and there was no new contract until the instrument sought to be reformed was signed. It is true that Milliken, the president of the petitioner in the court below, says that he was informed by the Commissioner that his application was accepted and his contract would be renewed. But he goes on to say that he then called on the chief of the stamp division, was informed by him that it had been decided that the application of any person who had a contract would be granted, and received blank copies of the contract to be executed, so that the acceptance was contemporaneous with the delivery of the instrument informing the petitioner of the terms. There is no room for the application of Harvey v. United States, 105 U. S. 671, and similar cases, upon which the petitioner relies. The only effect of the testimony is to confirm by the conduct and language of the parties the interpretation of the previous communications, which does not need that confirmation to be plain. It should not pass unmentioned that the communications were between the Commissioner and the firm, and therefore not even with the same person that brings the present suit.

In strictness it is not necessary to go further. For the parol testimony which we shall mention amounts to nothing, except upon the footing that there was a preliminary written agreement. But it is proper to add that it is doubtful, at least, whether the two letters bear the interpretation which the petitioner now puts upon them. It is plain that not all the paragraphs of the notice to contractors after the first were provisions to be added to future contracts. That which follows the one in question was on the face of it simply information as to what the applicants must do. The last paragraph, fixing the time within which applications would be received, also obviously was a self-protecting notice only, and although the petitioner does set it up as properly a term of the agreement, the averment is only by way of make-weight to what mainly is relied upon, and we hardly think that it needs discussion. The communication was a general form to instruct

and direct applicants for contracts. The most natural meaning of the clause principally in question was simply to give notice that applications from persons not already engaged in imprinting stamps would not be considered and thereby to limit the applications sent in. It is not natural to read it as intended to contract the Government out of its right to employ new persons in case a need to do so should arise.

The petitioner's letter also in its most natural interpretation would confine the changes in the contract to the requirements concerning salaries and the rate of compensation. It is true that it contains the general words, "and in accordance with your official communication dated April 25, 1899," but it goes on to show what it regards as the elements of that communication material to the contract by the following words. It mentions salaries and the rate of compensation, nothing else. The words quoted are not an independent clause but they qualify the next phrase "we to pay salaries," etc. On these two letters, even if they had made a contract, which they did not, the Government hardly could have been held to the disputed terms. It may be mentioned further that Milliken testified that when he wrote that letter he did not consider the clause in question to relate directly to the subject matter of the contract, and although at a later date he stated that he desired to modify his testimony, the only intelligible modification, if it be called one, is that his testimony related to the time when he wrote the letter, not to the time when he received the contract to be signed.

After what we have said but a few words need be added with regard to the parol evidence offered. Milliken says that when he received the blanks he said to the chief of the stamp division that he presumed the only changes from the former contract were those contained in the letter of April 25, was answered, "That is all," and thereupon afterwards executed the contract without reading it. If this were undisputed and had come from anyone authorized to bind the Government, still, whatever effect, if any, it might have upon an undisclosed

insertion, it would afford no ground for complaint at an omission, especially an omission of the paragraph we have discussed. The answer was true in letter and spirit, and in no degree warranted the inference that the blanks contained the disputed clause. The petitioner executed those blanks without any ground whatever for assuming that they contained anything which they did not, even if Milliken had been right in what he says he supposed to be the import of the notice of April 25.

Finally, there is not a particle of evidence that the contract was not drawn just as the United States, through its representative, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, intended that it should be, and for this reason again reformation must be denied. It is true that Milliken testifies that the Secretary of the Treasury admitted to him that the contract with the American Imprinting Company was in violation of the contract with the petitioner. But it is left doubtful, at least, whether the Secretary knew anything about what contract was intended to be made. The act of March 3, 1899, c. 424, 30 Stat. 1090, 1091, authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to procure certain stamps by contract, to be awarded under such terms, restrictions, and regulations as might be prescribed by the former with the approval of the latter. But that it not sufficient to warrant an assumption that the Secretary gave directions or had knowledge as to the intended form of the contract. Moreover, so far as appears, the Secretary did not suggest or admit that there was any mistake in the form of the instrument. It would seem that Milliken exhibited to him the notice of April 25 as containing the Government's agreement, and that the Secretary fell in with Milliken's interpretation of the paper, but refused to do anything until the Commissioner of Internal Revenue returned. For all the reasons which we have stated, we are of opinion that the United States is entitled to a decree as matter of law.

VOL. CCII-12

Decree reversed.

Statement of the Case.

In re LINCOLN, PETITIONER.

202 U. S.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

No. 21, Original, Submitted April 23, 1906.-Decided May 14, 1906.

Where petitioner's term of imprisonment has expired, but under the sentence he is still subject to confinement until a fine of $100 and costs has been paid, and nothing in the record shows whether such fine has been collected on execution as authorized by the sentence, but if not collected or collectible the petitioner can shortly be discharged on taking the poor debtor's oath, the case is practically a moot one, upon which the time of this court should not be spent.

Conceding the full jurisdiction of this court in habeas corpus, and although

the writ has been granted, in view of the special circumstances therein involved, in a case similar in some respects to the one at bar, it is a question in every case whether the exercise of that jurisdiction is appropriate. The ordinary procedure for correction of errors in criminal cases by writ of error should be pursued unless special circumstances call for a departure therefrom; and so held in regard to a petition for habeas corpus of one convicted in a District Court of the United States for selling liquor to Indians in Indian country who could and should have proceeded by writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals.

THE petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the District of Nebraska on an indictment charging that he did "wrongfully and unlawfully introduce into Indian country, to wit, into and upon the Winnebago Indian Reservation, a reservation set apart for the exclusive use and benefit of certain tribes of the Winnebago Indians, certain spirituous, vinous, malt and other intoxicating liquors."

Upon this conviction he was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and the costs of prosecution and to be imprisoned in the jail of Douglas County, Nebraska, for the term of sixty days and until said fine and costs were paid. The imprisonment commenced on February 19, 1906. Without pursuing his remedy by writ of error the petitioner on April 2, 1906, filed in this court his application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the United States has no police power or jurisdiction over the Winnebago Reservation, and that the law under which the

indictment was drawn is unconstitutional and void in so far as it applies to the said Winnebago Reservation, and that the United States District Court was wholly without jurisdiction in the premises. The indictment was found under the act of Congress of January 30, 1897. 29 Stat. 506. April 30, 1906, the case was submitted on petition, return and a stipulation of facts.

Mr. Thomas L. Sloan and Mr. Williamson S. Summers for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The sixty days named as the term of imprisonment had expired before the case was submitted, and indeed had almost expired before the application was made for the writ. There is nothing to show whether the fine and costs have been collected upon execution, as the sentence authorizes. If not so collected and if they cannot be collected, then, though possibly still in jail, he can shortly be discharged on taking the poor debtor's oath. Rev. Stat. § 1042. This section authorizes a discharge after a confinement of thirty days on account of the non-payment of fine and costs. So that within ninety days from February 19, the time the sentence took effect, the petitioner can secure his discharge either by paying the fine and costs or by taking the poor debtor's oath, as above stated.

In Ex parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378, which was an application for a writ of habeas corpus, it appeared that before a return to the writ could be made, or other action taken, the restraint of which the petitioner complained would terminate, and it was held that the application for the writ should be denied. Indeed the case at bar in principle is not unlike Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651; New Orleans Flour Inspectors v. Glover, 160 U. S. 170; Kimball v. Kimball, 174 U. S. 158, and Jones v. Montague,