DIGEST OF CASES.

Attorney-Services-Claims for-Statute of Limitations.-The statute of limitations does not begin to run against the claim of an attorney for fees for conducting a suit until the end of his services in that case; nor will it run against a claim for any other services until such services are finished. Mosgrove v. Golden. 5 Wis. L. N. 423.

Contract-Executory-Plaintiff must show Performance or Offer to perform.-The general rule is, that in suing upon an executory contract for services, the plaintiff before he will be entitled to recover, must aver and prove, if denied, that he has either performed the services, or that he was ready and offered to perform them. But where it is expressly stipulated or where from the nature of the contract itself the plaintiff is entitled to notice or a request to perform, then it is sufficient to aver and prove, if denied, a readiness to perform. Wehrli y. Rehwoldt. Ill. June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Contract-Rescission-The Fraud that will Authorize Purchaser to Rescind.-Where a joint owner of real estate, the legal title being in another of the owners, offered his services to negotiate the purchase of the same from the holder of the legal title, for a purchaser who was ignorant of the facts, which were not disclosed, and such joint owner procured the purchase, which was accepted in ignorance of the facts, it was held that these facts constituted constructive fraud on the part of the person negotiating the purchase, and entitled the purchaser to rescind the contract, if he had not put it out of his power to restore the whole interest he had thus been induced to purchase. Strong v. Lord. Ill. June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Evidence-Preponderance-Sufficiency.-Where a sale on execution is sought to be set aside in equity on the ground that the owner of the judgment released the land sold from the lien, and the father of the complainant testified to the release while the holder of the judgment testified equally as positive that he never released the lien on the property and neither witnesses' testimony was materially corroborated by other evidence, it was held, that the evidence as to this issue was so equally balanced as not to warrant a decree for the complainant. Dobbins v. Wilson. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal News, Aug. 4.

Fire Insurance-Policy-" Store Fixtures" and "Store."—" Store fixtures" in a policy of fire insurance means those store fittings or fixed furniture which are peculiarly adapted to make a room a store rather than something else.. "Store" must be distinguished from "factory," and means a shop or warehouse. Thurston v. Union Ins. Co., and four other cases. U. S. C. C., Dist. N. H., June, 1883. 16 Rep. 161.

Fire Insurance-Payment, etc.-Parol Evidence.-Payment, accord and satisfaction, performance and waiver may be proved by parol though the contract is under seal. Quincy v. Carpenter, Mass., 12 Ins. L. J. 487. Citing : Small v. Jenkins, 16 Gray 157; Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 429; Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Id. 302; Early v. Thompson, 15 Mass. 25.

Fire Insurance-Verbal Contract-Loss.-A verbal contract of insurance against loss by fire when fairly and understandingly entered into, is as valid and binding as though reduced to writing and signed by the respective parties, but in a suit on such policy the plaintiff can not recover for a loss without showing that the contract was completed before the happening of the loss, Paddon v. People's Ins. Co. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal News, Aug. 4.

Master and Servant-Bond of Servant-Liability of Surety on.-A surety is not discharged from liability by the mere fact that the principal is continued in master's employment after failure to pay over money promptly, of which fact the surety had not been advised. Rowley v. Jewell, 56 Ia. 492; Home Ins. Co. v. Holway, 55 Id. 157.

Parent and Child-Surrender of Child by Parent.-A parent may, by agreement, surrender the custoday of an infant child so as to transfer the legal custody of such child to him to whom it is surrendered. Bonnett v. Newmyer. Ia., June, 1883. 16 Rep. 172.

Practice-Motion—Ruling on no Part of the Record.-A motion to transfer a cause from the state court to the federal court, and the decision of the state court thereon is not a part of the record unless made so by a bill of exceptions. W. St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. People. Ill., June 16, 1883.. Chicago Legal News, Aug. 4.

Practice Written Contract-Suit-Demand.—Where suit is brought on a written contract for money due, it is not necessary to allege a written: demand therefor. Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass. v. Bick, Ind., 12 Ins. L. J. 484.

Principal and Agent—Gambling Contract-When Agent may Recover of his Principal on a Purchase made for him.—When an agent or commission merchant purchases grain for his principal on his order to do so, he can only recover of the latter his commissions, unless he has actually paid for the grain or the loss legally sustained by the seller, in which event he may also recover what he has thus been required to pay. It is not sufficient that the agent purchasing may be legally liable, he must have sustained damage by actual payment. Brand v. Henderson. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Public Highway-Dedication-Requisites for.-To make a good dedication requires a definite and certain description of that which is proposed to be dedicated, and an acceptance by the public before the withdrawal or abandonment of the offer to dedicate. Village of Winnetka v. Prouty. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal News, Aug. 4.

Railways-Several Lines-Damages-Liability.-Where goods have been transported by several carriers, and it appears that they were de-. livered to the first carrier in good condition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, they will be presumed to have been delivered to the last carrier in the same condition. Leo v. St. P. M. & M. Ry. Co. Minn., June 8, 1883. 16 Rep. 147. To the same effect: Shrever v. Ry. Co. 24 Minn. 506; Laughlin v. Ry. Co., 28 Wis. 204; Smith v. Ry. Co., 43 Barb. 225; Brintnall v. Ry. Co., 32 Vt. 665; Dixon v. Ry. Co., 74 N. C. 538.

