Argument for Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Minnesota, which construction is binding upon this court, the act of establishing the rate in question is a legislative act. In fact it is upon this theory that it had to be sustained. The rate as fixed must be considered as fixed by the legislature and no notice was necessary. Had the legislature by express terms declared that the plaintiff should charge no rate above one dollar per car, it would not be suggested that such an act would be void because the company had received no notice of its contemplated passage. If a legislature may regulate rates, and in doing so act through the medium of a commission, a notice of any contemplated action by the commission would no more be required, unless required by the terms of the act itself, than notice of the probable passage of the act.

The operation of the act would not amount to a taking of private property without compensation.

That this would be the effect of any and all regulations is, it seems to us, a sufficient answer in itself. Any regulation that, in the slightest degree, reduces the earnings of a common carrier must then be said to amount to a taking of property without compensation; but this court has affirmed the right to regulate rates when unrestrained by special charter, and until the case at bar, the right has not been questioned. The right to regulate necessarily involves the right to reduce the income of the company.

In Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, the court says: "General Statutes, regulating the use of railroads in a state, or fixing maximum rates of charges for transportation, when not forbidden by charter contracts, do not necessarily deprive the corporation, owning or operating a railroad within the State, of its property without due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, nor take away from the corporation the equal protection of the laws. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134, 135; Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 529; Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 354."

In Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 179, the

Opinion of the Court.

court says, "It has been adjudged by this court in numerous instances that the legislature of a state has the power to pre scribe the charges of a railroad company for the carriage of persons and merchandise within its limits, in the absence of any provision in the charter of the company constituting a contract vesting in it authority over those matters, subject to the limitation that the carriage is not required without reward, or upon conditions amounting to the taking of property for public use without just compensation, and that what is done does not amount to a regulation of foreign or interstate Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, 325, 331; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680."

commerce.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, to review its judgment awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus against the Minneapolis Eastern Railway Company, commanding it to comply with the requirements of the recommendation and order made by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota, on the 2d of August, 1887, and to change its tariff of rates and charges for handling and switching any car over the lines of its railway in the city of Minneapolis, regardless of the distance or the character of the freight in such car, and to substitute therefor the tariff recommended, published and posted bysaid commission, to wit, the rate of $1.00 for handling and switching any car over its line of railway in said city, regardless of the distance or the character of the freight in such car, being the rate published by the commission and declared to be equal and reasonable. The case arose under the same statute considered in the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, just decided, ante, 418.

The Minneapolis Eastern Railway Company was and is a railroad corporation duly created and organized under the general railroad law of the State of Minnesota, operating one or more lines of railway in the city of Minneapolis in that State, and a common carrier engaged in transporting freight

Opinion of the Court.

and property by rail within the limits of that city, and more particularly engaged in the business of handling and switching cars over its line or lines of railroad within said limits, and, as such common carrier, enjoying the right to conduct its business within the State of Minnesota, subject to the provision of section 4, of article 10 of the constitution of that State, and bound to carry minerals, agricultural and other productions and manufactures on equal and reasonable terms. Prior to the 7th of July, 1887, the company had and maintained in force a schedule of its tariff of rates within the city of Minneapolis, as follows: For handling and switching empty cars over its lines of railway within the limits of the city, $1.25 per car; for handling and switching loaded cars over its lines of railway within the limits of the city, $1.50 per car; and prior thereto said schedule of rates had been published by the company.

On the 7th of July, 1887, the Railroad Commission constituted by said act made an order which was served upon the company, and on the 2d of August, 1887, made a further order, a notice of which was served on the company in the following terms:

"Whereas, at a regular meeting of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota, held at the office of said commission, in the city of St. Paul, in said state, on the 7th day of July last, and pursuant to section 8 of an act entitled An act to regulate common carriers, and creating the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minne-, sota, and defining the duties of such commission in relation to common carriers,' approved March 7th, 1887, a notice of order was then and there made and issued by said commission and duly served upon you, of which the following is a copy, namely:

"Whereas, all railroad companies owning or operating terminal or switching facilities at or within the city of Minneapolis, in said State, with the exception of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, pursuant to subdivision (d) of section 8 of an act entitled "An act.to regulate common carriers, and creating the Railroad and Warehouse

Opinion of the Court.

Commission of the State of Minnesota, and defining the duties of such commission in relation to common carriers," approved March 7th, 1887, have filed with this commission copies of their several schedules of rates and charges for switching cars on their respective tracks at and within said city; and whereas it appears from said schedule that the rates and charges made by said companies vary from twenty-five cents per car for empty cars to two dollars per car for loaded cars; and whereas said commission, after due and careful inquiry and consideration, do find that each and every charge in excess of one dollar per car for switching within the limits of said city of Minneapolis is unreasonable and an excessive compensation for the service performed: Now, therefore, it is ordered and determined by this commission, pursuant to the authority in them vested by the aforesaid legislative act, that all such schedules be changed by striking therefrom all charges or rates in excess of one dollar per car for the switching or transfer thereof and insert in room of the words or figures stricken out the words "one dollar" or the appropriate sign and figure therefor. It is the object and purpose of this order to establish one dollar as the maximum charge for the switcung or transfer of any car at or within the limits of said city without regard to distance or the kind of goods or merchandise with which the car so switched or transferred may be loaded;"

"And whereas, by the subsequent action of said commission, of which said action you were duly notified by order of the commission, the said order or notice should not take effect or be considered to be of binding force upon you until the fifteenth day of said month;

"And whereas you have neglected and refused for more than ten days after and since the fifteenth day of July last to substitute such tariff of rates or charges or to adopt the same as recommended and directed by said commission, as in and by said notice and order you were recommended and required to do, and do still so neglect and refuse:

"Now, therefore, we, the said commission, do hereby publish and declare the said tariff of rates, namely, one dollar per

Opinion of the Court.

car for the switching or transfer of any loaded car by you within the limits of the said city of Minneapolis, as and to be the legal, equal and reasonable charge for such switching or transfer of cars by you, and that the same is now in force and effect in place of the charges and rate of compensation by you heretofore charged for such service.

"You, the said railway company, your agents and employés, will act accordingly or answer for a violation of the section and act to which reference is above made."

On the 10th of January, 1889, the commission, by the attorney general of the State made application in writing to the Supreme Court of the State to compel the company to comply with the recommendations made to it by the commission to change its tariff of rates for handling or switching cars within the city of Minneapolis, and to substitute therefor the tariff recommended by the commission, and to adopt the rates declared by the commission to be equal and reasonable for such services. The application set forth the schedule or tariff of rates so maintained by the company prior to the 7th of July, 1887, for switching empty and loaded cars over its lines of railway within the limits of the city of Minneapolis, the finding of the commission, on the 7th of July, 1887, that such schedule of rates was unequal and unreasonable, and its order establishing one dollar as the maximum charge for switching or transferring any car within the limits of the city, without regard to distance or the kind of goods with which it might be loaded; that the company had been duly notified of such action of the commission, and had neglected, for more than ten days after the 15th of July, 1887, to substitute or adopt the tariff of charges recommended and directed by the commission; that the commission had duly posted and published the tariff declared by it to be equal and reasonable; and that the company still refused to carry out the recommendation of the commission so made, published and posted, and continued to charge the rates so specified as its schedule tariff.

An alternative writ of mandamus was applied for and issued, commanding the company to adopt the rate of charges so declared by the commission to be equal and reasonable for