Statement of the Case. as it may, there was no restriction as to material. Operation in metal would, of course, demand variations in organization, but not necessarily anything more than would result from the experience of the intelligent mechanic. The Springs did not claim a combination of a slotted guide cam, an adjusting screw, a spring, guiding rods, etc., with a former, a cutting tool, a rest, and a griping chuck, and as it stands the claim was, in the existing state of the art, for an analogous or double use, and not patentable. The Circuit Court was clearly right, and its decree is Affirmed. GLENN v. FANT. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 357. Argued March 11, 1890.- Decided March 24, 1890. A stipulation was filed in this cause to the effect that the court should consider the cause as if the general issue and other named pleas had been pleaded and issue joined; that the cause should be heard upon an agreed statement of facts annexed with leave to refer to exhibits filed therewith;" and that the cause might be submitted to the court to decide on such statement, exhibits and pleadings. No bill of exceptions was taken, there was no finding of facts by the court below, nor was any case stated by the parties, analogous to a special verdict, stating the ultimate facts, and presenting questions of law only; Held, that this stipulation could not be regarded as taking the place of a special verdict, or a special finding of facts, and that this court had no jurisdiction to determine the questions of law thereon arising. THIS was an action at law commenced in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error on the 11th day of December, 1883, to recover certain amounts, for the payment of which the defendant was alleged to be liable upon an assessment levied on shares of stock in the National Express and Transportation Company of Virginia, held by him. The defendant demurred to the declaration, but subsequently it was agreed that the demurrer should be overruled, Statement of the Case. and a stipulation was filed to the effect that the court should consider the cause as if there had been pleaded the general issue and certain other pleas in the stipulation named, and as if issue had been joined thereon; that the cause should be heard upon an "agreed statement of facts," annexed as part of the stipulation, with leave to any party to refer to Exhibits X and Y, therewith filed; that a jury was thereby waived; that the cause might be submitted to the court to hear and decide upon said agreed statement of facts, exhibits and pleadings; and that either party might "rely upon any and all grounds of action or defence arising from said agreed statement of facts, exhibits and pleadings." The statement referred to was to the effect that the defendant was a subscriber for and assignee of the number of shares of the capital stock of the National Express and Transportation Company of Virginia in respect of which he was sued; that a certain deed of trust was as set forth in the record, therewith filed, marked Exhibit X; that Exhibit X was the record of a certain cause between W. W. Glenn and the National Express and Transportation Company of Virginia, in the Chancery Court of the city of Richmond, in the State of Virginia, afterwards removed into the Circuit Court of Henrico County, Virginia; and that on the 8th day of August, 1866, one Reynolds, claiming to be a stockholder of said company, filed his bill against said company in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, and certain proceedings were therein had, as would appear from the record in that cause, filed and marked Exhibit Y. It was agreed that the laws of the State of Virginia might be referred to as a part of the statement of facts, and certain other matters of fact were set forth, not material to be repeated here. The cause came on at special term, the demurrer was overruled, and the stipulation filed “with an agreed statement of facts thereto annexed, and with exhibits, marked 'X' and 'Y,'" and thereupon the cause was certified to the generai term of the court to be heard there in the first instance, "upon said stipulation and agreed statement of facts thereto annexed and exhibits therewith filed and the pleadings, in accordance Opinion of the Court. with the provisions of the stipulation aforesaid." A hearing was accordingly had at general term, and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant with costs, and the plaintiff sued out a writ of error from this court. Mr. Charles Marshall and Mr. John Howard for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry Wise Garnett and Mr. Conway Robinson, Jr., also filed a brief for plaintiff in error. Mr. Walter D. Davidge and Mr. Martin F. Morris for defendant in error. Mr. Eugene Carusi and Mr. Reginald Fendale were also on the brief for defendant in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court. No bill of exceptions was taken in this case, nor was there any finding of facts by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, nor any case stated by the parties analogous to a special verdict and stating the ultimate facts of the case, presenting questions of law only. What is styled here an "agreed statement of facts" is an agreement as to certain matters, and that the parties might refer to and rely upon any and all grounds of action or defence to be found in two voluminous exhibits, marked X and Y, being the records of two equity causes in other courts, including all the pleadings and evidence, as well as the orders and decrees therein. The effect of some of that evidence and of the conclusions of fact to be drawn from it is controverted. It is impossible for us to regard this stipulation as taking the place of a special verdict of a jury, or a special finding of facts by the court, upon which our jurisdiction could properly be invoked to determine the questions of law thereon arising. And while the case is governed by the rule laid down in Campbell v. Boyreau, 21 How. 223, yet, even if the statutory provisions in relation to the trial of causes without the intervention of a jury by the Circuit Courts of the United States were applicable, the result upon this record would be the same. Raimond v. Terrebonne Par Opinion of the Court. ish, 132 U. S. 192; Andes v. Slauson, 130 U. S. 435; Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604; Lyons v. Lyons Bank, 19 Blatchford, 279. The judgment must be HAMMOND v. HASTINGS. Affirmed. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 200. Argued March 7, 1890. Decided March 24, 1890. When, by general law, a lien is given to a corporation upon the stock of a stockholder in the corporation for any indebtedness owing by him to it, that lien is valid and enforceable against all the world; and a sale of the stockholder's stock to a person ignorant of the lien will not discharge it and thus authorize the purchaser to demand and receive a transfer of it so discharged. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. A. II. Garland for plaintiff in error. Mr. Don M. Dickinson, Mr. William II. Swift and Mr. Elisha H. Flinn filed a brief for plaintiff in error. Mr. Thomas McDougall for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. On July 22, 1884, George O. Sweet was the owner of twelve hundred shares of the capital stock of a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Michigan, known as George H. Ilammond & Company, as evidenced by two certificates of stock (which were alike in everything, except numbers of shares and dates); and of one of which, with endorsements, the following is a copy: VOL. CXXXIV-26 "This is to certify that George O. Sweet is entitled to eight hundred shares of $25 each of the capital stock of George H. Hammond & Company. Transferable only on the books of the company, in person or by attorney, on the surrender of this certificate. "Detroit, Mich., Jan'y 18, 1882. "[SEAL.] "GEO. H. HAMMOND, Pres't. JAMES D. STANDISH, Sec'y." Endorsed. "For value received, — hereby sell, assign, and transfer shares of the within stock, and do hereby conattorney to transfer the same unto stitute and appoint on the books of the company. These certificates had theretofore been pledged to the National Bank of Illinois, a bank located in the city of Chicago. On that day, in pursuance of the pledge, the stock was sold, and purchased by the defendant in error, Thomas D. Hastings. During all the time that Sweet owned the stock he was indebted to the corporation George H. Hammond & Company. After his purchase Mr. Hastings presented the certificates to the officers of the corporation, and demanded a transfer. This was refused, on the ground that the corporation had a lien upon the stock for the amount of Sweet's indebtedness to it. Thereupon this action was brought. George H. Hammond & Company was a manufacturing corporation, created in October, 1881, under the laws of the State of Michigan, with its principal office in the city of Detroit, Michigan, and Sweet was, during the time of these transactions, a resident of and doing business in the city of |