Real Estate—Judgment Lien—Appeal does not Defeat.-A conveyance of land by a judgment debtor to his son, for a valuable consideration, af-ter the judgment has become a lien thereon, and pending an appeal, will not defeat the lien of the judgment. In such case the grantee takes title, subject to the lien of the judgment, and a sale and deed, made on execution under such judgment, will pass the title unaffected by the conveyance. Dobbins v. Wilson. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal News, Aug. 4.

Real Estate Leave-Uncertainty Respecting Rent to be Paid.-A contract for a lease of premises, provided that the rent to be paid yearly was $1,513.84, subject to any errors in the figuring thereto attached, which, with the parol evidence identifying the figuring, showed that the rent to be paid was six per cent. on the cost of the property. Held, that the same was not void for indefiniteness and uncertainty as to the amount of the rent. The sum named is certain, and must govern unless a mistake in the estimate is shown, and this might have been done without the proviso providing for its correction, and parol evidence was admissible to show such mistake. McFarlane v. Williams. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Real Estate Contract-Is Sufficient if it May be Rendered so by Calculation.-Where a person bought a number of lots, a part of which he agreed to lease to the party negotiating the purchase, at a certain annual rental named, subject to any errors in the figuring on a paper attached to the contract, and it appeared that the sum named was intended to be six per cent, on the pro rata cost of the lots, it was held that the rent was not uncertain, as it could be readily estimated what the lots to be leased cost by comparing the number of square feet in them with the square feet in the entire purchase, and that six per cent. on that sum was the rent to be paid. McFarlane v. Williams. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Real Estate-Contract—Mistake—May be Shown by Parol Evidence and Corrected in Equity.-Where a mistake is made in a contract for the payment of a given sum of money by a miscalculation, on a basis adopted by both parties, it is competent to allege and prove the mistake in a court of equity, and parol evidence is admissible to prove the same. McFarlane v. Williams. Ill.. June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Real Estate-Contract-May give Data by Which Sum to be Paid can be Found.-A contract for a lease is sufficient if it gives the data by which the amount of rent may be found, leaving it to be worked out by calculation, and it is also sufficient to state a gross sum supposed to represent that calculation, subject to the correction of any mistake that may be in such calculation. But when the sum is stated, it will be presumed to be correct until a mistake therein is clearly proven. McFarlane v. Williams. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Real Estate Redemption—From Sale on Execution After Time has Expired When Fraud Has Been Practiced.—Where a complainant's land was sold on execution and bid in by one who was his family physician and regarded as an intimate friend and adviser, and complainant being an aged and illiterate person almost wholly ignorant of his legal rights, and the purchaser promised to give the debtor all the time he wanted to redeem, telling him he had fifteen months in which to redeem, and by artifice and misrepresentation lulled him into a sense of security, until the time of redemption had passed, with the knowledge and participation of the assignee of the certificate of purchase who had an old grudge against the complainant, and to whom a sheriff's deed was made, the property having been sold at a grossly inadequate price; held, that the complainant under these circumstances was entitled on bill in equity to redeem from the sale and have the sheriff's deed set aside as a cloud on his title. Palmer v. Douglas. Ia., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Statute-Construction.-Statutes imposing fines and penalties must be strictly construed. Hawkins v. People. Ill., June 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Trade-Mark-Name Not.-A name alone is not a trade-mark, unless it is understood to signify the particular manufacture of a certain proprietor. Hostetler v. Fries. U. S. C. C. S. D. N. Y. 16 Rep. 6. The same doctrine is held by the courts in Singer M'f'g Co. v. Loog. House of Lords. Dec. 13, 1882. 15 Rep. 538. S. C. 48 L. T. R. N. S. 3. Wheeler & Wilson v. Shakespear, 39 L. J. Ch. 36; Young v. Macrea, 9 Jur. N. S. 322.

Wills-Insanity-Evidence.-While ill-will, hatred, and the exhibition of violent passions by a person usually good-humored, do not of themselves constitute insanity, they may be manifestations of mental derangement, and evidence of their existence in the breast of the testator against the maternal grandfather of contestants, should be left to the jury trying the issue of testator's sanity. Shirley v. Shirley. Ky. June 9, 1883. 2 Ky. L. R. & J. 26.

Wills-Finding of Jury Binding on the Court.-In contested will cases in hancery the finding of the jury is conclusive unless clearly against the ht of evidence. In this respect such cases differ from ordinary in chancery, and are treated the same as cases at law. Long v. Long. Ane 16, 1883. Chicago Legal Adviser, Aug. 4.

Every trial is a contest of skill, tact and power in which one party is sure of defeat. This is necessarily so. To be able to satisfactorily explain to your client the cause of defeat, is often no easy task. Mr. Byron Bacon, of Louisville, at the banquet of the Kentucky Bar Association, responded to the toast, "How to explain to your client why you lost his cause," in the following admirable style:

I deprecate any thought that I respond because, from a more extended experience than my legal brethren, I bring to the solution of this question the exhaustive learning and skill of the specialist. The characteristic modesty of our profession forbids that I should arrogate to myself to instruct the eminent lawyers around me wherein they doubtless have attained the perfection that long practice can give.

I therefore assume that the subject was proposed for the edification of the novitiates, those young gentlemen to whom Blackstone so often and so feelingly alludes, who, after a long and laborious course of study, have been found, upon an examination by the sages of the law, not to have fought a duel with deadly weapons since the adoption of the new constitution, and have been admitted to our ranks. To them, then, I shall offer briefly some suggestions upon this point, hoping that they may not have need of them upon the termination of their first case.

The question as framed is not unlike that with which Charles II. long puzzled the Royal Society. He demanded the cause of phenomena, the existence of which he falsely assumed.