COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

87TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

CARL VINSON, Georgia, Chairman

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[No. 10]

H.R. 6151, TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT,
MISSILES, AND NAVAL VESSELS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, April 11, 1961.

The committe met at 10 a.m., Hon. Carl Vinson (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let the committee come to order.

Members of the committee, this is still an executive session. What we will discuss today is highly classified.

Now this morning we will start a hearing on H.R. 6151, a bill which I introduced yesterday, authorizing the appropriation of $11,874,800,000 for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels for the three military departments. Each member has a copy of the bill before him and can see how this sum is broken down for each of the three departments.

In view of the very fine posture hearings which we recently concluded, I do not think that these hearings on procurement should take any great amount of time.

However, we are going to look into each authorization most carefully.

We all know the kinds of material and weapons which the military services are procuring or intend to procure. The only thing we have to do now is to see exactly how many of each of these items the departments want to acquire and how much they will cost. We may agree with them or we may disagree with respect to particular items and certain phases of the bill.

Now, we will hear the Secretary of Defense this morning. And I am glad to say that I had the opportunity of reading this statement; I carefully read it last night, and I recommend the closest attention be paid to the Secretary's statement, which contains a wealth of information, and is clear, simple, and direct. I hope there will be full attendance in all these procurement hearings, since we must all remember that we have to write a bill at the conclusion of the hearing, get a rule on it, and then take it before the House.

It is the largest authorization bill every submitted to the Congress. And it places a very great responsibility upon all members of the committee. We must pay close attention and do a good job.

(The bill is as follows:)

[H.R. 6151, 87th Cong., 1st sess.]

A BILL To authorize appropriations for aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That funds are hereby authorized to be ap

(1235)

propriated during fiscal year 1962 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: Fos the Army, $211,000,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $1,585,600,000; for the Air Force, $3,287,000,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: For the Army, $550,800,000; for the Navy, $606,400,000; for the Marine Corps, $27,000,000; for the Air Force, $2,792,000,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: For the Navy, $2,915,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, the committee will be delighted to have you present the views on behalf of the three departments.

Later on, after you have finished your statement and members have had an opportunity to examine your remarks, why then we will call each one of the procurement services to break down the authorization.

It will not be necessary for you to stay here during all that time. I think you have other important matters to attend to. So we will excuse you after we finish with you here today.

Now, members of the committee, now pay close attention to what the Secretary has to say, in his very, very fine statement. It will give you more information than you have ever received before.

You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, gentlemen, for the length of the statement. However, I felt that the changes being proposed were so significant and important that you would wish to have a complete statement of the pros and cons affecting each of them.

When I appeared before your committee on February 23, I informed you that we had started a preliminary reappraisal of the fiscal year 1962 defense program and budget, as directed by President Kennedy. The results of this reappraisal have been incorporated in the President's special message on defense, transmitted to the Congress on March 28. We are now prepared to discuss the proposed changes in the detail which your committee will need for its consideration of H.R. 4362, the bill now before you.

This is the first time that Department of Defense witnesses are appearing before this committee in support of a request for appropriation authorization for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and ships as required by section 412(b) of the Military Construction Act of 1959. I am sure we can work out the necessary procedures to facilitate the consideration of the defense program and budget by the Congress under this new section of the law.

The general considerations and the principles and policies underlying the amendments to the fiscal year 1962 program and budget were outlined by President Kennedy in his special message to the Congress on March 28. I would, however, like to underscore certain of the points he made in that message.

The proposed changes to the January defense program and budget are based on a preliminary reappraisal of our defense posture. They deal only with the most urgent and important problem areas in which

we feel action at this session of the Congress could significantly improve our defense position in the near future. We did not attempt to review every item in the budget transmitted to the Congress in January. Such a comprehensive review must await a complete reappraisal of our basic national security policies, plans and d programs, the results of which may not be fully available for submission to this session of the Congress.

We think this is a reasonable approach to the problem. Our predecessors did a very thorough job in preparing their fiscal year 1962 proposals. But we clearly differ with their emphasis in several important areas and in these areas we have recommended a number of major revisions. Where we do not now have a sound and sufficient basis for change, we recommend that the January budget requests be permitted to stand. Meanwhile, we shall continue to study the 1962 program and budget. If further changes are found to be essential, we shall propose them promptly to the Congress during the current session.

