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Miss Crandall's Case. A case of some importance, as well as of no little excitement, is under discussion in Connecticut, as the public is already well apprised. We allude to the case of Miss Crandall, who was tried a second time in October last, before the superior court of that State, on a charge of teaching black children from other States, in violation of a recent law of Connecticut. The case presents one very important constitutional question, namely, the construction of the provision that secures to the citizens of each State the rights of citizens in the others. Reports of the second trial of Miss Crandall have been published in the Unionist, and the Windham County Advertiser, and the questions it involves are very ably discussed in the Abolitionist of November last. The case, we understand, is intended finally to be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States.

It is an information alleging a violation of the following law of Connecticut, viz.:

"Whereas attempts have been made to establish literary institutions in this State, for the instruction of colored persons belonging to other States and countries, which would tend to the great increase of the colored population of the State, and thereby to the injury of the people; Therefore it is enacted that no person shall set up or establish, in this State, any school, academy, or literary institution, for the instruction or education of colored persons who are not inhabitants of this State, nor instruct or teach in any school, academy, or literary institution, or harbor or board, for the purpose of attending or being taught or instructed in any such school, any colored person not an inhabitant of any town in this State, without the consent, in writing, first obtained of a majority of the civil authority and select men of the town where such school is situated, on penalty," &c.'

The prosecution was conducted by A. T. Judson, Esq. and C. F. Cleveland, the State's attorney.

The plea was not guilty. No question appears to be made in the case that the defendant had boarded and instructed at her school in Litchfield, colored children from other States, and the questions accordingly were, whether those children were citizens of other States, and as such had a right, under the provision of the constitution of the United States, alluded to above, to be instructed in Connecticut, and Miss Crandall had a right

to instruct them, the above statute of that State notwithstanding. The argument turns mostly on the question whether such pupils are citizens of the other States from which they come.

Mr. Justice Daggett, in charging the jury, says on this subject,

'The persons contemplated in this act are not citizens within the obvious meaning of that section of the constitution of the United States, which I have just read. Let me begin by putting this plain question: Are slaves citizens? At the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State was a slave State. Massachusetts had begun the work of emancipation within her own borders. And Connecticut, as early as 1784, had also enacted laws making all those free at the age of 25, who might be born within the State, after that time. We all know that slavery is recognized in the constitution, and it is the duty of this court to take that constitution as it is, for we have sworn to support it. Although the term " 'slavery cannot be found written out in the constitution, yet no one can mistake the object of the 3d sec. of the 4th article: :- No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

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'The 2d section of the 1st article, reads as follows: Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included in this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.” The other persons slaves, and they became the basis of representation, by adding them to the white population in that proportion. Then slaves were not considered citizens by the framers of the constitution.

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'A citizen means a freeman. By referring to Dr. Webster, one of the most learned men of this or any other country, we have the following definition of the term "Citizen: 1st, a native of a city, or an inhabitant who enjoys the freedom and privileges of the city in which he resides, 2. A towsman, a man of trade, not a gentleman. 3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any city town or country. 4. In the United States, it means a person native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, and of purchasing and holding real estate."

'Are Indians citizens? It is admitted in the argument that they are not, but it is said they belong to distinct tribes. This cannot be true, because all Indians do not belong to a tribe. It may be now added, that by the declared law of New York, Indians are not citizens, and the learned Chancellor Kent says, "they never can be made citizens." Indians were literally natives of our soil, they were born here, and yet they are not citizens.

The Mohegans were once a mighty tribe, powerful and valiant; and who among us ever saw one of them performing military duty, or exercising, with the white men, the privilege of the elective franchise, or holding an office? And what is the reason? I answer, they are not citizens, according to the acceptation of the term in the United States.

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Are free blacks, citizens? It has been ingeniously said, that vessels may be owned and navigated by free blacks, and the American flag will protect them; but you will remember that the statute which makes that provision, is an act of Congress, and not the constitution. Admit, if you please, that Mr. Cuffee, a respectable merchant, has owned vessels, and sailed them under the American flag, yet this does not prove him to be such a citizen as the constitution contemplates. But that question stands undecided by any legal tribunal within my knowledge. For the purposes of this case, it may not be necessary to determine that question.

