their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and fur ther distant, one from the other; and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less eliptical, and so its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence of the least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it ́would have done; which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the least particle may, for aught we know, have such effect on something in the constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the mind at a certain time, than otherwise would have been; which, in length of time, (yea, and that not very great) might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind. And so innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.

Another argument, which the forementioned author brings against a necessary determination of the Divine Will, by a superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the freeness of God's grace and goodness, in choosing the objects of his favor and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits. Page 89, &c.

In answer to this objection, I would observe,

1. That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom, than to suppose it determined by chance, and that his favors are bestowed altogether at random, his Will being determined by nothing but perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever; which must be the case, as has been demonstrated, if volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a wise end.

2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines the Will of God, in the choice of the objects of his favors, be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is not so great à manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessity of supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his favors on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the merit of the object of God's favor, or a moral qualification of the object attracting that favor and recommending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination of the act of God's goodness, to answer some wise designs of his own, some end in the view of God's omniscience. It is God's own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his volition.

3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts from wise designs in determining the particular subjects of his favors. None will say, I presume, that when God distinguishes, by his bounty, particular societies or persons, He never, in any instance, exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether, in these instances, God's goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all? And whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness? And if so, who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction's being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not? It is very manifest, with respect to the Apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a Christian and an Apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The Apostle himself mentions one end. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16. Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might shew forth all long suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on Him to life everlast

ing. But yet the Apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe,

4. Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of God's Will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favor, that, in many instances, this meral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs and inclinations of his goodness; being more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others; the inclinations of Infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God's sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another.

One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the necessity of the acts of God's Will; and that is, that something much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to fatal necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they oppose. For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subor dinate; I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any pur poses or decrees of his, about them. And if so, they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his, and independent on them, and to which his volitions must be subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's Will, arising from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessedness of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and entirely in

dependent on these things, and which they have no hand in, because they are prior to them; and which God's Will is truly subject to, he being obliged to conform or acccommodate himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every thing he does in his disposals and government of the world; the moral world being the end of the natural; so that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy the Supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his Will; and really subjects the Will of the Most High, to the Will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them.

SECTION IX.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes GOD the Author of Sin.

IT is urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions, or their necessary connexion with antecedent events and circumstances, makes the first cause, and supreme orderer of all things, the author of sin; in that he has so constituted the state and course of things that sinful volitions become necessary, in consequence of his disposal.

Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will,* cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this opinion of the necessity of the Will" absolves sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world, upon God, and upon his Providence, if that were admitted by the assertors of this fate; whether he himself did necessitate them to do these things, or ordered matters so, that they should be constrained to do them by some other cause." And the doctor says, in another place,† "In the nature of the thing, and in the opinion cf philosophers, causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est. In things necessary, the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient. And in this case the reason is evident; because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden, being a defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause of that deficiency."

Concerning this, I would observe the following things.

I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing pe culiar to this scheme; it is no difficulty or disadvantage, wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of Arminians ; and, therefore, not reasonably objected by them.

Dr. Whitby supposes, that if sin necessarily follows from God's withholding assistance, or if that assistance be not giv en, which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil; then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From whence, according to what he himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: He must be the efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God has so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assistance from them, that they are incapacitated for doing good, and determined only to evil. Our doctrine, in its conse

*On the Five Points, p. 361. + Ibid, p. 486. Ibid, p. 302, 305.