sons inhabiting New York. They are citizens of that State, and of course entitled to the privileges of citizens in all the States.

The debates in the New York convention show that the right of suffrage was not conceded to the people of color without debate. The subject was discussed. The speeches of Peter A. Jay, Chancellor Kent, Rufus King, and Abraham Van Vechten, in the convention, declare distinctly and explicitly that they considered free colored people citizens.

In many of the States, and we presume in all, free colored persons purchase and inherit real property without question. This is the case in some of the States, Massachusetts for instance, where the old rule of the common law disability of aliens in regard to real property, still continues. It is evident, therefore, that, in those parts of the country at least, free people of color are not regarded as aliens; for there can be no question, considering the prejudices which exist against this class of persons, that efforts would have been made to deprive them of their lands, if it had been supposed there was any pretence for it. If native free colored persons are not aliens, we contend that they are citizens, for the law recognizes no third class of per

sons.

'Suppose we should admit Dr. Webster's last definition of citizen to be correct; it clearly appears that many colored persons in the United States are citizens, for many of them exercise the elective franchise, and purchase, hold, and inherit real property.

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Judge Daggett seems to admit that a vessel owned and commanded by a native colored person is entitled to the privileges of an American ship, under the statute of the United States which requires it, in order to be so considered, to be wholly owned and commanded by a citizen or citizens" of the United States. Yet he says that though free blacks might be citizens within the meaning of the act of Congress, they are not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution. It strikes us, however, that by this concession, he leaves himself no ground to stand upon. It is obvious upon reading the statute and the constitution, that the word citizens is used in both cases in a precise, legal, technical sense, for the very purpose of defining a certain class of persons, who were to be entitled to certain privileges in this country. If Judge Daggett concedes that the word is used in this sense in the statute, can he give any reason for supposing it used in a different sense in the constitution?

'But the question, whether free people of color are citizens within the meaning of the constitution, has received a direct decision on an occasion of great interest. A statute of the United States, passed March 6, 1820, authorized the inhabitants of the territory now embraced within the State of Missouri, to form a constitution and State government, and provided that the State when formed should be admitted into the Union, upon an equal footing, with the original States. The statute also provided that an attested copy of the constitution formed by Missouri should be transmitted to Congress, as soon as might be after its formation. A State constitution was accordingly adopted by a convention in Missouri, in July, 1820. The fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of the third article of this constitution, makes it the duty of the general assembly, among other things," to pass such laws as may be necessary to prevent free negroes and mulattoes from coming to and settling in this State, under any pretext whatever." This constitution was brought before Congress at its next session. The clause in question gave rise to considerable debate, which resulted in the passage of a resolution on March 2, 1821, that Missouri should be admitted into the Union, upon the fundamental condition, that the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of the third article of the constitution submitted on the part of said State to Congress, shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen, of either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United States: Provided that the legislature of the said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the President of the United States, on or before the fourth Monday in November next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon the receipt whereof, the President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any further proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State into this Union shall be considered as complete."

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This resolution of Congress is a deliberate and solemn declaration of that body, which then embraced distinguished lawyers and statesmen from all parts of our country, that there were free negroes and mulattoes in the United States who were

citizens, and as such entitled to the protection of the constitution.

Our conclusion is, that all free people of color born in any State, are citizens of that State.'

The writer concludes from these premises that the statute of Connecticut in question is unconstitutional. It is apparent from the above opinion of the court and the remarks upon it, that the construction of the clause of the constitution of the United States, on which the case arises, is one of great importance, not merely in reference to free blacks, but also various other classes of persons, and that it is not without its difficulties. Independently of its bearing upon the condition of the colored population, it is a great constitutional question, worthy of all the discussion which seems likely to be bestowed upon it.

Lieut. Randolph's Case. The case of Lieut. Robert B. Randolph is among the most important recent juridical proceedings. Lieut. Randolph was arrested on a warrant issued by the solicitor of the treasury on the thirty-first of October last, under the act of the 15th of May, 1820, the second section of which provides that if any collector of the revenue, receiver of the public money, or other officer, who shall have received the public money before it is paid into the treasury of the United States, shall fail to render his account and pay over the same, in the manner or within the time required by law,' it shall be the duty of the comptroller to cause the amount to be stated,

exhibiting truly the amount due to the United States, and certify the same to the agent of the treasury, who is authorized and required to issue a warrant of distress against such delinquent officer and his sureties,' &c. Laws of United States, Story's Edition, vol. 3, p. 1791.