'It has been also urged, that as colored persons may commit treason, they must be considered citizens. Every person born in the United States, as well as every person who may reside here, owes allegiance of some sort to the government, because the government affords him protection. Treason against this government, consists in levying war against the government of the United States, or aiding its enemy in time of war. Treason may be committed by persons who are not entitled to the elective franchise. For if they reside under the protection of the government, it would be treason to levy war against that government, as much as if they were citizens.

'I think Chancellor Kent, whose authority it gives me pleasure to quote, determines this question by fair implication. Had this author considered free blacks citizens, he had an ample opportunity to say so. But what he has said, excludes that idea.

'Kent's Commentaries, vol. 2d, p. 258-"In most of the United States, there is a distinction in respect to political privileges, between free white persons and free colored persons of

African blood; and in no part of the country do the latter, in point of fact, participate equally with the whites, in the exercise of civil and political rights. The African race are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior rank and condition in society. Marriages are forbidden between them and whites in some of the States, and when not absolutely contrary to law, they are revolting, and regarded as an offence against public decorum. By the revised statutes of Illinois, published in 1829, marriages between whites and negroes or mulattoes, are declared void, and the persons so married are liable to be whipped, fined and imprisoned. By an old statute of Massachusetts, of 1705, such marriages were declared void, and are so still. A similar statute provision exists in Virginia and North Carolina. Such connexions in France and Germany constitute the degraded state of concubinage, which is known in the civil law. But they are not legal marriages, because the partics want that equality of state or condition, which is essential to the contract."

'I go further back still. When the constitution of the United States was adopted, every State (Massachusetts excepted) tolerated slavery. And in some of the States, down to a late period, severe laws have been kept in force regarding slaves. With respect to New York, at that time her laws and penalties were severe indeed, and it was not until July 4th, 1827, that this great State was ranked among the free States.

To my mind, it would be a perversion of terms, and the well known rule of construction, to say that slaves, free blacks, or Indians, were citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the constitution. God forbid that I should add to the degradation of this race of men, but I am bound by my duty to say, they are not citizens.

'I have thus shown you that this law is not contrary to the second section of the fourth article of the constitution of the U. States, for that embraces only citizens.

'But there is still another consideration: if they were citizens I am not sure this law would then be unconstitutional. The legislature may regulate schools. I am free to say, that education is a fundamental privilege; but this law does not prohibit schools. It places them under the care of the civil authority and selectmen, and why is not this a very suitable regulation ? I am not sure but the legislature might make a law like this, extending to the white inhabitants of other States, who are unquestionably citizens, placing all schools for them under suitable

boards of examination, for the public good, and I can see no objection to the board created by this act.

'What can the legislature of this State do? It can make any law, which any legislature can make, unless it shall violate the constitution of the United States or the constitution of its own State, and in my opinion this law is not inconsistent with either.

The jury have nothing to do with the popularity or unpopularity of this or any other law, which may come before them for adjudication. They have nothing to do with its policy or impolicy. Your only inquiry is, whether it is constitutional.

I may say with truth, that there is no disposition in the judicial tribunals of this State, nor among the people, to nullify the laws of the State; but if constitutional, to submit to them, and carry them into full effect, as good citizens. If individuals do not like the laws enacted by one legislature, their remedy is at the ballot boxes. It often occurs, on subjects of taxation, that laws are supposed by some to be unjust and oppressive. Nearly every session of the Assembly, attempts have have been made to alter and change such laws, but as long as they exist, they must have effect.'

The counsel for the defendant, Henry Strong, Esq. and the Hon. Calvin Goddard, excepted to this charge, and the case will come before the Supreme Court of Connecticut on these exceptions next July.

The writer in the Abolitionist makes the following among other remarks upon the above opinion.

1. What persons are native citizens of the United States, and of a State?

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The meaning of the word citizen in this connexion is a pure question of law, to be decided by an appeal to legal authority, not to the loose definitions of lexicographers, It seems, therefore, strange that Judge Daggett should have cited Dr. Webster, since his first three definitions, exhibiting three senses in which the word is used, have obviously no bearing on the question, and his last is manifestly incorrect. Dr. Webster makes holding the elective franchise, and purchasing and holding real estate, the criterion of citizenship in this country. But far more than half of the persons who are unquestionably citizens, including all women and minors, have not the elective franchise. These two classes are excluded in all the States; and in some of them citizens who do not pay taxes, to mention no other circumstances which exclude, do not enjoy the right of suffrage,

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