 | Yael Tamir - 1995 - 207 halaman
...1986, pp. 423-24. 38. Walzer 1989a, p. 41. Chapter Two 1. I have relied on Raz's definition of right: "X has a right if and only if X can have rights and,...X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding other person(s) under duty" (1986, p. 166). 2. MacDonald 1949, in Waldron 1984, p. 27.... | |
 | Jeremy Waldron - 1993 - 500 halaman
...recent work on rights is based on the following very plausible definition: " 'x has a right' means that, other things being equal, an aspect of x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.'"3 The individual interests which are the basis... | |
 | Association for Legal and Social Philosophy (Great Britain). Conference - 1994 - 156 halaman
...benefit(s)from that relationship".55 I therefore deviate from Raz's formulation that '"x has a right means that, other things being equal, an aspect of x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty"56 because this could be applied consistently with... | |
 | Ruth R. Faden, Nancy E. Kass - 1996 - 520 halaman
...rights is to give special weight to some interests in preference to others. As Joseph Raz defines it: "X has a right if and only if X can have rights, and...X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some person(s) to be under a duty."3 Raz's definition, however, does not rule out the importance... | |
 | Luis E. Lugo - 1996 - 244 halaman
...person? Joseph Raz suggests an answer. He defines rights as follows: " 'X has a right' if and only if, other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty." 1 Rights thus exist only when duties are justified... | |
 | Rex Martin - 1993 - 450 halaman
...1969], 81-2; first publ. in 1918). 7. See, in particular, Raz (1986, ch. 7); here he says, " 'Xhas a right' if and only if X can have rights, and, other...X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty" (1986: 166). For other examples, see Dworkin (1978:... | |
 | Guido Pincione, H. Spector - 2000 - 196 halaman
...of rights and his an accompanying principle concerning the capacity to possess rights. Definition: 'x has a right' if and only if x can have rights,...x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty. The Principle of Capacity to have Rights: An individual... | |
 | Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller (Jr.), Jeffrey Paul - 2001 - 282 halaman
...See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 166: "Definition: 'X has a right' if and only if X can have rights,...X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty." Raz deals here with the general concept of a... | |
 | Peter Alldridge, Chrisje H. Brants - 2001 - 301 halaman
...conception of rights I know is the Interest Theory proposed by Joseph Raz, in these terms: Definition: "X has a right" if and only if X can have rights,...X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty. 25 People being the paradigm and most important... | |
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if and only if X can have rights, and other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty". 
