RECENT ENGLISH CASES.

COMMON LAW.

Cases from 3 Barn. & Ad. Part 5; 1 Nevile & Manning, (in continuation of Manning & Ryland,) Parts 1 and 2; 2 Tyrwhitt, Part 4; Dowling's Practice Cases, Part 3; Moody & Robinson's Nisi Prius Cases, (in continuation of Moody & Malkin,) Part 2; and Carrington & Payne, Part 3. ACTION ON THE CASE.

1. (By reversioner.) A reversioner cannot sue a stranger for acts of trespass on the land, committed in assertion of a claim of right of way, unless they be attended with some tangible injury to the reversion. Baxter v. Taylor, 1 N. & M. 11. 2. (By author.) An author may maintain an action for the injury done to his reputation by the publication of an inaccurate edition of his work executed by a third person, provided it be published in such a manner that readers in general would believe the edition to be by himself. Archbold v. Swett, 1 M. & Rob. 162.

ARBITRATION.

1. (Death of party.) By the defendant's death after award made in pursuance of a rule of court, no verdict having been entered up, the suit abates, and the court will not enforce performance of the award by attachment. Maffey v. Godwyn, 1 N. & M. 101.

2. (Adjudication.) Where cross actions and all matters in difference are referred to an arbitrator, who decides on the cross actions only, it is no objection to the award that a distinct claim was brought before him on which he has not adjudicated, unless it be averred that he did not take it into his consideration. The King v. St. Katherine's Dock Company,

1 N. & M. 121.

3. (Setting aside award.) The fact of the arbitrator's being indebted to one of the parties is no ground for setting aside

an award, though the other party was not aware of it when he consented to the reference. Morgan v. Morgan, 1 D. C. P. 611.

ATTORNEY.

1. (Liability of.) An attorney is not liable for a mistake in a point of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained. King v. Burt, 1 N. & M. 262.

2. (Privileged communication to.) The protection of communications made by a client to his attorney applies to all cases in which the relation of client and attorney, subsists, and where the client applies to the attorney in his professional character. (4 B. & B. 4. See 1 C. & P. 158. 3 C. & P. 518, contra.) Doe d. Shellard v. Harris, 5 C. & P. 592. 3. (Privileged communication.) Where two parties have one attorney, a communication by one to the attorney in his common capacity is not privileged as regards the other. Baugh v. Cradocke, 1 M. & Rob. 182. Cleve v. Powell, 1 M. & Rob.

229.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

(Striking out indorsement.) After a bill had been put in and read, Denman, C. J. allowed the bill to be handed back, and an indorsement objected to as a fatal variance, to be struck out. Mayer v. Jadis, 1 M. & Rob, 247.

BOND.

(Assignment of breach.) If the breach of the condition of a bond be well assigned in other respects, it is not vitiated by the addition of immaterial allegations. Stothert v. Goodfellow, 1 N. & M. 202.

BURGLARY.

A booth used only for the purposes of a fair, but having wooden doors and windows bolting inside, is a sufficient dwelling wherein burglary may be committed. Rex v. Smith, 1 M. & Rob. 256.

CONTRACT.

(To hire carriage.) The defendant hired a gig of the plaintiff on a stipulation that the defendant should keep it in perfect repair. Held, that this included repairs rendered necessary by an accident not brought about by the default of the defendant. Reading v. Menham, 1 M. & Rob. 234.

See WORK AND LABOR; ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

CORPORATION.

1. (Authority of directors.) The charter of incorporation of a manufacturing company required the assent of the corporate

body, convened in a particular manner, to the affixing of the corporate seal by the directors, to whom the legal custody of it was given. The directors affixed the seal to a deed granting a retiring annuity to an officer of the company in consideration of past services, subject to a proviso restraining him from engaging in the manufacture of the article. Held, first, that they had authority to do so; secondly, that it lay upon the corporate body, repudiating their act, and impugning their authority, to show that the requisite assent was not formally given. Clarke v. Imperial Gas Light Company, 1 N. & M.

206.

2. (By law.) Where a charter of incorporation authorizes the corporators to elect a master de se ipsis, a by law narrowing the number of electors is valid, and its existence may be judicially infered from ancient usage, without the intervention of a jury. Nor will it be inferred from the circumstances of the election by the limited body having almost uniformly fallen on members of that body, that the by law also limited the number of the eligible; nor will the court on that ground give leave to file a quo warranto for the purpose of investigating the title of the master so elected. Rex v. Attwood, 1 N. & M. 286.

COSTS.

1. (Of one of several defendants in trespass.) Three defendants, sued for assault and false imprisonment, appeared by one attorney, but severed in pleading. The same evidence was adduced for all, except one witness called for one of them only. That one was acquitted. Held, that he was entitled to receive from the plaintiff on taxation (satisfying the master that he was not indemnified,) his aliquot proportion of the costs incurred by the three on their joint retainer, as well as the costs he had separately incurred. (4 B. & A. 700.) Griffiths v. Kynaston, 2 Tyrw. 757.

