MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. Liability for tort-damages.] A municipal corporation is liable in dam.
ages for a lawful and authorized act of its agents done in an unauthorized
manner, but not for an unlawful or prohibited act, and is not liable in
treble damages. Hunt v. City of Boonville (Mo.), 299.

2. Negligence — contractor.] A city employed a contractor to construct a
sewer in one of its streets. By the contract, power was reserved to the
city engineer to direct changes in the time and manner of conducting the
work and the contractor was held responsible to indemnify the city for
any damages it should be subjected to in consequence of his neglect ; and
the contractor executed a bond to the city for such indemnity. The
plaintiff was injured by falling into the excavation, carelessly left
unguarded. Held, that the city was not liable to the plaintiff therefor.
City of Erie v. Caulkins (Penn.), 642, and note, 647.

3. Negligence — excavation at side of alley.] A religious corporation made
an excavation inadequately guarded, at the side of a public alley in a city,
for entrance to the basement of their church. The plaintiff fell into it
in the dark and was injured, while attempting to cross the alley. Held,
that the city was liable to him for the injury, although the excavation
was not on the travelled portion of the alley. Niblett v. Nashville (Tenn.),
755, and note, 757.

Assessments for local improvements.] Sve ASSESSMENTS; TAXATION.
Enforcement of mechanics' lien against.] See MECHANICS' LIEN, 80.
Liability of school board for negligence.] See NEGLIGENCE, 414.
Tax on express companies.] See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 382.

NATIONAL BANKS.

Liability as bailee for special deposit.] In accordance with its habit, well
known to the directors, a national bank received from a customer some
bonds for safe-keeping, and the cashier gave a receipt for them. The
bonds subsequently disappeared, but in what manner was not shown, and
the president and cashier assured the depositor that she should lose
nothing, and the interest was paid her for two years. Held, that there
was sufficient evidence of gross negligence on the part of the bank to go
to the jury, and that the bank was liable for such gross negligence of its
officers. First National Bank v. Graham (Penn.), 628.

NEGLIGENCE.

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1. Municipal corporation - defect in street
runaway horse.] The
plaintiff's horse took fright, turned over his buggy, and threw it down
the embankment of the street upon which he was driving, and thus he was
injured. Held, that if the city was negligent in constructing the embank-
ment, in not providing it with necessary railing or other means of protec-
tion, and in not keeping the street in safe condition, and such negligence
was the real cause of the injury (the jury being the judge of these matters
as questions of fact), the plaintiff had a cause of action. City of Atlanta
v. Wilson (Ga.), 396, and note, 398.

NEGLIGENCE - Continued.

2. Board of education — liability for negligence.] A board of education is
not liable in its corporate capacity for damages for an injury resulting to
a pupil while attending a common school, from its negligence in the dis-
charge of its official duty in the erection and maintenance of a common
school building under its charge, in the absence of a statute creating a
liability. Finch v. Board of Education (Ohio), 414.

3. Remote and proximate cause.] An oil train on defendant's railway was
thrown from the track by a recent land slide, and the oil-tanks bursting,
the oil became ignited and ran down into an adjoining creek, swollen by
recent rains, and flowing down the creek, set fire to and destroyed the
plaintiff's buildings three or four hundred feet distant. Held, that even
if defendants were negligent, the damage was too remote to warrant a
recovery. Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. (Penn.), 653.

4. Safe deposit company-evidence.] A safe deposit company for hire
undertook to "keep a constant and adequate guard and watch over and
upon the burglar proof-safe," rented by plaintiff, and to protect its con-
tents from dishonesty of the company's employees. Some bonds which
the plaintiff had deposited in the safe disappeared. Held, that the com-
pany was bound to explain their absence. Safe Deposit Company v. Pol
lock (Penn.), 660.

some eighty feet from
A third person having
help, C approached to
Held, that A was not

5. Excavation on land adjoining highway- trespasser.] A was making an
excavation by contract on the land of B, at a point
the street, and ten or fifteen feet above its grade.
fallen into the excavation at night, and crying for
help him, fell into the excavation and was killed.
liable therefor. Gramlich v. Wurst (Penn.), 684.
6. Contractor-coal hole open in sidewalk.] The owners of a sugar
refinery employed a rigger to remove machinery from a railroad car to
their refinery. In doing the work the rigger opened a coal hole in the
sidewalk, and left it open a few minutes after the work was finished. A
lad fell into the hole and was injured. The rigger was paid by the day,
and the owners of the refinery neither directed nor interfered with the
manner of the work. Held, that they were not liable for the injury.
Harrison v. Collins (Penn.), 699, and note, 702.

