My purpose in this recitation is to make the point that S.J. 71, if adopted, would return us to a simpler and far less expensive way of funding transitions both as to President and Congress.

Surely the burden on the taxpayers would be far less if the Presidential transition occurred in about two weeks, as compared to the present assembling of huge staffs, consultants and paperwork over a period of 2-1/2 months.

Likewise, the earlier transition to a New Congress, a week or so after the election eliminates the present almost farcial, situation over two months or so of a District with two Congressmen, one going out with no interest in unfinished business and one coming in with no authority to take on responsibilities.

Much the same can be said of outgoing and incoming Senators (with all due respect!)

While I personally favor a single seven year term for Presidents, this is not addressed by S.J. 71. The amendment before you, if adopted, would, I think, have a far better chance of public acceptance, via the State Legislatures than would a proposal for a single Presidential term of whatever length.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before my old Committee and to stir the fronds of memory.

I have found, paraphrasing Vergil, that it is pleasant to remember these things.

"Et forsans haec olim memminisse iuvabit."

Senator HATCH. We are going to call our next witnesses to the witness table, and then have a short recess for just a minute or two.

For our next witnesses, we will invite two distinguished gentlemen to appear on a panel. They are John W. Macy, Jr., presently a private consultant on public administration and formerly Director of the Civil Service Commission during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Mr. Macy later served as Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency during the Carter administration. And the second member of the panel is Harrison Wellford, an attorney presently in private practice in Washington, DC, and formerly an important leader of the Carter administration transition teams in 1976 and 1980.

Both of these men are well qualified to speak on the subject matter of this proposal, Together they represent extensive handson experience in Government service and I feel very strongly that the subcommittee is very fortunate to have them here with us today.

So we will first hear from Mr. Macy and then from Mr. Wellford, but if we could take about a 2-minute recess for me to be able to spend a second in the back room, we will do that and within 2 minutes I will come back.

[Brief recess.]

Senator HATCH. Mr. Wellford is not here yet. We will call the committee to order, and should Mr. Wellford come in, I hope he will immediately take his seat at the table. If not, we will listen to you and then we will go to our next panel.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN W. MACY, JR., NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

SERVICE CORPS, AND HARRISON WELLFORD, ESQ.

Mr. MACY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am appreciative of your gracious introduction. I am pleased to have an opportunity to express myself on this Senate Joint Resolution No. 71, because I have been a participant in and a student of Presidential transitions since the Truman-Eisenhower changeover more than 30 years ago.

My attention has been directed primarily to the serious difficulties faced by newly elected Presidents in staffing their key appointments at the beginning of a new administration.

From my experience and observation, the transition period between the election and the inauguration is both too long and too short. It is too long because governmental leadership in matters of foreign and domestic policy is in virtual suspense for 77 long days. Whereas the outgoing President has constitutional responsibility until his successor takes the oath of office, the impact of his decisions is shortlived and serious matters tend to be deferred until the new President assumes office. Response to emergencies has been tentative and lacking the conviction necessary for national leadership. On the other hand, the incoming President is reluctant to reveal his policy hand until he has powers of execution. History records that, even with the best intentions, the successor and predecessor have difficulty in achieving a meaningful level of communication during this period.

But the period is too short, as it is presently used, to recruit, select and prepare the President's team of key players who will form the character of the new administration. Unlike the parliamentary system where a shadow cabinet has been formed within the opposition, there is no administration-in-waiting to join the newly elected President and provide him with policy development assistance and to accomplish the execution of existing statutes. The mere process of search, selection, clearance, investigation and confirmation consumes a large portion of the time span of the transition even if the incoming President has reached preliminary arrangements with respect to the top members of his team. Including cabinet officers, subcabinet officers, agency and commission heads, the new President must fill at least 300 critical vacancies at the earliest possible time.

The magnitude and nature of this Presidential problem have recently been studied by the National Academy of Public Administration and the findings published under the title "America's Unelected Government, Appointing the President's Team." I was one of the collaborators in the development of that report. Following a review of the historical experience of the past Presidents in the selection of these officers, the study examined the steps in the process, the problems of recruiting and retention, the obstacles of conflict of interest, and concluded with a series of twenty-two recommendations for possible improvements in the performance of this Presidential function. The following recommendations are particularly relevant in considering the significance of the proposed amendment in connection with staffing the Presidency. Even without the earlier date for assumption of office, the study urges an early start in the exercise of appointment responsibility. The essentiality of such an early start would be magnified if fewer days were available.

In recommendation 6 it is proposed:

As soon as possible after his party's nominating convention, each major party candidate for the presidency should designate a staff to begin preparations for personnel selection and to serve as the liaison on personnel issues with the incumbent administration. Funds in the federal transition act should be allotted specifically for this purpose.

