Mr. BECKER. I see what you mean. We discussed here, probably a month ago, isn't it, sort of a trainer or an incompleted plane without a weapons system.

Secretary MCNAMARA. An incomplete weapons system, yes, sir.
Mr. BECKER. An incomplete weapons system.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Mr. BECKER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman-one other thing. We don't continue the B-58?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; we are not proposing any funds for the B-58.

Mr. BECKER. None at all?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. The initial

The CHAIRMAN. The B-52 and the B-58 are not being increased in numbers.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Mr. BECKER. Are not being increased in numbers.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The B-47 will ultimately phase away.

Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, at the conclusion of your statement the Chairman raised some questions about the personnel figures that were mentioned in your statement.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. As increases beyond those which were proposed in the January budget.

Now, I would like to know what is the relationship between the strength when you get these augmentations and the current strength of the services?

Now, for instance, you are getting a 5,000 increase for the Army over the January proposal.

What does that mean as compared to the present strength of the Army?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will have to consult the detail tables on

that.

Let me say this: We are overstrength today in certain of our forces.

My recollection is the Army is one of those. The plans previously made will bring that strength down the levels recommended by the previous budget by the end of the fiscal year, and the increases we are proposing, therefore, represent a real increase above the levels that would otherwise have been attained.

Mr. HARDY. They represent real increases above the levels which were proposed, but there will still be considerable reductions below present day levels; isn't that right?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The last figures I have, which are for the 28th of February of this year, and which strengths were being pulled down by the lower draft calls in the spring of this year, were 874,600 for the Army. So that your point is correct, that the 875,000 figure, which I believe is what we are recommending in total-870,000 per the old request or the previous plan plus the 5,000 addition-is approximately what is shown here.

However, as I mentioned, the draft calls had been reduced. Action had been started previously, by the previous administration, to pull

this strength down by the end of the fiscal year to a level approximating the 870,000 figure, and that action is continuing because it couldn't be changed immediately.

Furthermore, the new strength is planned for new operations not previously considered and it will be necessary to pull this strength down from the old operations to permit the new. The doubling of the antiguerrilla forces is a good illustration of that.

Mr. HARDY. Well, the thing I was trying to understand-I believe you have about cleared that up-is that actually you apply the projected strength figures that were involved in the January budget and just change them to compensate for the changes in the program which you have made in this.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; you are quite correct. We did accept the foundation of the January budget and increased it to take account of the proposals we have made here today-the doubling of the antiguerrilla force, the 10 additional POLARIS submarines, the additional ground alert, and the additional Navy and Marine airborne alert units.

Mr. HARDY. So to the extent there were any reductions in the personnel strengths in the January budget, those conditions would still remain?

Secretary MCNAMARA. With the exception that the actions we took to close or terminate or reduce operations at 73 bases and installations will supply additional personnel over an extended period of time, which personnel can't-they were not planned upon previously and which personnel can be utilized to overcome some of the deficiencies that you referred to.

Mr. HARDY. But didn't you take those into account in these adjustments that you were making?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; because those personnel savings will not accrue sufficiently early to assist us in accomplishing the specific changes proposed here today.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now, another question. I think it was on page 14 of your statement that reference was made to stepping up production of missiles, MINUTEMAN particularly.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Now, isn't a key problem in the timing there with respect to the MINUTEMAN launchers as well as even more so than the missile itself?

Secretary MCNAMARAA. Bases and fixed installations on the ground. You are quite correct, that they are a very important element of the system and a long lead item, but they are not as long a lead item as certain of these production facilities. Therefore, the action which we are proposing to the committee, to double the production facility, that is, double the production capacity, is the longest lead item. It will permit further increases in the MINUTEMAN with construction requirements to be presented in fiscal year 1963 if such additional production of MINUTEMAN appears desirable at that time.

Mr. HARDY. But we still won't be able to really build up our striking ability until we get into a construction program for the launch sites?

Secretary MCNAMARA. You are absolutely-you are quite correct. Roughly, the leadtime is on the order of 22 to 27 months, which

means that the additional missiles would not be in place before the latter half of [deleted].

Mr. HARDY. Well, I have thought that we had previous testimony indicating that the problem at the moment was not so much the capacity for producing the missiles as it was for building the launch sitesthe platforms.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is right, of the first squadrons of MINUTEMAN. But very quickly those problems will be resolved and the later squadrons, certainly beyond the number we are proposing here, will depend almost exclusively for their early emplacement on the production capacity of the plants producing MINUTEMAN and the components thereof.

Mr. HARDY. One other question.

The CHAIRMAN. And the launching site program will come in in [deleted].

Secretary MCNAMARA. If it is-

The CHAIRMAN. If the missile turns out satisfactory?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; and if it is concluded that additional MINUTEMAN missiles are desirable.

The CHAIRMAN. Then could you build the bases and the launching pads to keep up with the production of the missile itself?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir. The additional production capacity that we are speaking of here would become available in time to support an operational unit in the latter half of [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Secretary MCNAMARA. And the construction required for units to be placed in operation in the latter half of [deleted] could be approved as part of the fiscal year 1963 budget, if,

as I say, it seems desirable to add to the MINUTEMAN strength at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HARDY. Now, what production capability is going to be involved here that would have any usefulness if we don't accelerate the production of the MINUTEMÄN missiles?