The changes in the defense program proposed by the President are the product of a cooperative effort on the part of all agencies of the executive branch concerned with national security. Within the Department of Defense itself, we have employed, in addition to the regular staff machinery, a number of special task groups to look into particular aspects of the program. Each of these task groups operated under the direction of a senior official and included representatives of the Military Services, the Joint Staff, and all other elements of the Department having an interest in that particular study. Throughout the course of the task groups' work, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs were kept informed. As the studies were completed, I personally reviewed the results in detail with both the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to have the benefit of their advice and counsel.

The final changes recommended by President Kennedy do not provide everything that everyone would like to have. Based on your own long experience in defense matters, I think you would agree that such unanimity is seldom, if ever, achieved. But I do believe it is fair to say that the President's recommendations reflect a consensus of the principal military and civilian officials of the Department of Defense. No doubt there is room for differences among reasonable men as to what constitutes the optimum combination of programs for the Nation's defense. All I can say is that we have carefully examined all of the principal alternatives and have selected that combination of programs which we believe will give the Nation a fully adequate defense at the least cost, in the light of the threat as we view it today.

We are keenly aware of the heavy burden the Defense program places on the American taxpayer. In arriving at the changes recommended in President Kennedy's message, we have endeavored to make savings wherever possible by eliminating programs and activities no longer deemed essential. But these actions are just the beginning of our efforts to achieve a more efficient and a more effective Defense Establishment. We are fully determined to continue our efforts to seek out and eliminate waste, duplication, and unjustifiable expenditures. We, as you, believe that the people of this country are entitled to a full measure of defense for every dollar spent.

I. STRENGTHENING AND PROTECTING OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENT

The problem of deterring an all-out nuclear war has been greatly complicated by the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles into the arsenal of our major adversary in the world struggle. Only a year or so ago the principal general war threat to our security was a surprise attack by large numbers of nuclear-armed manned bombers. A year or two from now our principal concern will be a surprise attack by large numbers of nuclear-armed ICBM's.

The problem of securing our strategic deterrent forces against a large-scale manned bomber attack was acute several years ago; it is still serious today. But it pales by comparison with the problem of defending against an ICBM attack. Preparations for a surprise manned bomber attack are difficult to conceal. Air bases cannot be easily hidden; the staging of large numbers of manned bombers for an attack cannot be readily disguised. Furthermore, the comparatively long-elapsed time from launch to strike and the relatively low speed of bombers allow many opportunities for detecting and attacking the invading aircraft. But the relative ease with which an ICBM can be concealed, the suddenness with which it can be launched, the speed with which it can reach its target, and the very small size of the attacking vehicle all make the task of detecting, tracking, and destroying the incoming warhead a technical problem of unparalleled difficulty. Thus, the shift of the threat from manned bombers to intercontinental ballistic missiles opens up a host of entirely new problems.

Today our strategic forces are fully adequate to carry out their assigned tasks. But as our principal antagonists acquire a large and ready force of ICBM's which could be launched with little or no warning, the problem of preventing the destruction of our forces on the ground becomes much more difficult. Essentially, there are two major approaches available to us: (1) develop forces which can be launched within the expected period of tactical warning; (2) develop forces which can ride out a massive ICBM attack.

The feasibility of the first approach is heavily dependent on timely and unambiguous warning. While we can be reasonably sure of timely warning, we cannot in the persent state-of-the-art be wholly sure of unambiguous warning. In the case of the manned bomber, this uncertainty presents some serious, but not necessarily critical, problems. The bomber can be launched under positive control and then ordered to attack its target only after the evidence of an attack is unmistakable. But, a ballistic missile once launched cannot be recalled. Yet, unless the missile is deployed in a mode which gives it a good chance to survive an attack, it too must be launched before the attack strikes home (i.e., within the relatively brief tactical warning time) or risk destruction on the ground. I need not elaborate on the dangers of this situation.

Accordingly, in reevaluating our general war position, our major concern was to reduce our dependence on deterrent forces which are highly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack or which rely for their survival on a hair-trigger response to the first indications of such an attack. Conversely, we sought to place greater emphasis on the second approach the kind of forces which could ride out a massive nuclear attack and which could be applied with deliberation and always under the complete control of the constituted authority.