take under the law, and not under the will. The land was sold upon a proper petition of the administrator with will annexed. The proceeds of the land, added to the personalty, made a sum large enough to pay all debts (including the mortgage); the statutory allowance for one year; the costs of administering the estate; dower in the entire proceeds of the land, and leave a surplus for the devisees. Held: The widow, as against the devisees, is entitled to dower in the entire proceeds of the land.

Judgment affirmed.

474. Levi Croll et al. v. The Village of Franklin et al. Error to the District Court of Warren County.

BY THE COURT.

On August 4, 1877, the Council of the Village of Franklin, Warren county, Ohio, passed an ordínance “for the annexation of contiguous territory" to the village, and appointing A. G. McBurney, "to prosecute the proceedings necessary to effect such annexation." Two succcessive applications to the commissioners of the county, were granted by that body; but the courts reversed their action, because of defects not affecting the validity of the ordinance, or the merits of the application. On the twenty-ninth of June, 1878, a third application was presented to the county commissioners. On hearing, after due notice, they granted it. Croll and others, resident in the territory ordered to be annexed, sued in the common pleas to enjoin the further proceedings required to complete the annexation. The act of March 1, 1877 (74 Ohio L. 36), was in force when the ordinance was passed. The municipal code, passed May 14, 1878, repealed said act. Section three (75 Ohio L. 165.) provided that "the territorial limits of * * exist. ing corporations shall remain as they are, until changed in the manner herein provided." Section eight (same page) kept in force all ordinances "not inconsistent with this title." The only change from the act of March 1, 1877, was the substitution of the words, “When the inhabitants generally of any municipal corporation shall desire," for the words, "When any municipal corporation shall desire.." Held: 1. This change of phrase made no change in meaning. No mode being provided for ascertaining what "the inhabitants generally" desired, the act of their representatives in council assembled expressed that desire.

2. The ordinance was "not inconsistent" with the title referred to in the municipal code; it continued in force and, while unrepealed, gave full authority to the designated agent "to prosecute the proceedings necessary to effect such annexation" until he succeeded, or was barred by a final decision on the merits.

Judgments below affirmed.

508. Stevens v. McKnight & Saw hill. Error to the District Court of Richland County.

BY THE COURT..

If in a contract in writing to sell land the tract is described as containing "about one hundred and forty acres," the import of the qualifying

word "about," is simply, that the actual quantity is a near appoximation to that mentioned. When there is found to be a material and valuable variation, a court of equity upon a petition for specific performance will give the word its proper effect. In this case, the county surveyor, upon actual measurement, found one hundred and thirtyfour and seventy-four hundredths acres in the tract. It was of the value of about fifty-five dollars per acre. Judgment reversed.

BY THE COurt.

Causes 479, 490, 533, 591 and 592, decided to-day, present no "novel or difficult" question of law. In each the main complaint is of a finding "not supported by the evidence." In view of the repeated announcements that a reviewing court ought not to revise the finding of the tribunal before which the witness appeared, unless it clearly appears that the evidence in support of that finding was insufficient, we would have deemed it our duty to assess penalties in these cases, if the statutes in force permitted the filing of a petition in error without leave. This statement is applicable to a number of other cases heretofore affirmed without report.

The reporter will not include the above in his reports.

451. Hoag v. Earl, adm'r., etc. Error to the District Court of Lucas County. Dismissed for want of preparation within extension of time heretofore granted.

479. Fahrenkamp v. C. & P. R. R. Co. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County. Judgment affirmed. No further report.

490. O'Brien et al v. Board of Education of Hiram Township. Error to. the District Court of Portage County. Judgment affirmed. No further report.

533. Holterhoff v. Comnity et al. Error to the District Court of Clermont County. Judgment affirmed. No further report.

591. Manson v. Cooper. Error to the District Court of Summit County. Judgment affirmed. No further report. 592. Coit v. Beck et al. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County. Judgment affirmed. No further report.

MOTION DOCKET.

No. 33. Tracy et al. v. Baum et al. Motion for a rehearing, and to modify decree in cause No. 192, General Docket. Motion overruled.

34. Swing and Mellen, executors, etc., ". Chatfield and Wood, executors, etc. Motion to set aside entry made on motion No. 28 in cause No. 542, General Docket, because it was contrary to agreement of counsel. Motion granted, and said motion No. 28 set for hearing on January 8, 1884.

35. Hildebrandt v. Polk. Motion to reinstate cause No. 505, General Docket. Motion granted.

36. Smith v. Foreman et al. Motion to reinstate cause No. 484, General

Docket. Motion granted.

Commission adjourned to Tuesday, January 8, 1884.

ASSIGNMENT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Wednesday, January 9.

352. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Uhriah W. Reed. Error to the District Court of Paulding County.

Wednesday, January 16.

493. Henry N. Raymond et al. v. Mattie D. Ross. Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga County.

498. Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Emeline T. Abraham. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

Wednesday, January 23.

504. Samuel Fosdick v. Cornelius Van Horn. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

542. Swing & Mellon, executors, etc. v. Chatfield & Woods. Error to the District Court of Clermont County.

Wednesday, January 30.

522. John H. Taphorn et al. v. Marietta & Cincinnati R. R. Co., as re-organized. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

524. Jane Swanger v. Wm. H. Lantz et al. Error to the District Court of Franklin County.

Wednesday, February 6.

546. John W. Rutherford et al. v. Henry Brachman et al. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

550. Jacob Harline, executor, etc. v. First National Bank of Xenia. Error to the District Court of Greene County.

Wednesday, February 20.

457. Chauncy Winchell v. Frank Frost. Error to the District Court of Portage County.

567. Joseph Rawson et al v. George Bogen et al. Error to the Dis

Wednesday, February 27.