Secretary MCNAMARA. None. I say none. There is a slight amount, but basically the answer is none.

Mr. HARDY. Well, the reason this question comes up, Mr. Secretary, a few years ago when there was some argument between the THOR and the

The CHAIRMAN. JUPITER.

Mr. HARDY. And the JUPITER, we proceeded on $30 million plant construction to build the THOR when we already had the capacity for building JUPITERS as fast as we could possibly build launch sites. Secretary MCNAMARA. (Nods.)

Mr. HARDY. And some of us were a little bit dubious about the way we were doing that, but we did that. And we built the number of THORS that were scheduled at the moment, and so far as I know the plant has no usefulness after we got through with those THORS.

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I comment just briefly on this point? The additional production capacity produced, a production capacity which represents a doubling of the presently planned capacity, from a rate of [deleted] per month to [deleted] per month can be accomplished at a very small price in relation to the total cost of such capacity; that is to say, $36 million for a 100-percent increase in production.

That is simply an insurance premium we are recommending to the committee at this time. We do not at today's meeting recommend specific use of that. If it is not used, in a sense the money has been wasted.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you. Now, you made reference also to the need for more practice firings both of POLARIS and MINUTEMAN. Secretary MONAMARA. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Presumably the production of missiles to be used for practice firings would represent costs which did not involve such things as the ship or the

Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely.

Mr. HARDY. Or the launch site?
Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely

Mr. HARDY. Now, would a comparison of those costs give us a true comparison of the cost of the missiles?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, not really. If you would like to have a comparison of the cost of the missiles, I can give you a comparison today inclusive of installation costs. And if you later wish cost comparisons exclusive, I would be happy to supply that to you.

Mr. HARDY. Well, I have been trying to get some comparative costs that I could get my teeth into and understand.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the best figures that I have foundand I will be happy to give them to the committee right now-include the cost of installation. Because this is a normal part of the force requirement.

And on that basis the figures are these, and I will give you these from memory and we can check later. But I believe they are approximately

correct:

Exclusive of installation costs, [deleted] million per missile for the MINUTEMAN.

[Deleted] million per missile for the POLARIS.

[Deleted] to [deleted] million per missile for the TITAN II.

Mr. HARDY. Well, is that presuming only one firing from your costing installation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, with a slight qualification, that it includes the cost of the spares that go along with the single missile to be fired.

Mr. HARDY. Well, of course, when you are talking about [deleted] million for the POLARIS, I don't know-there must be a pretty high percentage of that that is involved in the submarine itself.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would guess close to 85 percent is involved in the submarine itself.

Mr. HARDY. Well, when you fire a POLARIS from a submarine, you don't have the effect of creating the same sort of damage to the launching platform as you do when you fire a MINUTEMAN, do you?

Secretary MCNAMARA. So far as we know, the damage to the launch silo of the MINUTEMAN will not be extensive following firing.

I think the likelihood of using such a silo again is not very great. In the sense that if you conceive of the circumstances under which we would be attacked and would respond to the attack by a MINUTEMAN operation, the subsequent firings from those same silos I would think would be highly problematical.

Mr. HARDY. Presumably, your test firings of POLARIS at least would be from the submarine and you wouldn't have involved your heavy damage, would you?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Oh, for test firings, the costs are quite different than those I have given you because certainly in those circumstances we should include only the cost of the missile. The best figure I can give you today for that—and I can refine this if it will help you-is approximately [deleted] per POLARIS missile and approximately [deleted] per MINUTEMAN missile, for missiles to be used for test-firing purposes. These costs do not include any of the costs of the silo in the case of the MINUTEMAN or any of the costs of the submarine in the case of the POLARIS.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. Your mentioning of the B-52 and the B-58: I noticed on your schedule here on page 9 you show the-not page 9. No, on page 17 you show B-52 and B-47. You show no B-58's. Is it true that they are not going to be kept on alert?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir.

The number of B-58's in the inventory was rather small, and that is the only reason for leaving them out.

There are approximately [deleted] I believe, in the inventory at the present time.

Mr. BRAY. Are you building any more B-58's?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir. The B-58's are being built at the present time, and the total operational strength will build to a level of approximately [deleted], I believe, during the latter part of the next calendar year, at which time the production terminates, under the previous plans which we are not proposing any change to.

Mr. BRAY. Then you will build no bombers beyond that date? Secretary MCNAMARA. There are no bombers scheduled for production, no heavy bombers scheduled for production, beyond the latter part of calendar 1962.

Mr. BRAY. Is the B-58 called a heavy bomber, or is that a medium? Secretary MCNAMARA. It is called a medium bomber.

Mr. BRAY. And you are manufacturing no bombers as replacements as they go out of the inventory?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct.

Mr. BRAY. Then we will at a reasonably short period of time see the end of the manned bombers?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Unless additional production of some bomber aircraft is planned, and we have several possible aircraft under consideration."

Mr. BRAY. Of course, the B-58 is the farthest advanced of any of the new bombers because it is now in operation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir. However, it is now in operation and it is certainly the latest plane that has proceeded from the development stages into production as a heavy bomber, or medium bomber. But it lacks certain of the desirable features that I think could be associated with an advanced bomber; particularly it lacks the ability to carry the HOUND DOG and the SKYBOLT, both of which