66 66 acres of land to every noncommissioned officer and soldier who would agree to serve during the war. September 18, another resolution of equalization" followed, extending the bounty voted on the 16th to all who are enlisted or shall enlist for during the war. The bounty of ten dollars which any soldiers have received from the Continent in account of former enlistments to be reckoned as part payment of the twenty dollars allowed by said resolution.” October 8, Congress bound itself to give annually to every noncommissioned officer and soldier who would enlist "during the war" a suit of clothes valued at $20, or the same sum in money on certificate from his captain that he had procured the suit for himself. To reimburse officers for expenses incurred in recruiting, they were allowed $1.33 for every man enlisted. While Congress was thus bidding for men, the States began to bid in opposition, both for recruits for the Continental Army and for the militia. October 30, Congress asked Maryland to reconsider its resolution giving a $10 colonial bounty in lieu of 100 acres of land, assigning as a reason that other soldiers would demand the same bounty and require Congress to grant it. The following letter from Washington to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, written on the 10th of November, explains the difficulties imposed upon the General Government by the bounty offered to the soldiers of the Connecticut quota: I was yesterday evening favored with a call by the gentlemen appointed commissioners from your State to arrange your officers and to adopt some line of conduct for recruiting the quota of men which you are to furnish. In discussing this subject the gentlemen informed me that your assembly, to induce their men to enlist more readily into the service, had passed a vote advancing their pay 20 shillings per month over and above that allowed by Congress. It is seldom that I interfere with the determinations of any public body or venture to hold forth my opinion contrary to the decisions which they form; but upon this occasion I must take the liberty to mention, especially as the influence of that vote will be general and continental, that, according to my ideas and those of every general officer I have consulted, a more mistaken policy could not have been adopted or one that in its consequences will more effecually prevent the great object which Congress have in view and which the situation of our affairs so loudly calls for, the levying a new army. That the advance allowed by your State may be the means of raising your quota of men sooner than it otherwise would perhaps may be true; but when it is considered that it will be an effectual bar to the other States in raising the quotas exacted from them when it is certain that if their quotas could be made up without this advance coming to their knowledge the moment they come to act with troops who receive a higher pay jealousy, impatience, and mutiny will immediately take place and occasion desertions, if not a total dissolution of the army, it must then be viewed as injurious and fatal. That troops will never act together, in the same cause and for different pay, must be obvious to everyone. Experience has already proved it in this army. That Congress will take up the subject and make the advance general, is a matter of which there can be but little probability, as the addition of a suit of clothes to the former pay of the privates was a long time debated before it could be obtained. a Two days later, November 12, the bounty legislation of the year was closed by a resolution of Congress disapproving of the increased pay already promised by the colony of Massachusetts. Although Congress, for reasons beyond its control, was forced to continue the bounty system, the facts as given above show that all the evils which follow in its train were laid bare during the very first year of its existence. a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, p. 170. It may be laid down as an axiom, based upon historical proof, that any Government which foregoes its rights to compulsory military service, becomes more and more enslaved by depending solely upon voluntary military service induced by gifts of money, land, and clothing. DICTATORIAL POWERS GRANTED TO WASHINGTON. The campaign of 1776 demonstrated in a remarkable manner the dangers to which liberty was exposed by an unwise and feeble military policy. In his letter of September 24, Washington referred to the feeling that a standing army was a menace to liberty, yet for the lack of an adequate force of this character he found himself repeatedly compelled to exercise unwarrantable powers. Washington's embarrassing position is best portrayed by the following extract from his letter to the President of Congress, describing the measures adopted to secure the troops needed for the battles of Trenton and Princeton: Since their arrival we have been parading the regiments whose term of service is now expired, in order to know what force we should have to depend on, and how to regulate our views accordingly. After much persuasion, and the exertions of their officers, half or a greater proportion of those from the eastward have consented to stay six weeks on a bounty of $10. I feel the inconvenience of this advance, and I know the consequences which will result from it; but what could be done? Pennsylvania had allowed the same to her militia; the troops felt their importance and would have their price. Indeed, as their aid is so essential, and not to be dispensed with, it is to be wondered at that they had not estimated it at a higher rate. I perceive that Congress, apprehensive of this event, had made unlimited provision for it. a The condition of his army is again fully set forth in another letter to the same person, dated December 20: It is needless to add that short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt. We find, sir, that the enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball by rolling, will increase unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do it for a little while; but in a little while, also, and the militia of those States which have been frequently called upon will not turn out at all; or, if they do, it will be with so much reluctance and sloth as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Pennsylvania! Could anything but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia? Can anything (the exigency of the case indeed may justify it) be more destructive to the recruiting service than giving $10 bounty for six weeks' service of the militia who come. in, you can not tell how; go, you can not tell when, and act, you can not tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment? These, sir, are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence; this is the basis on which your cause will and must forever depend till you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy. I therefore beg leave to give it as my humble opinion that eighty-eight battalions are by no means equal to the opposition you are to make, and that a moment's time is not to be lost in raising a greater number, not