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Q. B. 471; 21 L. J., Q. B. 307; and semb., it might have been treated as either a bill or a note as against H. O. Id. An instrument payable to order, with a direction "at Messrs. A. B.," instead of to Messrs. A. B. may also be treated as a bill or note, in an action against the drawer. Shuttleworth v. Stephens, 1 Camp. 407 ; Allan v. Mawson, 4 Camp. 115.

Without the drawer's signature, a bill though accepted is of no force (see sect. 3, ante, p. 319), and cannot be treated as a promissory note; Stoessiger v. S. E. Ry. Co., 3 E. & B. 549 ; 23 L. J., Q. B. 293; Goldsmid v. Hampton, 5 C. B., N. S. 94 ; 27 L. J., C. P. 286; M'Call v. Taylor, 19 C. B., Ñ. S. 301; 34 L. J., C. P. 365.

So, a bill not directed to any drawee is void as a bill, and an acceptance by some one, to whom it is not directed, is no acceptance; Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Exch. 410; Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16; unless he be an acceptor for honour; Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 122.

An acceptance where there is no drawee named may make the person accepting liable as on a promissory note by himself. Peto v. Reynolds, supra. In Fielder v. Marshall, 9 C. B., N. S. 606; 30 L. J., C. P. 158, S. M. was sued on the following instrument :-" Pay to Mrs. E. F., or order,” (Signed) "A. L;" directed "To Mrs. E. F., Nelson Lodge, Chelsea," and across was written, "Accepted, S. M. ;"-the whole document except "A. L." was written by the defendant, and was given by him to E. F. to secure a debt from A. L. to her; and it was held that the address, "To Mrs. E. F.," might be treated as a repetition of the payee's name, and not as a drawee, and the document as a promissory note made by S. M.

Payee against Acceptor.

The proofs in this action entirely depend upon the pleadings. If the acceptance is intended to be put in issue, it must be traversed by the statement of defence. See post, Defence, p. 360.

Bill when payable-Statute.] Sects. 10, 11, ante, p. 320, respectively define what bills are payable on demand, and what bills are payable at a determinable future time.

By sect. 14. "Where a bill is not payable on demand" (vide sect. 10, ante, p. 320) "the day on which it falls due is determined as follows:

"(1.) Three days, called days of grace, are, in every case where the bill itself otherwise does not provide, added to the time of payment as fixed by the bill, and the bill is due and payable on the last day of grace: Provided that

(a.) When the last day of grace falls on Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday, or a day appointed by Royal proclamation as a public fast or thanksgiving day, the bill is, except in the case hereinafter provided for, due and payable on the preceding business day" (vide sect. 92, post, p. 349);

"(b.) When the last day of grace is a bank holiday (other than Christmas Day or Good Friday) under the Bank Holidays Act, 1871, and Acts amending or extending it, or when the last day of grace is a Sunday and the second day of grace is a Bank Holiday, the bill is due and payable on the succeeding business day" (vide sect. 92, post, p. 349),

"(2.) Where a bill is payable at a fixed period after date, after sight, or after the happening of a specified event, the time of payment is determined by excluding the day from which the time is to begin to run and by including the day of payment."

"(3.) Where a bill is payable at a certain period after sight, the time begins

Bill when Payable.-Acceptance.

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to run from the date of the acceptance if the bill be accepted, and from the date of noting or protest if the bill be noted or protested for non-acceptance, or for non-delivery."

"(4.) The term 'month' in a bill means calendar month."

By sect. 65 (5) "Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for honour, its maturity is calculated from the date of the noting for non-acceptance, and not from the date of the acceptance for honour." The provision in italics is new.

Bill when payable.]-It follows from sect. 14(1) that where a fast-day alone is proclaimed, the bills due that day are payable the day before, but if the proclamation further appoint the day to be kept as a bank holiday, they are payable the day after the fast-day.

