this, a judge who admitted his lust alone to prompt him to a conclusion as the only witness whose evidence he would receive, and if Tarquin could properly be likened to the incumbent of the judgment seat, this is a proper picture to draw of him. His lust had convinced him that he was blind with love for Lucrece. All the attributes of the judge were thus taken from him and of course no justice could be meted out to the prisoner. 507. Trial between Eye and Heart-Jury of Heart's tenants. 508. 509. 510. No cause alleged against lawful reason. Grant failing for want of consideration. 511. Forfeiting mortgaged property. Sec. 504. Determination of lease. "Against this coming end you should prepare, In urging that posterity is the only avoidance of death, the Poet here uses legal terms pertaining to a tenancy for years to illustrate to beauty the necessity of procreation to prolong the term of years. "Since sweets and beauties do themselves forsake it is suggested in these lines that the proper preparation ought to be made to prevent the coming end, so that the beauty which is given for a determinate term of years only, may be lengthened into a term without end or determination. When real estate is demised for a term of years it is called a lease, in law, and the end of the leasehold or tenancy is said to be the termination of the tenancy." 1 Sonnets, XIII, 3, 6. 2 Tiedeman's R. P. (3d ed.); Taylor's Land. & Ten. In the XVIII' Sonnet, it is said: "Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May, And summer's lease hath all too short a date." (3, 4.) Sec. 505. Improper to praise by hearsay.- After first promising that nothing but the truth will be expressed, as to his "love," the Poet affirms, on the best evidence, as to things actually known, that he is as fair as any mother's son, though not so bright as the fix'd stars of heaven. He will not affirm anything of his love, by secondary or hearsay evidence, but those who prefer hearsay to actual facts, could say much more. No painted rhetoric or hearsay evidence are needed to add color to the description given by the actual facts concerning the subject referred to. Things for sale require such praise, but not those things that are not intended for the market. As hearsay evidence is incompetent in all legal proceedings and opinions are only admissible by experts, or those possessing skill or experience in a given transaction, the reference in these lines to the rule requiring the best evidence of which the subject is susceptible, seems apparent. Sec. 506. Adverse party for advocate. "For to thy sensual fault I bring in sense- And 'gainst myself a lawful plea commence."3 An advocate is generally defined as the "patron of a cause," though it does not appear that the patrons called in at Rome to assist the cause of their clients were called by this name. The term Advocatus, in the time of Cicero, was not applied to the patron or orator who assisted in the 'Sonnets, XXI, 9, 14. Greenleaf on Evidence (14th ed.). cause in public, but rather as the etymology of the word would indicate, to the one called in to assist at the trial of the cause.1 "Sense," judgment or reason, is "called in" or brought in, as it were, as the advocate of the sensual one, and in this cause, sense is the adverse party to the sensual one, for whom this advocate appears and at once enters a "lawful plea" against Shakespeare. In the use of the term Advocate, the Poet uses it as it was understood at Rome, for an advocate was not the orator who pleaded in the cause, but was only called in to assist at the hearing, and in admitting that such an advocate could urge a lawful plea against himself, the Poet practically confessed the weakness of the client for whom "sense" or reason was called into the cause. Sec. 507. Trial between eye and heart-jury of heart's tenants. 1 "Mine eye and heart are at a mortal war, A quest of thoughts, all tenants to the heart; The clear eye's moiety and the dear heart's part: 1 Ulpian, Dig. 50, tit. 13; Tacitus, Annal. X. 6. After making this confession of sensuality, the Poet in the next two lines, admits that he experiences contending emotions over the fact "That I an accessory needs must be To that sweet thief which hourly robs from me." (13, 14.) But in the XL, Sonnet, he concludes that "I do forgive thy robbery, gentle thief, Although thou steal thee all my poverty." (9, 10.) As thus; mine eye's due is thine outward part, And my heart's right thine inward love of heart."1 This sonnet illustrates the custom of the Poet to illustrate his thoughts with legal proceedings, which ever seemed at his command. In these lines is presented the whole array of legal procedure, in a cause between the eye and heart, as contending parties, over the right to the image of the Poet's friend, including the pleas filed, the impaneling of a jury and the return of the verdict. The eye contended that the heart had no right to the image, while the heart denied the eye the freedom of the sight of the friend. The heart asserted the better title to the picture, while the eye denied the plea. To decide the title, a jury were impannelled, being the tenants of the heart, who, of course would be prejudiced jurors. By their verdict, which in the orderly course of such legal proceedings, would follow the pleas offered by the rival parties, it was decided that the eye was entitled to the outward vision, while the heart was vested with the inward love of the heart of his friend. From the entering of the plea, denied by the defendant, to the return of the verdict, this Sonnet shows a wonderful familiarity with legal proceedings in court, and follows the natural order of a trial, at law.2 Sec. 508. No cause alleged against lawful reason.— "Against that time when thought shalt strangely pass, 1 Sonnets, XLVI, 1, 14. It is surprising that Sewell (2d ed.) and Wyndham, should conclude that "'cide" was equivalent to "side," meaning that the jury would determine between the one side or the other, for the term clearly is a contraction of the word "decide," which is the very province of a jury, impannelled as this jury was. |