Bacon et al. v. Howard.

ary liabilities, originating abroad, or the original evidence, testimony, or proof, to establish the same," &c.

On the 5th of February, 1841, "An act of limitations" was passed, the first section of which, after prescribing shorter limitations for other causes of action, declares that "all actions of debt grounded on any contract in writing shall be commenced and sued within four years next after the cause of such action, and not after."

Without criticising the peculiar expressions used in these acts, it is obvious that their policy and object was to bar the prosecution of any claim for money or property at farthest in four years from the time when the right of action first accrued.

Now, the original cause of action, on which the judgment in question was obtained, must have existed or accrued at the latest on the 19th of October, 1840, when judgment was entered thereon in the court of Mississippi. Counting from that date, the action would have been barred on the 19th of October, 1844. But assuming that the time did not commence to run till the 17th of March, 1841, when the act of 5th February, 1841, is said to have taken effect, the action was barred on the 17th of March, 1845.

On the 23d of June, 1845, the Congress of the Republic gave their consent to the annexation of Texas to the United States, and the Convention which formed the Constitution of the State met on the 4th of July of the same year.

It would seem that doubts and apprehensions were entertained that, when Texas became a State of the Union, that section of the Constitution of the United States which prescribed that full faith and credit should be given to the judicial proceedings of each State might have the effect of reviving the claims of creditors in other States, on which judgments had been obtained. To obviate this anticipated difficulty, an act was passed on the 28th of June, 1845, "To prescribe the mode of authenticating foreign judgments, and to limit suits thereon." The fourth section of this act provides: "That all foreign judgments, decrees, and adjudications, upon which suit shall be brought in the courts of this Republic, should the same be of four years' standing and upwards, shall be forever barred and prescribed, unless sued on in sixty days from and after the passage of this act; those under four and over two years, unless sued on in six months; and those under two years, unless sued on in one year: Provided, the original cause of action shall remain unimpaired, and may be sued on at the election of the creditor, subject to prescription."

At first view, this act might be accused of making a very curt limitation, and to be retrospective in its operation. But

Bacon et al. v. Howard.

gave

when it is recollected that it gives a new form of remedy before denied, and that it only continues the rule of limitation to which the cause of action was already subject, and in fact a further grace to the creditor, he has no right to complain. Giving the complainant in this case the most favorable con struction of the act of limitations of 1841, his cause of action was barred on the 17th of March, 1845. The act of June, 1845, took away no existing right, but extended the time till the 27th of August of the same year. It is, therefore, not retrospective in its operation. It confers a favor, though it be a small one. The complainants may have failed to take advantage of it, for the reasons set forth in the bill. But the Legislature has not seen fit to make any saving in the act in favor of distant creditors, and the court cannot interpolate it. The Republic of Texas had the power to prescribe such rules to its own courts as best suited their condition, and their policy cannot be mistaken. Its accession to the Union had no effect to annul its limitation laws, or revive rights of action prescribed by its previous laws as an independent State. It is true, any legislation which denied that full faith and credit which the Constitution of the United States requires to be given to the judicial proceedings of sister States would be ipso facto annulled after the annexation, on the 29th of December, 1845. Thereafter, the authenticity of a judgment in another State, and its effect, are to be tested by the Constitution of the United States and acts of Congress. But rules of prescription remain, as before, in the full power of every State. There is no clause in the Constitution which restrains this right in each State to legislate upon the remedy in suits on judgments of other States, exclusive of all interference with their merits. The case of McIlmoyle v. Cohen (13 Peters, 312) leaves nothing further to be said on this subject.

The 20th section of the 7th article of the Constitution of the State of Texas exhibits the extreme solicitude of her citizens to prevent any misconstruction of their cherished policy on this subject.

It declares that "the rights of property and of action which have been acquired under the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Texas shall not be divested; nor shall any rights or actions which have been divested, barred, or declared aull and void, by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Texas, be reinvested, revived, or reinstated, by this Constitution, but the same shall remain precisely in the situation which they were before the adoption of this Constitution."

The complainant's cause of action had been twice barred before annexatior, and this section of the new Constitution

Christ Church v. The County of Philadelphia.

leaves no room to question the policy of their laws as to a re vival of rights once forfeited by laches.

In a case like the present, where the complainant has been compelled to have recourse to a court of chancery, because the Union Bank no longer exists, in whose name the action of law could be sustained, he is, of course, subject to the same rules of prescription as if he were in a court of law.

We are of opinion, therefore, that complainant's cause of action is barred by the statutes of Texas, and that the matters set forth in the bill to avoid their effect are insufficient.

The judgment of the District Court of Texas is therefore affirmed, with costs.