Where a bill is drawn at so many months after date, calendar months are intended, sect. 14 (4), supra, and the day on which it falls due is always regulated by the day of the date, irrespective of the length of the months, and in ordinary cases will be the day with the same number in the last month of the currency; thus a bill drawn at two months on the 10th of January, will be due on the 10th of March. But, if the date be one of the last days of a month having more days than the month in which the bill becomes due, then the bill will be due on the last day of that month: thus, bills drawn, at one month, on the 28th, 29th, 30th, or 31st of January, will, it would seem, in ordinary years, be all due on the 28th of February, and with the days of grace payable on the 3rd of March; Byles on Bills, 11th ed., p. 204; Story on Bills, 2nd ed. s. 330, pp. 74-75; Marius, 4th ed. p. 18; and the dicta of the judges in Freeman v. Read, 4 B. & S. 174; 32 L. J., M. C. 226, and in Webb v. Fairmuner, 3 M. & W. 473.

Acceptance. Statute.] By sect. 2 "Acceptance means an acceptance completed by delivery or notification," as to which vide sect. 21, ante, p. 321. Sect. 17. "(1.) The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer."

"(2.) An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the following conditions, namely:

(a.) It must be written on the bill and be signed by the drawee" (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 6). "The mere signature of the drawee without additional words is sufficient" (41 & 42 Vict. c. 13).

“(b.) It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money."

As to acceptance of a bill drawn in a set, vide sect. 71 (4), post, p. 330. As to signature by agent, vide sect. 91, ante, p. 318.

Sect. 18. "A bill may be accepted,

"(1.) before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete":

"(2.) When it is overdue, or after it has been dishonoured by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment":

"(3.) When a bill payable after sight is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder, in the absence of any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill accepted as of the date of first presentment to the drawee for acceptance." Sect. 19" (1.) An acceptance is either (a) general or (b) qualified." "(2.) A general acceptance assents without qualification to the order of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn.

In particular an acceptance is qualified which is

(a.) conditional, that is to say, which makes payment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfilment of a condition therein stated:

(b.) partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only of the amount for which the bill is drawn:

(c.) local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay only at a particular specified place:

An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general acceptance, unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid there only and not elsewhere" (1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 1):

"(d.) qualified as to time:

(e.) the acceptance of some one or more of the drawees, but not of all." By sect. 20 (1), ante, p. 321, the acceptor's contract is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the bill has been made, or notification of acceptance given as described in that section.

By sect. 44 (1), post, p. 343, "the holder of a bill may refuse to take a qualified acceptance.' As to the effect of taking such an acceptance, vide

sect. 44 (2), post, p. 343.

Sect. 52. (1.) When a bill is accepted generally presentment for payment is not necessary in order to render the acceptor liable."

"(2.) When by the terms of a qualified acceptance" (vide sect. 19, supra) "presentment for payment is required, the acceptor, in the absence of an express stipulation to that effect, is not discharged by the omission to present the bill for payment on the day that it matures."

"(3.) In order to render the acceptor of a bill liable it is not necessary to protest it, or that notice of dishonour should be given to him."

Sect. 54. "The acceptor of a bill, by accepting it—

(1.) Engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance" (vide sect. 19, supra) :

"(2.) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course" (vide sect. 29, ante, p. 322):

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(a.) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the bill ;

(b.) In the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the then capacity of the drawer to endorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement;

(c.) In the case of a bill payable to the order of a third person, the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse, but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement."

By sect. 71 (4) Where a bill is drawn in a set, "The acceptance may be written on any part, and it must be written on one part only."

"If the drawee accepts more than one part, and such accepted parts get into the hands of different holders in due course" (vide sect. 29, ante, p. 322), "he is liable on every such part as if it were a separate bill."