Lieut. Randolph, having been arrested and imprisoned on this warrant by the marshal for the district of Virginia, was brought before Mr. Chief Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Barbour. The case was argued by Mr. Robert C. Nicholas, on behalf of the United States, and by Messrs. B. W. Leigh and John Robertson, on the part of Lieut. Randolph. judges gave elaborate opinions on the case. in the discharge of Lieut. Randolph from

Both

The trial resulted

imprisonment, on

the ground that he did not come within the description of 'officer,' mentioned in the act; and also that his account with the government was not one coming within the description of cases in which this summary process by warrant was authorized by the act.

The Richmond Compiler says that 'the case was received by the crowd in attendance with the most evident delight. Even the respect for the court, and the veneration which is felt by every individual in the community for the distinguished individual who sits as the presiding judge, could not suppress an outward and noisy demonstration of the gratification of the audience.'

Unless the case shall be otherwise published in a form convenient for the use of the profession, we propose to publish the opinions at length in a subsequent Jurist.

Case of J. H. Pleasants. Contempt. Jurisdiction. The Richmond Inquirer says, the opinion of Judge Brockenbrough, recently pronounced in the case of Mr. Pleasants, has given general satisfaction. The following extracts will present the case and grounds of the opinion.

'The applicant is in custody of the marshal for the eastern district of Virginia; and has petitioned for, and obtained a Habeas Corpus, to relieve him from what he alleges to be an illegal detention. The marshal has made a return to the writ, by which it appears that he arrested the petitioner under authority of an attachment issued from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria, for a contempt by him committed, in not attending the said court as a witness, after being thereto legally summoned. The attachment itself, and the previous proceedings, together with an affidavit of the attorney for the District of Columbia, are annexed to the return. By these it appears, that the Grand Jury of that county have before them a bill of indictment, charging Robert B. Randolph and others with a conspiracy to commit an assault on the President of the United States in the said county, and that in the estimation of the said attorney, the said Pleasants may be a material witness in the said prosecution.

'Many important subjects have been brought into view during

this discussion, of which I shall notice such as I shall deem necessary to enable me to form a correct opinion on the case. At the very threshold I am met with the objection, that the court cannot take cognizance of the case, because the arrest of which the applicant complains, has been made by virtue of process of a court of the United States, who alone can judge of the legality of the arrest. This is a delicate question, and is attended with difficulty. When I look to the Habeas Corpus act, I find that its provisions are very general and comprehensive. It declares, that whenever a person detained in custody (whether charged with a criminal offence or not) shall apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum, and shall show by affidavit or other evidence probable cause to believe that he is detained in custody without lawful authority, it shall be the duty of the court to award the writ. And the court before whom the prisoner shall be brought, shall proceed to inquire into the cause of his imprisonment, and shall either discharge him, admit him to bail, or remand him into custody, as the law and evidence shall require. In every case in which there is a detention without lawful authority, the court may relieve the party detained. It would seem that, if the commitment be made by a court having jurisdiction to commit, this court ought not to discharge, although the judgment of the committing court be erroneous. But, if it be made by a court having no jurisdiction, then the discharge may be made.

Without going into the controverted question of commitments made under unconstitutional, and therefore void laws, there may be cases in which under constitutional and valid laws a Circuit Court of the United States may exceed its commission. It may exercise powers which the law will not warrant. By such unwarranted jurisdiction, they may seriously encroach on the personal liberty of men whom the State courts are bound to protect. Would not the judges in such cases neglect their duty, if they failed to protect them?

'In the present case a foreign court, that is, a court sitting beyond the limits of Virginia, and alleged to have only a local jurisdiction, has sent its process beyond its own territory, and arrested an individual within the jurisdiction of this court. I find it to be a general principle, that the courts of one State or county cannot issue its process into another without the consent of that other; but the court of the county of Alexandria claims an exemption from that general principle, and undertakes to arrest a citizen within our jurisdiction. When that citizen