Bostwick, Adm'r, etc. vs. Estate of Dickson. trust, and, as it does not appear that the trust was ever denied, the statute of limitations does not apply. --- Our statute authorizes an express trust for the beneficial interest of any person, when such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating it. Subd. 5, sec. 11, ch. 57, R. S. 1849; subd. 5, sec. 11, ch. 84, R. S. 1858; subd. 5, sec. 2081, R. S. 1878. This is the only formality prescribed for the creation of a valid express or active trust, that it shall be fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of the instrument. The inquiry is, Is not that requirement fully met or complied with in the bond? What is the trust created by it? It seems to us perfectly obvious from the language used that Dickson had bargained and sold to Mrs. Bailey an undivided one-half of the lots described; had received full payment therefor; that he retained the legal title of her interest, and was to sell the lots for himself and Mrs. Bailey as an opportunity might offer. When he made a sale, and should be called upon to account, he was to faithfully and truly account to and pay over to her one half of all sums which he should receive from sales made. This was one duty which he agreed and undertook to perform for the interest of Mrs. Bailey. It is very manifest that he was to give a conveyance to the purchaser, and render his services in making sales without charge to Mrs. Bailey, receive the proceeds, and account for one half of them. Another duty which he undertook was to execute to Mrs. Bailey or her heirs a good and sufficient deed of warranty of an undivided half of all lots which were not sold at the time such conveyance was demanded. This instrument creates an active trust, which is fully expressed and clearly defined as to how or for what purpose Dickson held the interest of Mrs. Bailey in the lots, the disposition he was to make of that interest, and how he was to account for her share of the proceeds. As observed by plaintif's counsel, the trust in the bond is more fully expressed and Bostwick, Adm'r, etc. vs. Estate of Dickson. more clearly defined than it was in the writing in White v. Fitzgerald, 19 Wis. 480, which was held to be a good and valid declaration of trust under the statute. Indeed, that case is perfectly decisive upon the point we are considering, unless it is overruled. But we are satisfied with the construction there given the statute, and are not disposed to change the decision. See, also, Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422. Consequently, as the object of the trust here was that Dickson should sell the lots in which he and Mrs. Bailey had an equal interest, and was to account for one half the proceeds to her, to that extent at least he was a trustee, and she was the cestui que trust. In the case of an express trust the law is well settled that the statute of limitations has no application, where there has been no denial or repudiation of the trust. Sheldon v. Sheldon, 3 Wis. 699; Howell v. Howell, 15 Wis. 55; Spear v. Evans, 51 Wis. 42; 2 Perry on Trusts, § 863, and cases referred to in note 1. It is further insisted that if the bond creates an express trust, then the acts of the parties, and all the circumstances, conclusively show a denial of the trust from the outset by Dickson, and an acquiescence in such denial by Mrs. Bailey. But we can see nothing in the complaint which warrants such a presumption or conclusion. It is true the amended complaint shows that Mrs. Bailey at the time of her death was, and had been for twenty-three years prior thereto, a resident of Janesville, where Dickson resided. But why she did not call upon him for an accounting before her death we are not informed. Possibly a trial will show that there had been settlements between them of a part or of all these transactions, or some valid reasons may have existed for her leaving the proceeds of the sales in his hands. We are left in the dark on these points, and it is idle to conjecture as to what the truth was. But we see no ground for holding that Dickson openly denied or repudiated the trust at any time. Bostwick, Adm'r, etc. vs. Estate of Dickson. Of course, the question arising upon the demurrer does not call for any expression of opinion as to the amount of the recovery, if any is had. If the complaint sets forth a claim of any amount against the estate of John P. Dickson, legal or equitable, which is not barred by the statute, the decision of the circuit court is correct, and must be affirmed. It follows from these views that the order or judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the county court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. By the Court.- It is so ordered. Upon a motion for a rehearing counsel for the appellant contended, inter alia, that even if the bond created an express trust, the statute of limitations is applicable because the plaintiff has a complete remedy at law for all sums received by Dickson on account of sales made by him. Lockey v. Lockey, Finch's Prec. Ch. 518; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90; Murray v. Coster, 20 Johns. 576; Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 242; Kennedy v. Baker, 59 Tex. 150; U. S. Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32-56; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201; Appeal of Yorks, 3 East. Rep. (Pa.), 587; Partridge v. Wells, 30 N. J. Eq. 176; Wood on Lim. sec. 200; Angell on Lim. sec. 178; Marsh's Ex'rs v. Oliver's Ex'rs, 14 N. J. Eq. 259. The cases of Sheldon v. Sheldon, 3 Wis. 699; Howell v. Howell, 15 id. 55; and Spear v. Evans, 51 id. 42, were cases of implied trusts as to which the plaintiffs had no complete remedy at law. To exempt a trust from the bar of the statute the question must arise between the trustee and cestui que trust, which is not the case here. Lyon v. Marclay, 1 Watts, 272; Marsh's Ex'rs v. Oliver's Ex'rs, 14 N. J. Eq. 259. The motion was denied April 6, 1886. See note to this case in 26 N. W. Rep. 549.- REP. Norcross vs. Griffiths and another. NORCROSS, Respondent, vs. GRIFFITHS and another, Appellants. March 4-April 6, 1886. Riparian owner: Title to bed of stream: Conveyance by metes and bounds: Presumptions. 1. The owner of the bank of a navigable stream by purchase from the United States is, in this state, conclusively presumed to be the owner of the stream in front of his purchase to the middle or thread thereof. 2. The same presumption arises in favor of the owner of such bank in all cases, however he acquired his title; but in the case of an owner not deriving his title directly from the government the presumption is not conclusive. 3. The owner of lands bordering upon a navigable stream and of the bed of the stream in front of such lands, may separate the ownership of such lands from the ownership of the bed of the stream, and convey them to different grantees. 4. When the owner of lands bordering upon a navigable stream conveys a portion thereof described by metes and bounds which (although no reference is made to the stream) include the whole of the bank of the stream along the whole length of the part conveyed, it will be presumed that he intended to convey and did convey all his rights to the bed of the stream in front of the land described, to the middle of such stream; and that presumption can be rebutted only by an actual reservation in the deed, or by evidence of such circumstances attending the making of the conveyance as clearly show an intention to limit the grant to the exact boundaries fixed by the description. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Rock County. Ejectment. The land in question is a part of the bed of Rock river, and is a part of lot 174 in Smith, Bailey and Stone's addition to the city of Janesville. Said lot 174 is bounded on the north by Milwaukee street and on the east by the middle line or thread of Rock river. On June 25, 1852, Timothy Jackman and Shubael W. Smith were the owners of the whole of said lot 174, except a strip along the east side thereof, lying wholly in the bed Norcross vs. Griffiths and another. of the river, having a frontage of twenty feet on Milwaukee street and extending back one hundred feet along the center line of the river, which strip had previously been conveyed to one Peter Myers. On that day they conveyed to Samuel D. Smith a portion of said lot 174, fronting on Milwaukee street and particularly described by metes and bounds which included the west bank of the river. The full description of the land so conveyed, as contained in the deed, will be found in the opinion. The land in question in this action lies in the bed of the river between the eastern boundary of the land described in that deed and the west line of the strip owned by Myers. The defendant Griffiths claims title under and by virtue of said deed to Samuel D. Smith and mesne conveyances by which the title to the west bank of the river became vested in him. In 1878 and 1879 he had erected a building over the river on the premises in dispute, and the defendant Holmes was in possession thereof as his tenant. In 1867, the said Timothy Jackman and Shubael D. Smith conveyed to Chester A. Alden, John Clark, and Horace Dewey all of said lot 174 excepting the part conveyed to Samuel D. Smith as aforesaid and certain other parts not material here. The plaintiff claims title to the premises in question under mesne conveyances from said Alden, Clark, and Dewey. The cause was tried by the court, a jury having been waived. The court found as facts that the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of the premises, and rendered judgment accordingly. The defendants appealed. For the appellants there was a brief by Winans & Hyzer and E. F. Carpenter, attorneys, and a separate brief by 1. C. Sloan, of counsel, and the cause was argued orally by Mr. Winans and Mr. Sloan. B. B. Eldredge, attorney, and Wm. Ruger, of counsel, for the respondent, contended, inter alia, that the parties to |