Acceptance, general or qualified.] A conditional acceptance will not support the allegation of a general one, though the condition has been performed. Langston v. Corney, 4 Camp. 177; Ralli v. Sarell, D. & Ry. N. P. C. 33; Swan v. Cox, 1 Marsh. 176. But, where the drawee has accepted on condition of an extension of time for payment, the indorsee may sue as on a bill accepted payable at the postponed date. Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891. Drawee of a bill, dated 8th September, at four months, accepted generally, adding the words "due 11th December." Held, a memorandum for his own convenience perhaps accidentally misdated, and not a qualified acceptance. Fanshawe v. Peet, 2 H. & N. 1; 26 L. J. Ex. 314. "Accepted, payable on giving up a bill of lading for goods, &c., per Amazon," is a conditional acceptance, binding the holder to give up the bill of lading on presentment for payment, but, not imposing on him a further condition to the acceptor's liability, that the bill of lading should be

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given up on the very day the bill falls due. Smith v. Vertue, 9 C. B., N. S. 214; 30 L. J., C. P. 56. Whether an acceptance be general or qualified is a question of law for the judge. Sproat v. Matthews, I T. R. 182.

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An acceptance, expressed to be payable at a banker's or other place, was formerly held to be a special or qualified, and not a general, acceptance. Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165. But by sect. 19 (2), ante, p. 329, replacing Onslow's Act (1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78), s. 1, such acceptance is general unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid there only, and not elsewhere. A bill which is drawn payable at a particular place is within this section; there being no distinction between the case where the bill is so rendered payable by the language of the drawer, or of the acceptor; and unless the acceptance be special within the statute, it is unnecessary, as against the acceptor, to aver or prove any presentment. Selby v. Eden, 3 Bing. 611; Fayle v. Bird, 6 B. & C. 531. The use of the word "only" is not essential to qualify the acceptance, if the words "and not elsewhere are inserted. Higgins v. Nichols, 7 Dowl. 551. By sect. 52 (1), ante, p. 330, when a bill is accepted generally, presentment for payment is not necessary in order to render the acceptor liable; and if the holder neglect to present, and the bankers, at whose house it is made payable generally, fail, with money of the acceptor in their hands, the acceptor is not thereby discharged. Turner v. Hayden, 4 B. & C. 1. But, by sect. 54 (1), if the acceptance is local, the plaintiff must prove presentment at the place named, in order to charge the acceptor; and this was the rule at common law. Rowe v. Young, supra. An acceptance payable at the acceptor's bankers is equivalent to an order on the banker to pay the bill to any holder who can by law give a valid discharge for it, and to debit his customer with the amount. Robarts v. Tucker, 16 Q. B. 560; 20 L. J., Q. B. 270, Ex. Ch.

A bill of exchange drawn generally may now be accepted in three ways; either generally, or payable at a particular banker's, or at a particular banker's and not elsewhere. If the drawee accepts generally, he undertakes to pay the bill at maturity when presented to him. If he accepts payable at a banker's, he undertakes to pay the bill at maturity, when presented, either to himself or at the banker's. If he accepts payable at a banker's and not elsewhere, he contracts to pay the bill at maturity, provided it is presented at the banker's, but not otherwise. Halstead v. Skelton, 5 Q. B. 93.

Acceptance, how proved.] The acceptance, where traversed, is proved by evidence of the acceptor's handwriting, and the production of the bill, with such proof, is prima facie evidence of acceptance before action brought, as the presumption is that it was accepted within a reasonable time after date, according to the regular course of business, and before maturity. Roberts v. Bethell, 12 C. B. 778; 22 L. J., C. P. 69. What is such reasonable time depends on the places of residence of the parties, &c. Per cur., Id. If several, not partners, are acceptors, the handwriting of all must be proved. Gray v. Palmers, 1 Esp. 135.

