DIGEST OF CASES.

Assignment-Attachment-Priority.-Every state has the right to regulate the transfer of property within her boundaries; therefore, under the laws of Pennsylvania, where an assignment of personal property is made by the owner thereof in another state, for the benefit of creditors, and the said property is attached in Pennsylvania, subsequent to the assignment but before the recording thereof in Pennsylvania by a creditor who had no actual notice of the assignment; the attaching creditor will take in preference to the assignee. Warner's App. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1, 1888. 16 Rep. 728.

Attachment-Subsequent Execution—Priority of Lien-Where an execution is issued, and the goods are already in the custody of the law by virtue of a writ of foreign attachment, issued earlier in the same day, the attachment will take precedence of the execution, and the lien of the latter will not be carried back so as to share pro rata with the attachment. Warner's App. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1, 1883. 16 Rep. 728.

Attorney-Privileged Communication.—The testimony of attorneys upon matters in which they did not act in any professional capacity, and upon which no information was received through the confidential relation of attorney and client, is competent. Reinehart v. Johnson. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec 5, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 452.

Charge of Court-Abstract Proposition.-It is not error to refuse an abstract proposition in the abɛence of a request that the court apply it to the facts of the case. Ward v. McCue. Pa. Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1883. 14 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 160

Common Carrier-Contract Limiting Liability-Negligence.—A common carrier may relieve himself from the strict liability imposed on him by the common law, by a special contract, but he cannot contract for exemption from the consequences of his own or his agent's negligence, Railroad Co. v. Simpson. Kan. Sup. Ct., Nov. 9, 1883. 17 Cent. L. J. 474.

Criminal Law-Murder-Evidence of Weak Mind-Threats.-1. Evidence that the perpetrator of a deliberate murder is unlearned, passionate, ignorant, or even of weak mind, unless the weakness of mind amounts to such a defect of reason as to render him incapable of knowing that the act is wrong, is inadmissible. 2. It is no excuse for murder that the perpetrator has not power to control his actions when aroused, or in a passion. It is the duty of men who are not insane or idiotic, to control their evil passions and violent tempers, or brutal instincts, and they are responsible for not doing so. 3. A mere threat, even if made by a lawless and desperate man, is no excuse for taking life. Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth. Ky. Ct. of App., Nov. 17, 1888. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 363.

Contract-Measure of Damage for Failure to Furnish Goods Under.The measure of damage for violation of a contract to furnish goods, which were to be manufactured in one city for sale in another, is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the place of sale, and not the market price at the place of manufacture, though the vendees acquire property at the time of the delivery of the goods to the railroad, in the city where made. Louis Cook Manufacturing Co. v. Randall. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 507.

Criminal Law-One Crime as Evidence of Another-Joint Indictment.— 1. To make one criminal act evidence of another, they must be connected as part of a general plan or design, or the connection may be shown by such circumstances of identification as necessarily prove that the person who committed one crime must have committed the other; but a mere isolated crime can not be given in evidence. 2. Where two persons are jointly indicted and tried, evidence tending to establish the guilt of either may be given, although it incidentally prejudice the other defendant, but the court should, in its instructions, expressly limit the effect of the testimony to the proper person. Swan v. Commonwealth. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 29, 1883. 16 Rep. 729.

Foreclosure-Junior Mortgage-Redemption.-A junior mortgagee not made a party to the foreclosure of the senior mortgage, has the right to redeem from such mortgage; but where the prior mortgagee has become the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, thereby acquiring the equity of redemption, he may pay the amount upon the junior mortgage, redeming that, the junior incumbrancer, when he redeems, being entitled, not to a conveyance of the premises, but only to an assignment of the prior mortgage. Smith v. Shay. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 4, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 444.

Homestead-Foreclosure of Mortgages—Marshalling Securities.—Where certain lands, including the homestead, are mortgaged, and the mortgagor creates another mortgage on that portion not the homestead, he is entitled, on the foreclosure of the senior mortgage, to have the property other than the homestead sold first, even though the junior mortgage had been previously foreclosed; otherwise he would be deprived of his homestead, not by his voluntary act, but by operation of law. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Gleason. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 524.

Intoxicating Liquor—Action for Damages—Pleading—Exemplary Damages.-1. Where the petition alleges the sale of intoxicating liquors to the plaintiff's husband in a certain house, evidence that it was sold elsewhere, is admissible, since the description of the saloon property is wholly immaterial and surplusage; the owner of the building not being made a party defendant, and no attempt being made to charge his property therefor. 2. Exemplary damages need not be demanded in the petition; the jury may add them as they think proper. Gustafson v. Wind. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 523.

Judicial Sale-Rights of Purchaser who Borrows Purchase Money.— Where a purchaser of realty at sheriff's sale, being unable to pay the amount of the bid, borrows the amount from another, and the sheriff's deed is made to that other under an agreement that the said conveyance shall stand as security for said loan with interest, such conveyance is in law a mortgage, and equity will decree a re-conveyance to the borrower on payment of the loan. Logue's App. Penn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 22, 1883. 40 Leg. Int. 485.

Municipal Corporation—Liability for Unlawful use of Private Property by Railroad Company.-A municipal corporation is not liable for the negligence of a railroad company in constructing its road upon private property, and has no authority to permit or forbid the company to acquire the right of way over such property. Callahan v. Des Moines. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 6, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 470.