Of carrier-injury to passenger in caboose.] See CARRIER, 693.

Of contractor for municipal work.] See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 642.
Injury from breaking of telegraph pole.] See TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 10;
See, also, MASTER AND SERVANT; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; NUISANCE.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

1. Implied warranty of genuineness of negotiable instruments.] One who
sells negotiable bonds impliedly warrants their genuineness, and in case
they are forged, is liable for the return of the purchase money, without
any offer to return such bonds, and although the vendee has resold the
bonds at a greater price. Smith v. McNair (Kans.), 117.

2. Executed by executor-descriptio personæ.] An executor, for an
expense connected with his trust, executed a promissory note in the ordi-
nary form, on interest, adding to his signature the words, "executor of,"
etc. Held, that the executor was liable individually, and not in his repre-
sentative capacity, on the note. Rittenhouse v. Ammerman (Mo.), 215.
3. Note of married woman—surety.] When the note of a married woman
is void for the coverture, the surety on the note is none the less liable.
Hicks v. Randolph (Tenn.), 760.

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4. Indorsement — parol evidence to vary effect of.] Parol evidence is inad-
missible to change a simple indorsement of a promissory note into an
indorsement without recourse. Doolittle v. Ferry (Kans.), 166.

5. Indorsement after maturity.] One who indorses an overdue note, at request
of the maker, in consideration of indulgence by the payee, is liable as a
guarantor. Rivers v. Thomas (Tenn.), 784.

6. Indorsement by stranger- evidence to define his liability.] When A
indorses a note payable to the order of B, at the time it is made, he is
prima facie liable to B as guarantor or maker, as B may elect; but he
may show by extrinsic evidence that his intention was to bind himself
only as guarantor or as second indorser, and thus limit his liability. Bur-
ton v. Hansford (W. Va.), 571, and note, 580.

7. Irregular indorsement

liability upon.] A negotiable promissory note
was indorsed by the payee in the usual position. The defendant had
previously written his name across the back of the note near the other
end, in an inverted position. Held, that the defendant was liable as sec-
ond indorser. Arnott's Administrator v. Symonds (Penn.), 630.

8. Discharge of principal discharges surety.] A surety on a promissory note
may plead in bar to an action on the note, a judgment discharging the
principal on account of the illegality of the note. Gill v. Morris (Tenn.),
744.

9. Revival of liability of discharged indorser.] An indorser, whose liability
has not been fixed by notice, and who, with knowledge thereof, subse-
quently either acknowledges his liability or promises to pay the note, is
bound by such recognition. Bogart v. McClung (Tenn.), 737.

10. Right of accommodation indorser to subrogation.] One who has dis-
counted negotiable paper for the maker cannot be compelled by the
accommodation indorser to resort to collaterals belonging to the maker in
his hands before resorting to him, although the indorser relied on the col-
laterals in making such indorsement; although the holder knew of his
reliance and that the indorsement was for accommodation; although the
proceeds were applied by the holder to payment of other paper of the
maker; and although other parties are in the same situation with the
indorser. The remedy of the indorser is to pay the paper, and demand
and enforce the security. First National Bank v. Wood (N. Y.), 66.
11. Waiver of protest of note after dishonor.] Before the maturity of a
promissory note the holder and the accommodation indorser had some
conversation about extending the time of payment; but no arrangement

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS — Continued.

After

was made. The note was not presented for payment at maturity.
ward the holder and the maker went to the indorser to arrange for an ex-
tension, the maker then asked the holder if he desired a new note, and he
replied that if it was agreed to, he would let the note stand as it was.
The indorser said, "then I will waive protest," and the holder thereupon
agreed to the extension. Held, in an action on the note against the
indorser, that this would warrant a finding that the indorser under-
standingly agreed to continue to be liable, and a nonsuit was errone-
Ross v. Hurd (N. Y.), 1.

ous.