2. The declaration contained three counts. The verdict was entered for the plaintiff on one count, and for the defendant on two others. All the plaintiff's witnesses were necessary in support of the count found for him; and all the defendant's witnesses were as necessary for the one count as the others. Held, that the defendant was not entitled to the costs of the issues found for him. Richards v. Cohen, 1 D. P. C. 534. 3. In an action of libel there were ten defendants; three of them demurred to some of the counts, and went to issue upon the rest; the others did not demur, but pleaded. Judgment on

the demurrer being given for the three, they immediately gave notice that they should proceed to tax their costs on the demurrer. Held, that they were not entitled so to do. Forbes v. Gregory, 1 D. P. C. 679.

COVENANT.

1. (To repair, what a breach of.) Covenant to repair and keep in repair a dwelling house, with all such buildings, improvements, or additions, as should be erected, set up, or made by the lessee. The lessee enlarged the windows, opened a new external door, and took down an internal partition. Held, no breach of the covenant. (22 Vin. Abr. 439. 10 H. 7, fol. 2, pt. 3.) Doe d. Dalton v. Jones, 1 N. &. M. 6.

2. (For not repairing. New trial.) In an action of covenant for non-repair, the question is whether the covenant to repair had been substantially complied with. Minute damage, as the non-repair of the broken glass of a sky-light, is not sufficient to constitute a breach.

3. Where the verdict is for the defendant, the court will not grant a new trial to enable the plaintiff to recover nominal damages. Harris v. Jones, 1 M. & Rob. 173.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

A creditor who states the debt due to him from a debtor who is entering into a composition to be a certain sum, less than the fact, agrees to execute a release, and receives a dividend on that sum, cannot afterwards sue the debtor for the residue. Seager v. Billington, 5 C. & P. 456.

DEVISE.

(Words passing a fee.) The will began, 'as for such temporal estate as God has given me, I give, devise, and dispose of it as follows.' Then followed a devise of real estate to A, without words of inheritance, and a residuary clause confined to personalty: Held, that there was not sufficient to give A a fee. There was also a devise of land to B, without words of inheritance, and if he died under eighteen, it was to descend and go to A; A was not the heir at law: Held, that the devise over raised no presumption of an intention to give the fee to A. Doe d. Knocker v. Ravell, 2 Tyrw. 719.

EASEMENT.

The use of a piece of ground as a timber yard and saw pit for twenty years does not give the owner such an exclusive right to the light and air as to enable him to maintain an action

against a person obstructing them by building. Roberts v. Macord, 1 M. & Rob. 230.

EJECTMENT.

1. (Service.) Service on an attorney, who was sworn to be, to the best of deponent's knowledge and belief, the attorney of the mortgagee in possession, was held, insufficient without an acknowledgment. Doe d. Collins v. Roe, 1 D. C. P. 613. 2. (Service.) The declaration was delivered and explained to a daughter of the tenant, who said her father was up stairs and ill, but that she would go up and explain it to him, which she afterwards said she had done: Held, sufficient. Cockburn v. Roe, 1 D. P. C. 692.

ESTATE.

Doe d.

1. (Discontinuance.) Lands were limited to A for five hundred years, remainder to B in tail, remainder to C in tail, reversion to B in fee. B levied a fine with proclamations to the use of himself in fee: Held, that though A's term continued B's estate was thereby discontinued, and C's remainder in tail devested. B died without issue, having devised to G during C's life, remainder to D, C's son and heir, for life. Centered, suffered a recovery, devised to D for life, and died. D entered: Held, that D was not remitted. It was conceded that C was not remitted, and that his recovery was void. Doe d. Cooper v. Finch, 1 N. & M. 130.

2. Bequest of leaseholds to A, in trust to permit B, the testator's widow, to take, and receive the rents during her widowhood, and on her death or re-marriage, in trust to sell and divide the proceeds between testator's sons C and D. A, B, and C joined in a lease to D for the residue of the term, reddendum to B and C, with power of re-entry to A, B, and C, and the survivor; A, the trustee having died: Held, that the legal estate vested in A only, and B therefore could not exercise the power of re-entry. (4 Taunt. 23. 2 Tyrw. 289.) Doe d. Barker v. Goldsmith, 2 Tyrw. 710. EVIDENCE.

1. (Letter from attorney.) The fact of a party being defendant's attorney in the action is not of itself sufficient proof of authority to make a letter written by him with reference to the subject in dispute, but before action brought, admissible against the defendant as evidence of a fact admitted in the letter. (4 Cowp. 133. 3 C. & P. 380.) Wagstaff v. Wilson, 1 N. & M. 4.

2. (Evidence to contradict party's own witness.) When, on an