Admittedly two factors simplify transitions in parliamentary regines. One is the limited number of government positions available for political appointment. The other is the requirement (in most cases) that the cabinet be chosen from the parliament and the consequent prior existence of a 'shadow government.' Nevertheless the possibility of a swifter transition in our polity deserves serious exploration. This is all the more the case because of the noxious consequences of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963. That act was designed to institutionalize the process of transition from one administration to another. In practice, it has transformed that process into a bureaucratic monstrosity. Formerly the transition was handled by modest presidential staffs with expenses met by the national committee of the victorious party. The 1980-81 transition involved 1200 people as well as $2 million granted under the Transition Act and an additional $1 million or so (no one can be sure, since the Presidential Transition Foundation refuses to open its records) raised and expendeprivately. The Transition Act has not only contributed to the weakening of the role of the political party, but it has encouraged all forms of pre-inaugural bureaucratic jostling and infighting. The case seems to me strong for the repeal of this Act. For nearly two centuries American Presidents managed to succeed each other without making a big production of it. Cutting the interregnum from ten to two weeks would avoid the costly sprawl of transition bureaucracy that marked the 1980-81 changeover. It would relieve Washington more papidly of the spectral presence of a vanishing administration. It would minimize the dangerous period of policy void that paralyzes domestic decisions and invites trouble in world affairs. Most beneficial of all, it would compel presidential candidates to assemble their teams and plans in advance of the election. In these days, when hyped television spots have driven out the policy speeches other of /times, the disclosure of prospective cabinets and programs would do something to restore substance to campaigns and to offer voters better evidence on which to make their decisions. The case against the proposed amendment is that it would not leave incoming Presidents enough time to figure out their policies and their major appointments. But if a new President has not figured out his policies and his major appointments before the election, he hardly deserves to be President. The proposed amendment, by enforcing on presidential candidates the discipline of advance planning and by reducing the post-election period of national impotence, could not but have a stimulating effect on responsible politics. I strongly urge that this amendment receive the committee's most thoughtful consideration. (PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, VOL. 13, FALL 1983) THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION: by JAMES P. PFIFFNER Associate Professor of Political Science I. Introduction and functions a President performs. In order to achieve his policy goals a President must first gain control of his major tools of power: legislation, the budget, personnel, and administration. This article will analyze the early experience of the Reagan administration in its attempts to gain control of the government in these four crucial areas. It will ...conclude that in achieving its legislative and budget goals the administration's careful planning and consummate political skills can serve as a model for future transitions. This is not to assert that it gained these goals with no costs to other priorities. Early personnel choices by the administration put a heavy emphasis on personal loyalty to Ronald Reagan. .This was done at the cost of professional experience and the ability of many chief executives to choose their own management teams. The personnel process involved a Electoral mandates are made, not born. What a President does after his election and in his first several months in office sets the tone for his administration and may determine whether or not he is able to deliver on his campaign promises. While President Reagan's transition was **marked by some successes and some failures, he took office under a favorable set of circumstances. No major domestic or foreign crises were pending, and the U.S. hostages had been returned from Iran. The nation had elected him in a landslide victory and had presented him with the first Republican Senate in several decades. Although the electorate had spoken emphatically, it had not articulated its preferences very precisely. The analysis of public opinion polls showed that the public did not necessarily support the conservative goals or drastic budget trcuts the Reagan administration had prom-veries of clearances that helped assure that ised, though it did want increased defense. ge-mpending, reduced taxes and overall reductions in spending.' * But in an important sense electoral mandates are made in office, not born in the election. President Reagan pursued his policy priorities in his early months in office and received positive approval ratings in opinion polls. The electoral "mandate" was an opportunity to lead the country in the direction he wanted to go, and he took that opportunity to accomplish much of what he had set out to do in his first eight months in office. The goals of any presidential transition are to take over the government in order to direct national policy toward the priorities of the new President. This article will focus on the transition of governmental power rather than on the many other roles 623 all bases were touched, but this was done at the cost of time. Subcabinet personnel appointments dragged on into the summer of 1981. at the cost of administrative leadership and managerial direction. This extended the period of bureaucratic drift that is involved in any change in top leadership. This article will also examine the view from the bottom up, that is, what happens in the bureaucracy during a period of presidential transition. II. The Lame-Duck Eleven Weeks Policy direction and control can come to a presidential administration only after the inauguration on January 20th. But the groundwork for the takeover of power must begin well before November, and be under way in earnest immediately after the election. The foundation for the tran 624 | PRESIDEntial studies QUARTERLY sition is laid during the lame-duck eleven weeks between election and inauguration. As the outgoing administration ties up loose ends, the President-Elect scrambles to put together a governing team, and the bureaucracy slips into neutral gear while it awaits its new bosses. The Outgoing Administration After the election new policy initiatives stop as agencies become reluctant to make agreements that may become moot on January 20. The outgoing administration is usually sensitive to the need to give the incoming President as clean a slate as possible. On the other hand, there is a flurry to complete those policy decisions well underway so that they cannot be easily reversed by the new people. One example of this was the litigation over the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE), the professional level entry examination that had been challenged in court as discriminatory. The Justice Department and the Office of Personnel Management were handling the case, and in the final days of the Carter