576. Leopold Burckhardt v. Fourth National Bank of Cincinnati. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

584. Wadsworth Coal Co. v. Silver Creek Mining and Railway Co. Error to the District Court of Medina County.

Wednesday, March 5.

586. Adin G. Hibbs, administrator, etc. v. Union Central Life Insurance Co. Error to the District Court of Franklin County.

594. Ohio Valley Insurance Co. v. James S. Kirk et al. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County.

Wednesday, March 12.

596. Abraham Zimmerman v. Mary Zimmerman. Error to the District Court of Mahoning County.

N. B. This being published previous to the making up of the docket for the January term, 1884, the numbers of the cases are those of the January term, 1883.

DIGEST OF CASES.

Accord and Satisfaction-Tender-Acceptance.-To afford a good defense, an accord and satisfaction must be executed, i. e., both tendered and accepted; promise to accept is not sufficient. Therefore, a plea which sets up a bare promise to accept, is bad. Johnson v. Hunt. Ky. Ct. of App., Sep. 20, 1883. 17 Cent. L. J. 468.

Damages-Surface Water Diverted Upon Land of Another-Ditch.-One land-owner has no right, independent of a grant, to gather the surface waters on his lands, and, by means of ditches, cause them to flow upon the land of another, where they would not otherwise go. Hoganon ▼. St. Paul. M. & M. R. Co. Minn. Sup. Ct., Nov. 17, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 374.

Divorce-Condonation.-Where the libellant had herself committed adultery six years prior to the offense complained of by her, and the libellee, at the time, with full knowledge of the facts, condoned her offense, such crime affords no defense to the present libel. Cumming v. Cumming. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Sep., 1883. 17 Cent. L. J. 449.

Domicile Of Parent Governs Legitimacy of Child.-A person legitimate, according to the law of the domicile of his father at the time of his birth, is legitimate everywhere, for the purpose of succeeding to personal property. Matter of Andros. Eng. H. Ct. of J. Ch. Div., July 23, 1883. 49 L. I. Rep. (N. S.) 163; 28 Alb. L. J. 429.

Dower-Bankruptcy of Husband Does Not Bar.-In Pennsylvania, as in other states, dower is not barred by an assignment of the husband's estate under the bankrupt act of the United States, and a sale by the assignee in bankruptcy under order of the court. Porter v. Lazear. Sup. Ct. U. S., Oct., 1883. 28 Alb. L. J. 431.

Common Carrier-Must Carry Goods of Other Carriers.-A common carrier is bound to furnish other common carriers the facilities necessary for the proper conduct of their business. Wells v. Oregon, etc. Co. U. S. C. C. D. Oregon, 1883. 17 Cent. L. J. 471.

Contract-Marriage Brokage-Validity.-1. An agreement to surrender and discharge certain notes in consideration for the maker's services and influence in obtaining a wife for the holder, is a marriage brokage contract, and, therefore, void. 2. An agreement to discharge certain notes in consideration that the maker would write and deliver for the holder, letters to a lady, with a view to a matrimonial alliance, is void, for want of a legal consideration. Johnson v. Hunt. Ky. Ct. of App., Sep. 20, 1883. 17 Cent. L. J. 468.

Criminal Law-Larceny-Selling and Delivering Another's Property.-A induced B to purchase certain property from him, falsely claiming to be the owner, and pointed it out, whereupon B carried it away. Held, to be larceny in A, the asportation being considered to be his act. Cummins v. Commonwealth. Ky. Ct. of App., June, 1883. 16 Rep. 718.

Fraud-Deed-Parental Influence.-A deed of conveyance obtained by one standing in loco parentis from a minor (nineteen years of age) ignorant of his rights, upon representations which are false, will be annulled at the suit of the grantor. Brown v. Burbank. Cal. Sup. Ct., Aug., 1883. 16 Rep. 717.

Inn Keeper-Liability for Lost Valuables-Notice to Deposit-Negligence. -1. Where goods of a guest are lost at an inn, to relieve the inn-keeper from liability, it must appear that they were lost from one of the causes for which he is not liable; as, for instance, the negligence of the guest. 2. It is not imputable as negligence in the guest that he consented to be placed to sleep in a room with another guest, with whom he did not come to the inn, and who was a stranger to him, by whom his goods were stolen. 3. Notice to the guest to deposit valuables with the landlord, where not such as the statute prescribes, does not relieve the landlord from liability, unless it be brought to the knowledge of the guest, so that his assent to limiting the liability of the landlord may be presumed. Olson v. Crossman. Minn. Sup. Ct., Nov. 17, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 375.

Insurance-Cancellation of Policy-Notice.-The company notified the agent to cancel the risk, who, in turn, notified the insured, but at the request of the latter, consented to let the policy stand to a specified time, at the end of which he cancelled it on his books after being unable to find the insured. Held: 1. That such direction to the agent when the insured had been notified, was as effective as the most express notice, that the policy had been cancelled. 2. That an agreement with the agent to continue the policy in force by the insured after such notification, would not have been binding. Spring'f. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon. Tex. Sup. Ct., May 29, 1883. 12 Ins. L. J. 889.

Libel-Pleading-Extrinsic Matter.-In an action for libel, when the language of the publication is not actionable per se, but requires explanation by some extrinsic matter to make it actionable, the complaint must allege such extrinsic matter, which, coupled with the language published, affects its construction, and shows that it conveyed the actionable meaning which plaintiff claims for it. In those trades or professions in which, ordinarily, credit is essential to their successful prosecution-as, for example, that of merchant-language is actionable per se, which imputes to one in such trade or profession want of credit, or responsibility, or insolvency, past, present, or future. Such language necessarily, or naturally and presumptively, causes pecuniary loss to the person of whom it is published. Newell v. How. Minn. Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 1883. 17 N. W. Rep. 383.