Note of non-commercial firm executed by one partner.] See PARTNERSHIP,
733; BANKS.

NOTES.

Champerty, by attorney, 319.

Constructive fraud, as between husband and wife, 26, 726.

Counsel fees, as damages in libel, 528.

Death, under civil damage act, 518.

Dower, in partnership real estate, 270.

Duty of municipal corporation to keep safe margins of streets, 757.

Exemption from execution of partnership assets, 246.

Insolvency as evidence of fraud in contract of purchase, 504.

Jurisdiction of probate courts, 286.

Liability of stranger indorser, 580.

Liability to pay rent in assigned lease, 494.

Life insurance insurable interest, 327.

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Limiting time of prisoner's counsel in addressing jury, 413.

Obligation of State officers to obey subpoena of grand jury, 678.

Officer de jure, when entitled to salary, 754.

Municipal liability for injury to runaway horse in defective street, 398.

Municipal responsibility for negligence of contractor, 647.

Municipal taxation of farming lands, 639.

Practical location of division lines, 239.

Prisoners as witnesses, 140.

Mechanics' lien on public buildings, 83.

Negligence of contractor, 702.

Satisfaction of statutory penalties, 722.

Shackles on prisoner in court, 116.

Verdict in absence of prisoner, 394.

Waiver of condition in insurance policy, 597, 601.

NUISANCE.

1. Eaves-drip —- contributory negligence.] The defendant so constructed
and maintained the roof of his building, that the water flowed therefrom
upon the wall of plaintiff's adjoining building, and, penetrating it, dam-
aged his goods. Held, that the fact that the defendant's wall was so
openly and loosely constructed, as easily to admit the water, was no
defense to an action for such damages. Gould v. McKenna (Penn.), 705.
2. Corruption of water-course.] The plaintiff purchased a tract of land in
the coal region, and erected a residence upon it. A leading inducement to
the purchase was a pure mountain stream of water running through the
land. The plaintiff constructed a pond for fish and ice upon it, and from
it supplied a cistern, a ram, and a tank in the attic of his house. Subse-
quently defendants opened a colliery on the stream two miles above,
which corrupted the water and spoiled it for plaintiff's uses, killed fish
and shrubbery, corroded the pipes and compelled plaintiff's abandonment
of the water. Held, that plaintiff had a right of action therefor, and
that a nonsuit was erroneous. Sanderson v. The Pennsylvania Coal Co.
(Penn.), 711.

Excavation near highway.] See NEGLIGENCE, 684; MUNICIPAL Corpora-
TIONS, 755.

Telegraph pole in street— injury from breaking of.] See TELEGRAPH COM-
PANY, 10.

OFFICE.

1. Officer de facto-payment of salary to, by county.] County commis.
sioners paid to the county clerk de facto, claiming de jure, the salary of
his office. The title to the office was then in litigation to the knowledge
of the commissioners, and the clerk de fucto was insolvent. Held, that
the clerk de jure, whose title was affirmed, had no cause of action against
the county commissioners for such salary. Commissioners of Saline County
v. Anderson (Kans.), 171.

2. Officers de jure, when entitled to salary.] A city physician was duly
elected, but was prevented by injunction at the suit of the prior incum-
bent, from taking possession of the office, and the latter drew the salary
for some months thereafter. The injunction having been set aside, held,
that the former was entitled to recover salary for that period from the
city. Memphis v. Woodward (Tenn.), 750, and note, 754.

3. Vacancy in constitutional law.] The Constitution of Missouri author-
izes judges to hold office during a fixed term, and until their" successors"
are "elected and qualified." In case of a "vacancy" by death, the gov
ernor is to order a new election. A, a judge, was elected for a term ex-
piring on the first Monday of January, 1875. In November, 1874, B was
elected as his successor, was duly sworn, and was a person qualified for
the office, but two days before the commencement of his term he died.
Held, that A's right to hold over ceased with B's qualification and did not
revive with his death, and that a new election was authorized. State ex
rel. Attorney-General v. Seay (Mo.), 206.