less, in my opinion and the opinion of my officers, than a hundred and ten. It may be urged that it will be found difficult enough to complete the first number. This may be true, and yet the officers of a hundred and ten battalions will recruit many more men than those of eighty-eight. In my judgment this is not a time to stand upon expense; our funds are not the only object of consideration." The almost total dissolution of the Army, the rapid advance of the British through New Jersey, and the apprehended fall of Philadelphia, the capital of the United Colonies, inspired Congress with such alarm that, on the 27th of December, it not only voted the increase recommended for the Army, but vested Washington with dictatorial a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, pp. 254,255. powers. This resolution, so fraught with danger to the future liberties of the States, reads as follows: This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis, and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of General Washington, do hereby Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition to those already voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said battalions of infantry; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand light-horse, three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the States for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier-general, and to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American Army; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the Army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the Continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and to return to the States, of which they are citizens, their names, and the nature of their offences, together with the witnesses to prove them. That the foregoing powers be vested in General Washington, for and during the term of six months from the date hereof, unless sooner determined by Congress. Could Congress have foreseen the consequences of creating and dissolving armies, it is more than probable that it would never have been. constrained to resign its powers, even for a moment, into the hands of a military commander, however eminent for his patriotism and virtue. CHAPTER III. CAMPAIGN OF 1777. TROOPS REQUIRED AND FURNISHED. After the victory at Princeton on the 3d of January, Washington's army went into winter quarters at Morristown. His command, on the 19th of January, consisted of "800 Eastern Continental troops, remaining of twelve or fourteen hundred" who "first agreed to stay, part engaged to the "last of this month," and part to the middle of "next;" five Virginia regiments reduced to a "handful of men," a three other battalions in the same reduced state, and 700 Massachusetts militia whose terms of service were to expire in less than two months. On the 14th of March, he reported to the President of Congress that from the most accurate estimate he could form, "the whole of our numbers in Jersey, fit for duty at this time, is under 3,000. These, 981 excepted, are militia and stand engaged only till the last of this month." Thus at the very beginning of the year our lack of military wisdom had reduced Washington's regular soldiers to less than a thousand, while the enemy had more than 20,000 veterans in and about New York. It is needless to point out how much the fortunes of our cause at that junction were furthered by the inaction of the English commander. By the 24th of May the arrival of reinforcements, raised under the act creating the 88 battalions, increased Washington's command to 45 regiments, which were organized into 10 brigades and 5 divisionsnumbering in all about 7,500 men. The military operations in New Jersey from March until the end of June, when the British evacuated the State, mainly consisted in a series of marches and countermarches, Washington not feeling able to give or receive battle. From New York the British transferred their forces by sea to the head of Chesapeake Bay, fought and defeated Washington at the battle of the Brandywine on the 11th of September, and on the 25th entered Philadelphia. It will be remembered that in the previous December the capital was only saved by the $10 bounty which Washington gave the Continental troops whose enlistments had expired, this largess having induced them to remain with the Army until after the battles of Trenton and Princeton. a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4, p. 283. 66 In the present emergency Congress turned to raw troops. On the 28th of July it recommended to the executive council of Pennsylvania "to call out 4,000 militia in addition to those already called forth." August 24, but three weeks before the battle of the Brandywine, it urgently recommended to the State of Maryland to immediately call out not less than 2,000 select militia to repel the invasion of the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware." To this end Congress also requested Pennsylvania to strengthen the Army with 4,000 and Delaware with 1,000 militia, while eight counties, near Chesapeake Bay in Virginia, were asked to contribute one-third of their strength. Notwithstanding these urgent calls, when the critical moment arrived only one small brigade of militia was present with the Army, and this body, from its position on the left, took no part in the action. On the 4th of October, the battle fought at Germantown, with indecisive results, ended active operations for the year so far as the troops under Washington were concerned. A council of war, called by him on the 29th of October, estimated the entire British army in Philadelphia at 10,000 men, the American force consisting of 8,313 Continentals and 2,717 militia. In the north the campaign was made memorable by the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga on the 17th of October with 5,791 men, all that remained of an invading army of nearly 10,000. The number of troops, Continental and militia, which took part in the investment and capture of Burgoyne's army, was a little over 17,000, the total force present for duty being 13,200, of which 9,090 were Continentals and the rest militia. Instead of the usual dispersion, could this force have been transferred to Pennsylvania might not an investment of Howe in Philadelphia have spared us five more weary years of war? The value of a trained officer in command of raw troops was illus trated during this campaign by the victory of the militia at Bennington, under the command of the veteran, General Stark. The remaining operations during 1777, mainly consisted in British descents on the New England coast and in the taking of Forts Clinton and Montgomery in the Highlands. These posts, however, were immediately abandoned by the enemy. The following table," compiled by the Secretary of War from the actual returns of the Army, shows the quotas required by Congress from the different States to fill up the 88 battalions voted in Septem ber, 1776, and the additional battalions created on the 27th of December, 1776, as well as the number of troops furnished by the different States during the year. a American State Papers, vol. XII, p. 15. |