Argument for Respondent. least so far as the reported decisions disclose. All of the cases assume, and in some cases it is expressly stated, that the right to frame a charter must be exercised under and in accordance with the procedure set forth in the constitution. People v. Gunn, 85 Cal., 238; Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal., 204; Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash., 17; State v. Field, 99 Mo., 352; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo., 458; State, ex rel., v. Scales, 21 Okla., 683. In Ohio only a few provisions of the constitution have been passed upon by this court in respect to the question of whether or not they are self-executing. These decisions will be supplemented by authorities from other jurisdictions which may be of assistance in passing upon the question involved. Lamb et al. v. Lane, 4 Ohio St., 167; Kulp v. Fleming, 65 Ohio St., 321; Middletown Natl. Bank v. Toledo, A. A. & N. Ry. Co., 197 U. S., 394; Older v. Superior Court, 157 Cal., 770; Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kans., 569; Tuttle v. Natl. Bank, 161 Ill., 497; Lewis v. Lackawanna County, 200 Pa. St., 591; Commonwealth, ex rel., v. Harding, 87 Pa. St., 343; Morley v. Thayer, 3 Fed. Rep., 737; Roback v. Taylor, 2 Bond, 36; Austin v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 45 Tex., 234; Brown & Co. v. Seay, 86 Ala., 122; State, ex rel., v. Spokane, 24 Wash., 53; Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va., 58; Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y., 345. Mr. Scott D. Kenfield and Mr. A. J. Freiberg, also submitted briefs on behalf of respondent. Opinion of the Court. SHAUCK, C. J. We understand it to be conceded that prior to November 15, 1912, when the constitutional amendment set out in the statement of the case became effective, the councils of municipalities were without authority to use public moneys for the purpose of establishing and operating moving-picture shows. Certainly the absence of plain statutory authority therefor denotes its absence. As the city of Toledo had existed and flourished from its founding without a municipally-owned attraction of that character, the declaration of the second section of the ordinance that it is an "emergency measure" must be taken to mean that it is a measure for which there is now supposed to be opportunity. The case of the relator requires it to maintain the two propositions that without action by the general assembly or the electors of the city its council may "exercise all powers of local selfgovernment," and that the suggested mode of entertainment is within those powers. Both propo sitions are denied. Brief attention to the history out of which this amendment arose will aid materially in understanding its form and some of its provisions and in answering some of the questions which the present case presents for determination. The first half-century of our statehood, as was universally conceded, had demonstrated the necessity for uniform legislation upon the subject of corporations, both municipal and private, in order that there might be a system of corporate law. This was a recognition of the very great importance of opportunity to know what the law is. Such uniformity was in terms required by the constitu tion of 1851. Opinion of the Court. Thereafter municipalities rapidly increasing in size and numbers attracted the attention of lobbyists whose schemes were not always acceptable to each other nor to a majority of legislators, and resort was had to a scheme of acts of limited operation, though in a form assumed to be general, whereby the practical operation of the requirement was weakened and finally so far annulled that the municipal law of the state was without form and much of it was void. By the year 1902, the situation was recognized as intolerable and the full operation of the constitutional requirement was restored. Throughout the ensuing decade, that requirement was respected by all departments of the government of the state; municipal credit was greatly improved, and it became apparent that every city in the state had a much better government than any had before. But progress toward the perfection of the uniform municipal code was slow. It was retarded partly, at least, by differences in the suggestions of natural persons who control or desire to control the exercise of municipal power. These were said to be differences in the needs of different municipalities. Many believed that the differences were altogether subjective and in no sense objective. There was, too, a belief entertained by many disinterested persons that the form of government devised was, at least in many of the municipalities, too expensive and that it added unnecessarily to the burden of taxation. It resulted that in framing the amendment now under consideration, influence was exercised both by those who believed that the best results could be obtained by continuing to Opinion of the Court. unite the intelligence and activity of the state upon a further improvement of the General Code and by those who believed that more satisfactory results could be reached by conferring upon the electors of different municipalities a larger influence in establishing the instrumentalities for their local government. Full authority for this statement is found in the provisions of the article. By the first and second sections municipalities are classified as cities and villages, and the legislature is peremptorily required to pass general laws for their organization and government. On the 15th of November, when the article took effect, such laws were already in force, and they continued to be in force, operating upon every municipality in the state until a change should be effected in some mode authorized by the amendment. This conclusion results necessarily from the familiar doctrine of Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607, where it was held that the new constitution of the state (that of 1851) created no new state. It only altered in some respects the fundamental law of a state already in existence; and even this was done pursuant to the prior constitution, under whose provisions the convention was called and the new constitution framed. It follows that all laws in force when the latter took effect, and which were not inconsistent with it, would have remained in force without an express provision to that effect: and all inconsistent laws fell simply because they were inconsistent; in other words, all repugnant laws were repealed by implication. The conclusion also results from the express provision of the general schedule to the present amendments: "All Opinion of the Court. laws then in force [when the adopted amendments took effect] not inconsistent therewith shall continue in force until amended or repealed." It follows that on the 15th of November the government of every municipality in the state remained unchanged. But the amended article authorizes the electors of a municipality to secure some immunity from the uniform government which it perpetuates as the primary status of all municipalities, and to entitle their municipality "to exercise all powers of local self-government." We have heard and read much discussion of the cases upon the self-executing capacity of constitutional provisions. The rational rule upon the subject clearly deducible from the decided cases is that such provisions are, or are not, self-executing according to their nature and terms. Much of the discussion in the cases cited relates to constitutions which perform the function heretofore regarded as appropriate of locating the powers of government and defining the modes of their exercise. From that source but little argument can be drawn to affect the interpretation of an instrument so largely legislative as is this. It is also to be observed that questions respecting the self-executing capacity of constitutional provisions usually relate to the necessity for legislative action to make them effective. This article provides two modes of securing the permitted immunity from the operation of the uniform laws which the legislature is required to pass. One of them is defined in the second section, and manifestly it is not self-executing, for it expressly authorizes the legislature to pass "additional laws," |