of punishment. It operates unequally upon the poor and the rich, and seems too much like the selling of criminal licenses. The only equal punishment is a deprivation of liberty, which is of very nearly the same priceless value to every citizen. But in this respect, Ohio does but fall in with the universal practice. We should like to see the experiment made of abolishing pecuniary penalties altogether. That those who have abused their civil liberty, no matter what their standing, should be for a time. deprived of it, seems to be a peculiarly appropriate retribution. But the time has not yet arrived for so great an innovation.

In regard to civil matters, the commmon law is our guide, unless superseded by legislation. Down to the year 1806, we had a statute expressly adopting the English common law, and all statutes in aid thereof, prior to 1607. Since the repeal of that statute, the authority of the common law rests upon general consent. Our courts feel themselves bound by it whenever it comports with the spirit of our institutions. When this is not the case, they have not hesitated to overrule it.

Of all the branches of the law of property, that which relates to real property has here undergone the greatest change. It has been simplified to a degree almost incredible. We have no hesitation in saying that it could be written in one tenth part of the space required by the English law on the same subject. To show that this assertion is not extravagant, we shall mention a few particulars.

The first legislation over this territory was the celebrated Ordinance of 1787. Mr. Dane, its author, could well appreciate the opportunity which was here offered of trying a bold experiment. He knew with what a tenacious grasp the doctrines of the feudal system, which had been brought over by the first emigrants, adhered to the soil in which they had once taken root; and he resolved that the citizens of this region should be guarded against them in the outset. Accordingly he inserted a few sweeping provisions concerning the title, descent, and transfer of land; the consequence of which is, as he has himself said, that our land titles are more truly republican, and more completely divested of feudality, than any titles in America were at that time.

The doctrines of tenure do not here exist even in theory.

We derive our titles directly from government, but we hold them by absolute ownership. So far as we know, there is not in our land system, a single doctrine deduced from the ancient notions of tenure. Our titles are in the strictest sense allodial.

The Statue of Uses, with its long train of consequences, we have never adopted. Of course we know no distinction between Uses and Trusts. But we have adopted one of the modes of conveyance to which that statute gave rise, namely, bargain and sale. And this is the only conveyance we have ever used. Accordingly, the cumbrous law of Feoffments, Fines and Recoveries is entirely dispensed with. The same is true of livery of seizin and all its consequences. It is a settled principle with us that the execution and delivery of the deed completes the conveyance to all intents and purposes, without either a livery of seizin by the grantor, or an entry by the grantee.

Entailments and Perpetuities, are prevented by a statute rendering void all limitations beyond persons in being and their immediate issue; and providing that an estate tail should become a fee simple in the heirs of the first grantee.

All joint interests in land are reduced to tenancies in common. Joint tenancies have never had an existence.

And coparceners are now placed on the same footing, in every respect, as tenants in common.

Real actions, with their thousand technicalities, have never had an existence. The only action we use for the recovery of title or possession of lands, is the action of Ejectment, which we make a universal remedy. The fictions made use of in this action have not yet been laid aside. We are still guilty of the flagrant absurdity of employing fictitious persons, when the real parties would, in every respect, answer the purpose much better, since then a judgment would be conclusive. But there is good reason to believe that this evil will be soon reformed; for there is a growing disposition among our legislators to take counsel from reason instead of precedent; and her counsel is to do away with all legal fictions, and substitute the real truth in their place.

Our limitation to the action of Ejectment is twenty one years; and in cases of disability, only ten years after the re

moval thereof. Titles, therefore, are soon quieted; and long dormant claims are in no danger of being brought forward, after the real facts connected with them have been forgotten.

But our system of remedies in regard to real property would have been incomplete, if some method had not been devised to dispossess refractory tenants and intruders upon land, more speedily than can be done by the action of Ejectment. This desirable object has been effected, by the action for forcible entry and detainer, which is made triable by a jury of six men, before two justices of the peace; and by means of which, the party may obtain his writ of possession in less than twenty days.

Aliens are allowed the same rights in regard to real estate as citizens; and thus the questions concerning alienage which have elsewhere given so much trouble, are here put forever

at rest.

