory result. At last, assuming all the responsibility, he took the General in Chief with him, turned his back on the War Department, and, without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the house of General McClellan, where, for the moment, he brought the long controversy to a close by saying:

General, you will take command of the forces in the field. a

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 451–453.

CHAPTER XXV.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE FINAL REMOVAL OF GENERAL MCCLELLAN FROM COMMAND.

The Departments of the Rappahannock and Shenandoah having been swept away by the course of events, the laconic order to General McClellan ought to have restored unity of command East of the Alleghenies, but the morbid fears still entertained as to the safety of the capital, again prevented a result which might otherwise have been decisive. On receiving this order, the commander of the Army of the Potomac did not seek to harrass or perplex the mind of the President. He might have represented that there could be no success in military operations while any civil officer other than the constitutional Commander in Chief was permitted to exercise military command. He proposed, however, no conditions, but like a faithful and subordinate soldier, at once crossed the Potomac to make dispositions against attack. The moment he appeared, the acclamations of the troops could be heard for miles, throughout the whole extent of the long columns.

No sound should have been more welcome at the capital. Confidence was restored. Retreating from a twice-fatal field, the defeated and dejected armies became, in an instant, ready for battle. In this crisis history repeated a valuable lesson. The fugitives from the First Bull Run spread such terror and dismay throughout the country, that for six months it was found impossible to again meet the enemy.

It was now reserved for the Army of the Potomac to prove that discipline could cover a multitude of blunders. Not a moment was lost in reorganizing. General McClellan was restored to command on the 2d of September. The same day General Halleck ordered the two armies to fall back to the defenses. On the 3d, the heads of columns were directed across the Potomac, and on the 12th, the right wing reached Frederick. Thus far everything had gone well. But now the chronic fear in regard to the safety of the capital again began to trammel the action of the commander. On the 9th, he received a telegram from General Halleck:

Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Dranesville, 1 think we must be very cautious about stripping, too much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this. «

On the 11th, General Halleck again telegraphed:

Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here. b

a McClellan's Report, p. 186.

b Ibid., p. 187.

The offer was quickly accepted and the request made for all the troops that could be spared, but none were sent forward. The next day the President again telegraphed:

"" * * *

Governor Curtin telegraphs me "I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland. Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborated the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt.a

By unexampled good fortune, General McClellan, on the 13th, received the full text of General Lee's order for the investment and capture of Harper's Ferry. The order directed Jackson, with three divisions, to move via Williamsport and Martinsburg, on Harper's Ferry; McLaws, with two divisions, to Maryland Heights; Walker, with one division, was to recross the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and occupy Loudoun Heights; Longstreet, with two divisions, all the reserve, supply, and baggage trains, was ordered to Boonsboro; Hill's division was to form the rear guard; the cavalry, after detaching a sufficient force to accompany each of the moving columns, was to bring up the stragglers in the rear.

Five divisions of the Confederate Army were thus separated from the remaining four by a broad river, while nothing but a thin curtain separated the artillery and trains from the whole Army of the Potomac. Never was a more brilliant opportunity presented to a commander. Another opportunity had presented itself for ending the Rebellion. Unfortunately the telegraph brought news of divided councils at the capital. The President a few days before had relinquished control, but he had not yet learned the importance of signifying his wishes through a General in Chief. While the President was telegraphing, "Please do not let him (the enemy) get off without being hurt," General Halleck was urging more caution. On the 13th, the day the order was found in the enemy's camp, he telegraphed McClellan: Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over. a

Thus hampered by contradictory orders, McClellan moved forward, and on the 14th, to the great alarm of the enemy, captured the line of South Mountain, but not without a loss of more than 2,000 men.

To the despatch announcing this victory the President replied:

Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.

On the same day, the following telegram from General Halleck checked the energy and boldness which ought to have characterized his movements:

Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear."

It may be said that, with the knowledge that had come into his possession, General McClellan should have imitated the example of Montecuculi, who refused to read the despatches from his government till

a McClellan's Report, p. 187.

after the close of the campaign. The knowledge, however, has first to be tested, besides, since the time of a Montecuculi or a Eugene, who dared to attack his enemy in defiance of orders, the modes of communication had changed. The telegraph bound the commander of the Army of the Potomac to Washington. Had he postponed the opening of a telegram for a single day, his conduct would have been insubordinate, and would have justified his instant removal.

Notwithstanding the renewed interference from Washington, he still had a brilliant prospect of success when, on the 16th of September,« he heard of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. This untoward event, brought about in part by the misconduct of the raw troops who abandoned Maryland Heights, but chiefly due to the imbecility of the commanders, cost the Government 12,000 men. On the morning it occurred, nearly the whole army was over the South Mountain and Franklin's corps was at Crampton's Gap, but 7 miles from Maryland Heights. Had the garrison held in check for a few hours longer McLaws' two divisions, they would have been overwhelmed by Franklin. The capture of Harper's Ferry opened up to McLaws the only means of escape. Rapidly crossing into Virginia, five of the six divisions which had participated in the investment began their circuitous march to rejoin the forces north of the Potomac.

REVIEW OF CRITICISMS OF GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

An ex parte investigation, made by a military commission of which General Hunter was president, threw the blame of the surrender of Harper's Ferry upon the commander of the Army of the Potomac. In the report of this commission it was stated:

The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such censure deserved. The General in Chief has testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only 6 miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading army. The General in Chief also testified that, in his opinion, he could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concurred.

The conclusions of the commission were reached by a very simple process. By eliminating the restraining influence of General Halleck's telegrams, and making no allowance for the enemy's movements from the 2d to the 13th of September, the problem, as presented to the commission, was one in arithmetic.

General McClellan assumed command at Washington on the 2d of September, and on the 4th, two of his corps were on the north bank of the Potomac at Tenallytown. The distance from Tenallytown to Harper's Ferry, as the crow flies, was but 40 miles. Casting aside the whole of Lee's army, as Banks's force of 35,000 men had been set aside by Generals Hitchcock and Thomas when they reported that the President's orders for the defense of Washington had not been complied with, it clearly appeared that had the army moved at the rate even of 6 miles a day, it would have arrived at Harper's Ferry on the 11th, whereas the surrender did not take place till four days later, on the 15th.

a It is possible that McClellan heard this news on the night of the 15th. At 7 o'clock a. m., on the 16th, he telegraphed General Halleck: "I learn that Miles surrendered at 8 a. m. yesterday."-EDITORS.