uncertain fractions between him and his grantee. It is more reasonable to suppose that the intention was to follow the center of the main stream, the more especially as a call for the stream or its bank would carry title to the middle thread. A call for half of a stream requires the same construction in order to avoid the like evils. We are the more willing to accept the conclusion in this case, because the evidence leaves no doubt that the owners of the land on the west bank, which has been the site of a mill since early in the century, have always treated the island as an extension of the low land on their side, and the loss in washing has been from their bank.
The decree below will be reversed with costs.
For obstructing levy — who may maintain.]
The agent of a railroad
company obstructed an officer in levying an attachment upon goods
loaded upon one of the trains of the company, and removed the goods
out of the State by running out the train. Held, not to furnish a cause of
action against the company, at the instance of the plaintiff in the attach-
ment. Western Railroad v. Thomas (Ga.), 411.
Against married woman.] See MARRIAGE, 566.
On county warrants.] See COUNTY WARRANTS, 261.
To recover money paid on contract void under statute of frauds.] See
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 351.
When justification of libel, ground of] See SLANDER AND LIBEL, 431.
Sale of real estate by.] See JURISDICTION, 161.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1. Undisclosed principal] Defendant purchased of plaintiff wheat on his
own credit, ordering it to be charged to him, and stating that it was for,
and to be delivered at, the "Blissville Distillery." Plaintiff did not
know the proprietors of the distillery. Subsequently the agent disclosed
the names of the principals, and the plaintiff commenced an action
against them. Held, that whether the principal was disclosed on the
sale was a question of fact, and that the subsequent disclosure and action
against the principals was not conclusive of an election to hold them
alone responsible, but was evidence for the jury on that contested fact.
Cobb v. Knapp (N. Y.), 51.
Declaration of agent.] See EVIDENCE, 13.
Of husband as to wife's separate property.] See MARRIAGE, 88.
Liability of common carrier of.] See CARRIER, 28.
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS
See MARRIAGE, 28.
After discharge on habeas corpus.] See HABEAS CORPUS, 218.
Infant — liability for unintentional assault.] An infant is liable for his torts
like an adult. A charge of unlawful assault by shooting is sustained by
proof of a shooting, and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show an
intention or negligence on the part of the defendant, but it is for the
defendant to show an absence of such intention or negligence. Conway
v. Reed (Mo.), 354.
1. For local improvements — duty of commissioners in making.] Statutes
delegating power to charge the property of individuals with the cost of
local improvements must be strictly pursued, and any substantial depart-
ure from the prescribed formula vitiates the proceedings. Merritt v. Vil-
lage of Portchester (N. Y.), 47.
2. Statutory construction.] Commissioners, appointed by legislative authority
to apportion and assess the cost of a local improvement, were required by the
statute to make oath, before entering on their duties," faithfully and fully
to discharge the duties." The oath taken was that each would perform the
duties" to the best of his ability." In action to restrain the collection of
the assessment, held, that their proceedings were illegal for defect in the
oath. Ib.
8.- J Commissioners, appointed by statute to assess the cost of a local
improvement, were by the statute required after making the assessment
to publish notice of the time and place when and where the parties could
be heard. The notice published was that “all persons feeling themselves
aggrieved must present their objections in writing." Held, that the com-
missioners exceeded their jurisdiction in thus restricting the parties, and
that the objection was not waived by appearing and filing written objec
tions to two reports, which were sent back for correction, a new assessment
being subsequently made with the same requirement for written objec-
tions. Ib.
4. Estoppel.] A party who signs a petition asking for the enactment of a muni-
cipal ordinance for the grading and paving of a street; and who is elected
and acts as one of the commissioners in the performance of the work,
selling the bonds of the city and expending the proceeds in the work,
and in assessing the property benefited, including his own, is estopped
from denying the validity of the act of the legislature by virtue of which
the ordinance is passed or of the mode of assessment thus adopted. Bid
well v. Pittsburgh (Penn.), 662.
Of prospective profits-rights of prior judgment creditor.] An agricul
tural society assigned for the benefit of their creditors the proceeds of a
fair about to take place on their grounds. Held, that such assignment was
void as against the lien of an execution issuing before the payment of
such proceeds to the creditors. Huling v. Cabell (W. Va.), 562.
Check does not operate as.] See BANKS, 55,
ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
Foreign assignment-delivery by mail-comity.] S., a resident of this State
and a creditor of W., who resided in the State of Missouri, prepared and
sent to W., for execution, a deed of assignment to himself, in trust of all
the debtor's property, real and personal, situate in this State, “for the
benefit of all his creditors, under the insolvent laws of Ohio," which deed
W duly executed and placed in a post-office in the State of Missouri,
addressed to S. in the State of Ohio, who received the same by due course
of mail, and immediately entered upon the execution of the trust. Held,
the assignment was complete and effectual to pass title to the assignee,
from the time the deed was placed in the post-office, as against subsequent
attaching creditors. Johnson v. Sharp (Ohio), 529.
Action for obstructing levy — who may maintain.] See ACTION, 411.
Power of, by wife to husband.] See MARRIAGE, 38.
Agreement to compensate attorney-interest in non-assignable cause of
action.] A having sustained personal injuries by the negligence of B,
employed C as attorney to sue therefor, upon the agreement that C was
to have a certain proportion of any recovery for his compensation. C
notified B of the arrangement. The suit was brought, and C settled with
A, and obtained his release. Held, that such release was a bar to the
action. Coughlin v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (N. Y.), 75.
Champerty.] Although champer tous contracts are void, yet, as it is an essen-
tial element of such a contract that the attorney is to contribute to the
expenses of the litigation, an agreement merely, that the attorney is to
receive, as compensation for his services, a portion of the subject-matter of
the litigation, is not champertous. Duke v. Harper (Mo.), 314, and note,
319.
AUTREFOIS ACQUIT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 390.
|