It was a hard doctrine of the common law, which compelled a man, who had been making improvements upon land, supposing he had a good title, to lose the value of his improvements upon being evicted by a person having a better title. But this hardship is entirely done away by our statute for the benefit of occupying claimants. The privilege of this act is extended only to those occupants who have an apparently good title, and not to squatters and intruders; and it gives the person who shows a better title, his option, to take the land and pay the occupant for the improvements, or to receive the naked value of the land without the improvements, and release his claim to the occupant. It is not easy to conceive of a law more perfectly equitable than this.

On the subject of waste, our law is equally liberal. The severe penalty of forfeiture and treble damages is not enforced. The party who is guilty of waste is made answerable in simple damages, as in justice he ought to be, and no more; with the single exception of a tenant in dower, who forfeits the place wasted, but not the treble damages. In regard to dower, the only peculiar feature of our law is, that the widow is dowable in the equitable as well as legal estate of her deceased husband. And the whole subject of dower is made cognizable in chancery. It may be added, that, if dower be not sooner assigned, the widow is allowed to remain one year, instead of forty days, in the family mansion, without charge,

In regard to descent, the only peculiar provisions of our law are, that bastards can inherit and transmit inheritance, from the mother; that the children of persons who afterwards marry, thereby become legitimate; and that the annulling of an illegal marriage does not render the children born during the marriage illegitimate. But we still retain that most absurd and unreasonable doctrine, that husband and wife shall be the last persons to inherit from each other; that is to say, those persons who sustain the dearest and most intimate of all the relations in life, are postponed for the most remote relative; and only permitted to inherit from each other, when the property would otherwise escheat to the state.

In regard to Wills, the only remark which occurs, is, that no person under age is allowed to make a will; but all adults, except idiots and lunatics, and not excepting married women, can make a will.

In regard to rent, we have never adopted the tyrannical proceeding by distress. The only cases in which distress is allowed are in the collection of taxes and canal tolls. The landlord must collect his rent in the same manner as he would any other debt. This makes the subject of rent in Ohio a very simple matter; for most of the common law distinctions grew out of this remedy by distress.

These points have been selected, from among many others which might be mentioned, for the purpose of showing not only the extent to which our law of real property has been simplified; but also, that, as a whole, it is as liberal and equitable as it is simple. Let us now advert to some other topics.

We have some salutary provisions in regard to pleading and evidence, which serve greatly to facilitate the attainment of justice, in despite of technicality. For example, no plea in abatement is allowed without an affidavit of its truth, unless it be to the jurisdiction of the court, or where the truth of the plea is manifest from the record; and there is no parol demurrer for infancy. We are thus protected from that most unjustifiable abuse in judicial proceedings, the putting in pleas for the sole purpose of delay.

Again, we have a provision allowing the defendant in all cases, instead of putting in a special plea, to plead the general issue, with a notice of the special matter. How many cases

are thus prevented from stranding on the shoals of technicality, and allowed to be decided on their real merits, must be obvious to every one who reflects on the subject.

Again, in actions founded upon negotiable paper, we have an exceedingly salutary and trouble-saving provision, namely, that whether the defendant be the drawer or endorser, the plaintiff shall not be required to prove his signature, unless he first deny it under oath. Now where claims are sent from a distance, more especially, this rule is so manifestly beneficial in its operation, and so free from the possibility of doing injustice, that the only wonder is that it has not been universally adopted.

Another provision of great practical utility, as tending to prevent surprise, is that which obliges each party, on demand by the other, to furnish a bill of particulars, specifying all the matter he intends to bring forward in evidence at the trial. This provision in a great measure obviates the evil to which general pleading is liable. Each party may be apprized beforehand of all he has to encounter at the trial, and come prepared. There is no necessity for fighting in the dark.

We also have provisions concerning set-off and tender. The effect of which is to engraft upon the law the plain suggestions of equity. For example, where the plaintiff's claim is for unliquidated damages, the defendant may at any time before issue joined, make a tender of so much as he admits to be due ; and if the plaintiff refuse it and do not recover more at the trial, he pays the costs. The narrow and technical rules of set-off are in like manner enlarged; but there is not room to particularize. Enough has been said to show the extent to which we are protected against those snares and pit falls, with which the common law doctrines of pleading and evidence so much abound.

Let us now turn our attention to some points connected with the relation of debtor and creditor. Here we are compelled to speak more in censure than praise. The balance turns too much in favor of the debtor; for unless he be particularly honest and conscientious the creditor stands but little chance in making his claim. This assertion may be easily verified.

In the first place, by the ordinary course of proceeding it takes about nine months to obtain a judgment. Now it is obvi