administration, negotiated a consent decree that committed OPM to develop Civil Service entrance examinations that did not have a discriminatory impact on minority groups. While the outgoing Carter officials felt they were minimizing the cost to the government and still upholding the spirit of non-discrimination, the Reagan people felt they made an eleventh hour deal that committed the government to a form of reverse discrimination. A major concern of all newly elected administrations is that the outgoing administration will attempt to seed the bureaucracy with its own people, either to save their jobs or to leave behind people sympathetic to the old and hostile to the new administration's goals. One way this can be done is to have people who entered the government as political appointees converted to career status in the Civil Service or to career Senior Executive Service appointments. In the past this could be done wholesale and was called "blanketing in." It occurred when a President staffed a new agency with officials from his own party, and then issued an executive order that put the personnel of the new agency under the jurisdiction of the merit system and under Civil Service rules. The next administration thus could not throw out the political appointees upon taking office, and could remove them only for cause through cumbersome Civil Service procedures. Most presidents since the Pendleton Act was passed in 1883 to World War II engaged in this practice to a greater or lesser extent. This option is no longer readily available to presidents, but individual political appointees can try to immunize themselves from being ousted by the next administration by getting for themselves "career status" with all the attendant procedural protections of the Civil Service. This maneuver is called "burrowing ́in.” On January 4, 1980 OPM sent out FPM (Federal Personnel Manual) Bulletin 273-18 to remind agencies that during election years they ought to "carefully review all personnel actions to be certain they meet all civil service rules and regulations and also that these actions are free of any stigma of impropriety." The bulletin urged agency personnel directors to review carefully any actions that would place incumbents of positions in the excepted service in the competitive service.' In a follow-up Operations Letter to OPM officials on September 17, 1980 it was reiterated that "before any competitive staffing action is initiated involving a conversion of an excepted service employee" it should be ascertained that there is a "bonafide vacancy" and that, "In no instance should vacancies be announced solely to convert an excepted service employee to a position in the competitive service." Despite OPM policy there were some attempted conversions of political appointees to the career service. OPM investigated 43 conversions in three agencies during the transition period and concluded that 13 were improper. Conversions are legitimate if there is a genuine competitive selection process or if the employee had a prior competitive service appointment. Not all conversions are attempts to "burrow in." The General Ac THE CARTER-REAGAN TRANSITION | 625 counting Office did an investigation of conversion cases during the transition period that covered four additional agencies. While it found no improper conversions, it found that sothe attempts were made but stopped by OPM or the agency's personnel monitoring system. The GAO report suggested that a more comprehensive monitoring system be instituted for future presidential transitions.' While the problem of potential conversions from political to career status is a serious one, the number of such attempts during the Carter-Reagan transition was small, and the OPM monitoring system seemed to pick up most improper actions. President Carter named Jack Watson his deputy for the transition. On November 10 Watson sent a memo to cabinet and agency heads reminding them that the purpose of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 was to provide for the orderly transfer of the executive power.” He admonished those preparing materials for the incoming transition teams not to innundate them with excessive detail or unsolicited advice. "Our guideline is simply to be helpful and forthcoming in every way possible, without burying the new people under mountains of briefing books and paper. ." Thus the official presidential line was to be as helpful as possible to the incoming administration. There were, however, some undercurrents advocating the minimum of help and cooperation. These probably reflected attitudes of individuals who still felt bitter about the campaign or who received less than full cooperation in the transition from the outgoing Ford administration four years earlier.' On November 12, 1980 Watson sent out another memo reminding heads of departments and agencies that the President wanted to give the new administration "appropriate latitude" in filling career SES vacancies or making transfers. Since the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act prohibits new agency heads from transferring career Senior Executives until 120 days after taking office, the memo instructed that "the President expects all department and agency heads personally and carefully to review all recommendations for new SES appointments and transfers of career SES employees between now and January 20, 1981." In addition to this the director of OPM had been carefully monitoring all new SES appointments for the last several months of the Carter Presidency to avoid even the appearance of improper political appointments to the career ranks. In this period some entirely legitimate personnel actions were held up or cancelled in order to eliminate any hint of partisan personnel actions. On December 10 a Watson memo requested letters of resignation from presidential appointees who expected to leave the government by January 20, although it pointed out that resignations were not technically required until requested by the new administration. It also asked for draft letters of appreciation from the President to the appointees and for the names of the officials who would be acting in positions the presidential appointees left.' Some of the final acts of the Carter administration were to decide which political appointees were to get what type of gift as a token of appreciation for service in the Carter administration. The Reagan Transition Bureaucracy The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 provides that in order "to promote the orderly transfer of the executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of the office of a President and the inauguration of a new President" that the Administrator of General Services (GSA) provide office space wherever the President-Elect wants as well as staff, travel, communication and printing expenses. The Act, as amended in 1976, provides $2 million for incoming administrations and $1 million for the departing President." While in 1976 President Carter returned $300,000 of his allotment to the treasury, the Reagan administration used the full $2 million plus another million in private funds. When asked about the amount spent by an administration advocating lower government spending, deputy director for transition administration, Verne Orr, replied "The dollar just doesn't buy what it did four years ago." 9911 While President-Elect Nixon chose to run his transition from the Pierre Hotel in |