sake of argument to be correct) is not such as to demand an answer either because, as stated, it does not contain some essential element necessary to the right, or because (2) the right is avoided by some fact contained in the bill avoided itself, or because the bill is multifarious, scandalous or impertinent.

(Scandal is any matter which it is not becoming the dignity of the Court to hear or which reflects on a party. Impertinence consists of needless prolixity, as setting forth deeds in haec verba. Multifariousness is the allegation of matters entirely distinct and unconnected, or the introduction of parties having no interest in the subject matter or decree.) 3. Plea, which is either (a) affirmative, in the nature of a special answer setting up and relying on one or more facts not alleged in the bill as a cause why the suit should be delayed, dismissed or barred; (b) negative, denying one or more facts set up in the bill as a cause why the suit should be delayed, dismissed or barred; and (c) anomalous, reasserting and relying upon some fact stated in the bill and which is therein impeached and denies the facts and charges relied on as a ground for impeachment.

(A plea must be supported by an answer when, (a) the complainant admits the existence of a legal bar, and alleges some equitable circumstances to avoid its effects and interrogates as to these circumstances and (b) when the complainant does not admit the existence of a legal bar and states some equitable circumstances which may be true, and to which there may be a valid plea, together with other circumstances inconsistent with the substantial validity of the plea, and interrogates as to the latter circumstances.)

4. Answer, which is the response of the defendant to the interrogatories contained in the bill. Generally speaking, however, an answer is the pleading in which the defendant takes up the allegations of the bill, paragraph by paragraph, and replies thereto, either by way of plea, demurrer or disclaimer.

Exceptions to Answer is the method whereby a complain

ant objects to the sufficiency of the defendant's answer, either in matters of form or substance.

A decree is the sentence or judgment of the Court pronounced after the hearing or submission of the cause. Decrees are (a) interlocutory, pronounced for the purpose of ascertaining matters preparatory to final decree; and (b) final, pronounced for the purpose of fully deciding and disposing of the whole merits of the cause and reserving no questions or directions for the future judgment of the Court.

A motion is an interlocutory application by or on behalf of a party to the suit. A petition may be preferred by one a party to the suit or not. These proceedings relate to the amendment of pleadings, appointment of receiver and other matters which may arise after the filing of the original bill, and independent thereof.

JURISDICTIONAL RULES.

I.

EQUITY HAS NO JURISDICTION WHERE THE REMEDY AT LAW
HAS ALWAYS BEEN PLAIN, ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.

(1) The foregoing rule lies at the foundation of the system of equity jurisprudence. Equity does not create rights which the common law denies. It had its origin as we have seen in the necessity for specific, and more effectual, remedies for wrongs and injuries where the law either gave no substantial redress, or, by reason of the special circumstances of the case, the redress given was inadequate and practically unavailing.

(2) It is not enough that there is a remedy at law; in order to exclude equity, it must be "as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity."

Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet., 210, 215; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S., 79, 95; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S., 505, 514; Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S., 375, 400.

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The remedy must be plain; that is, neither doubtful nor obscure.

It must be adequate; that is, it must not fall short, in any material particular, of the right to which the party is entitled. It must be complete; that is, it must be able to secure the right of the party in every particular at the present and for the future.

Teft v. Stewart, 31 Mich., 367; Frue v. Loring, 120 Mass., 507; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall., 74; North v. Peters, 138 U. S., 271 ; Pom. Eq. Jur., Sec. 180; Riley v. Carter, 76 Md., 581, 597; Scarborough v. Scotten, 69 Md., 137, 140

(3)

EQUITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS.

(a) The Constitution of the United States declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."

This has been held, from the beginning, as preserving the distinction between common law and equity as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. "The remedies in the courts of the United States are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of State courts but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles." (Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat., 212, 223. See Equity Rule 90.)

The Judiciary Act of 1789 declared that suits in equity should not be sustained in any case where "plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”

The Supreme Court has held to the strict observance of this rule and has often refused to follow the practice of the State courts under statutes extending jurisdiction in equity to cases formerly cognizable only at law, save in special cases where the general subject matter is of an equitable character or founded on some recognized ground of equity interposition.

Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S., 451; Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S., 106; Lindsay v.

>

Shreveport Bank. 156 U. S., 485, 493; Whitehead r. Shattuck, 138 U. S., 146; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S., 338; Langdon . Sherwood, 124 U. S., 74; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S., 15; Wehrman . Conklin, 155 U. S.. 314; Buzard. Houston, 119 U. S., 347; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall., 466; Thompson v. R. R. Co., 6 Wall., 134; Hipp e. Babin, 19 How., 271; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet., 210; Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69, 89; Osborne v. M. P. Ry. Co., 147 U. S., 248, 258; N. Y. Guaranty Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S., 205, 214.

(b) Ordinarily, the want of jurisdiction in equity, when not apparent on the face of the bill, must be brought to the attention of the court by plea or answer. (Wylie v. Cox, 15 How.,

415, 420.)

But the court may, of its own motion, dismiss a bill for want of jurisdiction when, from the allegations, or the proofs, it is plain that there is no proper case in equity.

Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall., 466; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall., 211, 228; Allen v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. S., 658, 662.

Where, however, the subject matter is one within the general scope of the jurisdiction in equity, the objection that there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, in the particular case, must be made in limine.

Reynes . Dumont, 130 U. S., 354, 395; Hollins v. Briarfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S., 371, 380; Merwin Eq., ?? 104-109.

A decree, therefore, in such cases, or in one where, the question being made, the court has erroneously determined that it had jurisdiction, is binding and cannot be impeached collaterally.

Mellen v. Moline Iron Works, 131 U. S., 352, 367.

II.

EQUITABLE JURISDICTION IS, IN GENERAL, NOT OUSTED BY A SUBSEQUENT EXPANSION OF THE LEGAL REMEDY.

(1) Bispham says, upon excellent authority: "If a court of equity has originally assumed jurisdiction over a particular class of cases, it will not, as a general rule, be ousted from that jurisdiction simply because, in the progress of common

law improvement, redress comes to be subsequently attainable at law."

Pr. of Equity, 5 ed., p. 62; 1 Story Eq. Jur., Sec. 64, i; 1 Pomeroy Eq. Jur., Secs. 182, 276, 277; Sweeny v. Williams, 36 N. J. Eq., 627; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S., 417, 449.

(2) Nor will the jurisdiction be considered as ousted by a statute giving a remedy at law. The statutory remedy will be regarded as cumulative unless the contrary intention be expressed or shown by necessary implication.

Darst v. Phillips, 41 Ohio St., 514; Phillips v. Kelly, 12 Or., 213; Sweeny v. Williams, 36 N. J. Eq., 627; Lee v. Lee, 54 Ala., 590; 1 Story Eq. Jur., Sec. 80; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., Sec. 182.

(3) An important exception to the general rule, is, that a court of equity will not now entertain a bill by the assignee of a strictly legal right merely because he cannot bring an action at law in his own name; for the reason that he has a plain and adequate remedy at law by an action in the name of his assignor, to his own use.

Walker v. Brooks, 125 Mass., 241; Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S., 672, 677; N. Y. Guaranty Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S., 205, 214; Glenn v. Marbury, 145 U. S., 499, 508; Notes to Ryall v. Rowles, 2 L. C. Eq., 4 ed.,. pp. 1567 and 1670.

III.

EQUITY JURISDICTION, HAVING ONCE ATTACHED TO A CASE, WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPLETE RELIEF THROUGH THE FINAL ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS INVOLVED.

(1) The prime object of this rule is the prevention of a multiplicity of suits, which is a favorite doctrine of equity.

It means that when its jurisdiction has been invoked, in good faith, for a purpose clearly within its powers, a court of equity will proceed to administer complete and effectual relief though in so doing it may become necessary to determine some questions, ordinarily cognizable alone at law. For example equity has no jurisdiction to award compensation