Opinion of the Court.

Concerning the provision in Section 3, Article XVIII (may adopt such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws), the general laws referred to are obviously such as relate to police, sanitary and other similar regulations, and which apply uniformly throughout the state. They involve the concern of the state for the peace, health and safety of all of its people, wholly separate and distinct from, and without reference to, any of its political subdivisions-such as regulate the morals of the people, the purity of their food, the protection of the streams, the safety of buildings and similar matters.

Manifestly, therefore, it was necessary, when the constitutional convention was conferring all powers of local self-government on cities, to provide that, in the adoption of such regulations by any city for itself (police, sanitary and similar ones), they should not conflict with general laws on the subject.

It is a well-settled rule that the body adopting amendments, such as are here involved, will be presumed to have had in mind the course of legislation and existing statutes touching the subjects dealt with. People, ex rel. Jackson, v. Potter, 47 N. Y., 380, and cases cited. The legislature of Ohio in the codifications adopted by it, covering many years, including the last one adopted, has included a separate title, designated by it "Police Regulations," in which it has included the general laws of the character we have above described. If it had been intended that the limitation should comprise the wide and elastic scope contended for, it would have been so expressed.

Opinion of the Court.

We think it clear that the regulations referred to in Section 3 are such and such only as we have indicated, and that it would be contrary to the import of the language and to the intent of the framers of the amendment to hold that by this clause there is denied to cities the authority to adopt charter provisions concerning the manifold subjects within the field of proper municipal activity, unless they are "not in conflict with general laws" on the subjects proposed to be dealt with.

Such a holding would disregard the purpose of the people in making the amendment. If the construction indicated is a correct outline of the extent of the authority conferred in Article XVIII, then the constitutional grant would seem to be a vain and empty thing, of no actual value.

There has been a new distribution of governmental power. The distribution has been made by the people. This court held in Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 608, "The constitution did not create the municipalities of the state, nor does it attempt to enumerate their powers." But during the life of the constitution of 1851, until the amendments, our cities exercised only such powers as were granted to them by statute. All agree that Article XVIII was adopted for the purpose of changing that condition and of materially adding to the governmental status and power of our cities and villages.

And yet under legislative control they had as much real power as is conceded to them by the construction contended for, by which they would be compelled to run all of their acts in the channels fixed by the general assembly.

Opinion of the Court.

The experiences which created the public sentiment that led to the adoption of this amendment are well understood and they are not confined to Ohio.

The admiration that has been everywhere excited for the work of the founders of our national and state governments has been justified by their service.

The general powers of each were well defined. But the municipal governments were not SO favorably initiated or developed.

Existing before the institution of our system and without any constitutional definition of their powers, they fell by a sort of passive consent, and because it was deemed wise, under the control of the state legislatures.

The ever-increasing needs and importance of urban populations were attended by a remarkable series of legislative makeshifts in the effort to meet these conditions, with results not at all satisfactory.

It would seem to be evident that the administration of municipal affairs is a matter that is purely practical and local, wholly without important connection with the policies, partisan and otherwise, which naturally affect the operations of the national and state governments, but by reason of the procedure followed the government of cities has been largely determined and controlled by these extraneous influences.

Inefficiencies and imperfections of admitted and disquieting importance have long been too apparent in the conduct of these local affairs of the people.

Concurring Opinion.

That which is called the municipal problem is and has been for many years a matter of serious concern to students of our institutions. It is natural that these imperfections and inefficiencies should be attributed to the system under which they have occurred, and it is also natural that the people should desire to try the experiment of bringing these governments closer to themselves.

However, the business of the court is to ascertain from these amendments what the people intended by their adoption-what changes have been made. Their wisdom is not the concern of the court. Impressed with these admonitions we have arrived at the result stated, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

WANAMAKER and WILKIN, JJ., concur. SHAUCK, DONAHUE and NEWMAN, JJ., dissent.

WANAMAKER, J., concurring. In the main I heartily concur in the opinion by Judge Johnson in support of the judgment of this court. There are, however, additional reasons that to my mind are not only pertinent but paramount in arriving at a just and sound conclusion in this case. These I shall briefly set forth in the following opinion:

"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government"-this is the cornerstone of home rule for Ohio cities. Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution 1912.

Any farmer, workingman, business man, banker, physician, clergyman or any layman with average intelligence in English, understands the clear,

Concurring Opinion.

comprehensive and complete grant of power included in the above words. Some lawyers and judges seem to have serious doubt about it.

However, if these words stood alone the opposition reluctantly concede that their their scope and dimensions would allow the city of Cleveland under its charter the right and privilege of selecting its own officers in its own way.

Certainly to the average mind "all powers" of local self-government means "all powers." It is hard to realize that "all" may mean only "some," "part," "a fraction" or anything less than "all." The words are so simple and so clear in the general grant that there is neither right nor occasion for doubt or interpretation.

The opposition to the city's right under its charter so to select its own officers have abandoned all objections hitherto urged save that the general sweeping grant of power expressed in the words "municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government" is cut down by two qualifications or limitations in the constitution itself: First, the last half of Section 3, Article XVIII, which reads: "and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws;" and second, Section 7, Article V, "All nominations for elective state, district, county and municipal offices shall be made at direct primary elections or by petition as provided by law," etc.

Now to the first objection. In every municipality there are three kinds of governmental power now being exercised: federal, state and