THE RECTOR, CHURCH WARDENS, AND VESTRY, OF CHRIST CHURCH, IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, IN TRUST FOR CHRIST CHURCH HOSPITAL, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE COUNTY OF PHILADEL

PHIA.

Where it does not appear either by express averment or by a recessary intendment from any matter stated in the case, nor does any entry on the record of the cause in the Supreme Court of the State show, that any of the questions of which this court is entitled to take cognizance under the terms of the 5th section of the judiciary act, arose in the cause and were actually decided by that court, the writ of error must be dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act.

As the decision of the court was, that the record did not show any ground of jurisdiction under the 25th section of the judiciary act, it will be proper to state what that record was.

The acts of 1833 and 1851 are recited in the opinion of the court, and need not be repeated.

The rector and church wardens were assessed for taxes upon several pieces of property, amongst which was the following: Lower Delaware ward, No. 8 Cherry street, Hospital lot, &c., $126.

They paid the tax upon the whole assessment, including the above, under protest, and then brought an action in the State court to recover the amount so paid. The court decided in favor of the defendants. Upon being carried to the Supreme Court of the State, that court reversed the judgment of the court below, so far as respected the tax upon the Hospital lot. The rector and church wardens, believing that the whole of the property ought to be exempted from taxation, brought the case to this court. The question which they intended to raise

Christ Church v. The County of Philadelphia.

was, whether or not the act of 1833 was a contract, irrepealable except with their consent. But the record presented only the following state of facts.

March Term, 1853, No. 145. Docket Entries.

The Rector, Church Wardens, and Vestrymen, of Christ Church, H. M. WATTS. in the City of Philadelphia, in trust for Christ Church Hospital,

v.

The County of Philadelphia.

145.

W. D. BAKER

Summons case ret'ble the first Monday of June, 1853, exit 11th May, 1853.

"Service accepted.'

March 3d, 1854.-Case stated in the nature of a special vervict filed.

April 1, 1854.-Judgment entered without argument for defendants by the court. By writing filed, it is agreed that the above case may be removed by the plaintiffs to the Supreme Court, without any recognizance being given by them. Eo die assignments of errors filed.

April 4, 1854.—Argued.

December 27, 1854.-Reargued.

March 12, 1855.-Opinion by C. J. Lewis, judgment reversed, and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in error for the sum of one hundred and twenty-six dollars, with costs. Eo die opinion filed.

The case was submitted on a printed argument, by Mr. Watts and Mr. Meredith for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Porter for the defendants.

The arguments proceeded upon the ground that the question of impairing the obligation of a contract was raised by the record; but, as the court decided that no such question was properly involved in the discussion, it is thought unnecessary to report the arguments.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under the 25th section of the judiciary act of the 24th September, 1789.

These parties, without any pleadings, stated a case, in the

Christ Church v. The County of Philadelphia.

nature of a special verdict to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, upon which a final judgment was rendered. It appears from the case, that in April, 1833, the Legislature of Pennsylvania enacted: "That Christ Church Hospital, having for many years afforded an asylum to numerous poor and distressed widows, who would probably else have become a public charge, and that, in consequence of the decay of the buildings of the hospital estate, and the increasing burden of the taxes, its means are curtailed and its usefulness limited; therefore, that the real property, including ground rents now belonging and payable to Christ Church Hospital, in the city of Philadelphia, so long as the same shall continue to belong to the hospital, shall be and remain free from taxes."

That in April, 1851, the Legislature of the same State enacted, "that all property, real and personal, belonging to any association or incorporated company, which is now by law exempt from taxation, other than that which is in the actual use and occupation of such association or incorporated company, and from which an income or revenue is derived by the owners thereof, shall hereafter be subject to taxation, in the same manner and for the same purposes as other property is now by law taxable; and so much of any law as is hereby altered and supplied be, and the same is hereby, repealed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to exempt cemetery companies from taxation."

It further appears, in the case stated, that the county of Philadelphia, in the year 1852, caused certain real estate and ground rents of the plaintiffs in the city of Philadelphia, and which were possessed by the plaintiffs before the date of the act first mentioned, to be valued and assessed for taxes, and that the taxes were subsequently paid to the officers of the county, under protest, by them. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover only for so much of the taxes assessed and paid which were levied for property in the actual occupancy of the plaintiff for hospital purposes.

It does not appear, either by express averment or by a necessary intendment from any matter stated in the case, nor does any entry on the record of the cause in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania show, that any of the questions of which this court is entitled to take cognizance, under the terms of the 25th section of the judiciary act, arose in the cause, and were actually decided by that court. Therefore, in conformity with the established doctrine of this court, (Armstrong v. The Treasurer of Athens county, 16 Pet., 282; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. S. C. R. 738,) the writ of error must be dismissed.