Negligence-Common Service.-An employe cannot recover from his principal or employer for an injury caused by the negligence of another employe engaged in the same business, and the fact that the negligent employe has the power to direct the acts and movements of the one injured. does not take the case out of such general rule. Heine v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. Wis. Sup. Ct., Nov. 20, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 420.

Negligence-Duty of Railroad Company as to Fences.-Where a railroad company must fence in order to shield itself from liability, it can not be charged with negligence for not providing convenient places for animals to leave the track after coming upon it. Gilman v. Sioux City and Pac. R. Co. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 520.

Negligence-Injury to Adjoining Owner of Building-Contractor.-A. person who does work on his own land, which necessarily exposes his neighbors to risk, is bound to take all necessary precautions to protect them from injury, and he is not freed from this liability by the fact that he has employed a contractor, if an injury is in fact caused, though by the unauthorized and improper act of the contractor's workmen. Hughes ▼. Percival. House of Lords, June, 1883. 49 L. T. R. N. S. 189. 16 Rep. 735.

Parent and Child-Liability of Parent for Necessaries.—Where a parent (or one who by bond or otherwise undertakes the support of children in loco parentis) stands ready to furnish such support, no other person is authorized to act for and charge the expenses for necessaries upon the father, without an express promise to that effect, or proof of circumstances implying such a promise. Judge v. Barrows. Wis. Sup. Ct., Dec. 11, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 540.

Promissory Note-Consideration.-The consideration of negotiable promissory notes may be inquired into in an action on the notes by the promisee against the maker. Kennedy v. Goodman. Neb. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1883. 2 Den v. L. J. 12.

·Promissory Note—Memorandum Indorsed Before Delivery-Conditional Payment-Negotiability.—1. A memorandum upon the back of a note; made by agreement of the parties before delivery, will bind them as if it were written on its face and above the signature of the maker. 2. A note, negotiable in form, but whose payment is conditional upon the non-payment of another note mentioned, is not a negotiable note. Grimison v. Russell. Neb. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1882. 16 Rep. 723.

Replevin—Mingled Chattles of Several Owners—Undivided Crops.— Where chattles of the same nature and quality, belonging to different owners, are mingled in one mass, any owner may claim his aliquot part by replevin, but when the property is not susceptible of division so that it may be seized by the officer and delivered to the plaintiff, as in case of an undivided half of a growing crop, replevin will not lie. Reed v. Middleton. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 532.

Service Upon Agent-Whether Binding on Principal.-The statute provides that when a company or individual has an agency for the transaction of any business in any county other than where the principal resides, service may be made on any one employed in such office or agency, in all actions growing out of the business of that office or agency; therefore, a service in such office on an agent of the company in respect to transactions by another and previous agent of the same company, is not such as will bind the principal. State Ins. Co. v. Granger. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 504.

Statute of Limitations-Pleading— Waiver.-—A party relying upon the statute of limitations, must set it up in his pleading, or he cannot avail himself of this defense. Lockhart v. Fessenich. Wis. Sup. Ct., Nov. 20, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 302.

Street-Power to Authorize Occupation by Street Railway—Curative Act. The city of Dubuque, having no authority under its charter to pass an ordinance granting the use of its streets for a railway, to be operated by horse or steam power, and the legislature being prohibited by the constitution from passing local or special laws where a general law can be made applicable, it is not within the power of the legislature to ratify Buch ordinance by a special act, and thus accomplished indirectly what it can not do directly, as the power to ratify a contract results from the power to originally authorize the contract. Stange v. Dubuque. Ia. Sup. Ct., Dec. 8, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 518.

Trial-Argument-Open and Close.-To entitle a defendant to open and conclude, his admission of the plaintiff's cause of action must be made before the trial commences, and must be entered of record. When the defendant, before the trial commences, admits specifically the plaintiff's cause of action, so as to relieve the plaintiff from adducing any proof, and causes the admission to be 'entered of record, then, and not till then, is he entitled to open and conclude the argument. Dugey v. Hughes. Tex. Ct. of App., Oct. 13, 1888. 2 Denv. L. J. 21.

A HIGHER STANDARD FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR.

We commend, to those who are inclined to think that the attempt to raise the standard of fitness and preparation of students applying for admission to the bar, is being carried forward with unnecessary severity, the following article upon the subject from the last number of the Central Law Journal:

"The recent action of one of the boards of bar examiners of Ohio, in rejecting the applications of seventeen out of twenty-one of the applicants for admission to the bar, may seem at first impression, harsh and arbitrary, but, upon second thought, it must be admitted that it is but a move in the direction which has been taken none too early, and which should have been taken years ago, throughout the west. The profession, from the facilities offered to the student, has become crowded with men entirely incompetent for its arduous duties; their incompetency compels them to resort to trickery, to eke out a living, and not only do they ultimately come to grief, but they continue to increase the prejudice of the people against the bar, and strengthen the impression, which has always prevailed, that the bar is but a nest of rascality, and that these men are excellent vouchers for the characters of all. The bar and the judiciary hold the power in their hands. The standard of knowledge and ability, can be fixed by them alone, and it lies within their scope to raise it so high, that none but those who can do honor to the profession can be admitted to its fold. In the medical profession