In recommendation 7 this theme was further emphasized:

To assist new Administrations in identifying highly qualified candidates for presidential appointments, the national committees of the Democratic and Republican parties should each develop and maintain a permanent, up-to-date talent bank. This should be made available to the party's presidential candidate immediately after the nominating convention.

Such a talent bank, whether maintained by the national committees or some other body, could be useful to an incoming administration only if it contains the names of candidates with genuine and abundant substantive qualifications for the job a President must fill.

In recommendation 8 the transition process would be facilitated: Steps should be taken immediately to prepare a set of briefing papers for new Administrations that identify all of the steps formally required to effect a presidential appointment. These written materials should be gathered by the management side of the Office of Management and Budget and made available to every major candidate for the presidency.

This action would correct the existing condition where an incoming administration must acquire basic information de novo because of the absence or unavailability of materials from the predecessor administration.

Finally, in recommendation 9:

As a first priority during the transition period, the President's personnel staff should establish a (fixed) timetable for interlocking political, investigatory, and conflict-of-interest clearances for its appointees. These should be carefully designed to minimize delay in the clearance process.

The adoption of these recommendations, with an even more accelerated schedule of advance planning and action, would be absolutely necessary to permit a new President to assume office with any operational effectiveness by the 20th day of November.

In view of the serious policy hiatus under the present system, the proposed timetable revision is highly desirable. The inaugural date was changed from March 4 to January 20 in 1937 in recognition of governance deficiencies in the original constitutional schedule in light of the need for critical policy decisions and of more rapid means of transportation and communication. Today there is need for a further tightening in the transition of governmental power in a volatile and rapidly changing world where the factors of space and time impose a true sense of urgency. In supporting the enactment of the resolution, I urge recognition of the necessity for earlier, more expeditious and more professional processes to assure that the President assumes office with the wisdom and talent of his supporting team.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Those are my brief observations with respect to the proposed amendment, and I reiterate my support for its favorable treatment.

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Macy. I will have some questions for you in just a second.

Mr. Wellford, let's turn to you. Happy to have you here.
Mr. WELLFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I probably have to leave in 5 minutes, going over to the Senate. I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement follow your statement.

Senator HATCH. Without objection, we will place that in the record at that point.

Mr. Wellford.

STATEMENT OF HARRISON WELLFORD

Mr. WELLFORD. Thank you. My name is Harrison Wellford, I am a partner in the law firm of Wellford, Wegman, Krulwich, Gold & Hoff here in Washington.

In 1976 and in 1980 I served as coordinator of Presidential transitions focusing first on the White House and the Executive Office of the President in 1976, and then on the executive branch as a whole in 1980.

I want to commend the committee for giving a close look at this important subject. Transitions have been happening in this country almost every 3 years for the last 20 years, but they have been remarkably little studied. The primary study, initiated by the Brook

ings Institution, dealt with transitions that are very different from those that we have experienced in the 1970's to the 1980's.

So I think the committee is dealing with an important topic and one that I feel honored to have the opportunity to address.

The Presidential transition period is a unique phenomenon in American Government; it is unique in its duration, the scope of the change involved, and generally, in the absence of partisanship that the participants have shown. At the best, these transitions are peri ods when citizens of good will put aside partisan passions and work constructively to manage the transfer of power. But because they involve a possible question about who is actually in charge of that power, transitions are also periods of potential peril during which allies and enemies alike can be uncertain as to who is speaking for the U.S. Government.

Through a combination of dumb luck and good will among participants, we have managed to muddle through transitions very well since the first transition from George Washington to John Adams a couple of hundred years ago.

But our pride in the harmony with which power has been transferred in this country should not blind us to the fact that transition is inherently a period of potential peril for our government in the world. The 6-month duration of the transition-3 months for the old team to withdraw and 3 months for the new team to get confirmed and fully assume power-is an astonishingly long period for the leadership of the world's greatest democratic power to be in flux.

To understand the importance of that statement, you have to compare our situation to the European parliamentary democracies. In Europe only a handfull of senior policy positions change hands during the changing government, but in the United States the entire policy superstructure of the Federal Government, thousands of professionals in hundreds of agencies, is replaced in a few months.

This degree of change is unprecedented among the Western allies.

Transition staffs in the last 10 years have become bureaucratic behemoths which no longer put the President-elect's needs first and which, by their confusing and cloudy mandates, create new dangers for an already unstable period. One reason the transition process has gotten out of control is the one the committee is focusing on, and that is the question of whether or not the transition period lasts too long.

While pushing inauguration day up 2 months, to November 20, to me seems impractical for reasons I will discuss in a minute, there is no doubt in my mind that the period should be shortened, perhaps to a mid-December date.

I support a shortened transition period for the following reasons-let me just go through these briefly, and then I will take your questions.

First, an early inaugural would narrow the window of vulnerability, especially in foreign affairs, when uncertainty as to who is in charge may encourage adventures by our enemies while at the same time undermining the President's will to act in a crisis.