Acceptance by partners.] By sect. 23 (2), ante, p. 325, "the signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to the signature by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as partners in that firm." If one of several partners accepts a bill drawn on the firm, it is sufficient to prove the partnership, and his handwriting, in an action against all; Mason v. Rumsey, 1 Camp. 384; and, where a bill was directed to "E. M. and others, trustees of," &c., and was "accepted E. M.," it was held that, on proving that E. M. accepted by authority of the other trustees, plaintiff could recover on the bill against the others, as well as against E. M., though E. M. alone signed,

and did not expressly sign on behalf of the rest. Jenkins v. Morris, 16 M. & W. 877. But, the name of the firm must appear on the face of the instrument, and an action cannot be maintained thereon against the firm, when one partner signed his own name only, although the proceeds were in reality applied to partnership purposes; Siffkin v. Walker, 2 Camp. 308; Emly v. Lye, 15 East, 7; Nicholson v. Ricketts, 2 E. & E. 497; 29 L. J., Q. B. 55; for no person whose name, or the name of whose firm, does not appear on the bill can be liable on it; Emly v. Lye, supra; Beckham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79, 92, 96; Miles' Claim, L. R. 9 Ch. 635, and see sect. 23, ante, p. 325. It was, indeed, held in Mason v. Rumsey, ante, p. 331, that where a bill was directed to a firm, an acceptance by one partner in his own name was sufficient, but, this decision is not in accordance with the later decisions cited above, and the reason given by Ld. Ellenborough that “it would have been enough if the word 'accepted' had been written on the bill," is now removed by sect. 17 (2) (a), ante, p. 329. Where a bill is accepted by a partner in a firm in a name common to himself and the firm, and he carries on no business separate from the firm, there is a presumption that the bill is accepted for and binds the firm. Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson, 5 C. P. D. 109, 121, C. A. This presumption may, however, be rebutted by evidence that the bill was accepted as that of the partner for his own private purposes, and not as that of the firm. S. C.

It is a good defence that the plaintiff had notice that the firm would not be bound by such an acceptance; Gallway Ld., v. Mathew, 10 East, 264; Jones v. Corbett, 2 Q. B. 828; Grout v. Enthoven, 1 Exch. 838, or, that the bill was not accepted for partnership purposes, and that there was covin between the partner who accepted and the plaintiff. Shirreff v. Wilks, 1 East, 48. Although it was formerly held that, in the absence of fraud or collusion, a party who had received a bill given by one or several partners in the name of the firm for his separate debt, might sue the partnership on such bill; Swan v. Steele, 7 East, 210; Ridley v. Taylor, 13 East, 175; Lloyd v. Ashby, 2 B. & Ad. 23; it is now established that the unexplained fact that a partnership security has been received from one of the partners in discharge of a separate claim against himself is a badge of fraud, or of such palpable negligence as amounts to fraud, which it is incumbent on the party who takes the security to remove, by showing either that the party from whom he received it acted with the authority of the rest of his partners, or that he himself had good reason to believe so. Leverson v. Lane, 13 C. B., N. S. 278; 32 L. J., Č. P. 10; Ex pte. Darlington Joint Stock Banking Co., 34 L. J., Bky. 10; Arden v. Sharp, 2 Esp. 524; Green v. Deakin, 2 Stark. 347; see also Heilbut v. Nevill, L. R., 4 C. P. 354; Ex. Ch., L. R., 5 C. P. 478, cited post, Part III., sub. tit. Actions by trustees of bankrupts-Fraudu lent conveyance; this defence was formerly raised by a traverse of the acceptance. Hogg v. Skeen, 18 C. B., N. S. 426; 34 L. J., C. P. 153, explaining Musgrave v. Drake, 5 Q. B. 185. But under Rules, 1883, O. xix., r. 15, ante, p. 283, it would seem it ought to be specially pleaded.

Where one partner has subscribed in a style slightly differing from the real name of the firm, it is a question for the jury whether he had authority from the firm to do so; or whether he must be taken to have issued the bill on his own account. Faith v. Richmond, 11 Ad. & E. 339. And, it seems that no partner has any implied authority to bind in any but the true style of the firm. Kirk v. Blurton, 9 M. & W. 284. Where a bill was accepted by one of two partners, "J. B. & Co.," the true style being "J. B.," the firm was held, as matter of law, not bound. S. C. The correctness of the application of the law in this case has, however, been doubted, on the ground that it was a question for the jury whether "J. B." and "J. B. & Co." did not mean the same thing. Stephens v. Reynolds, 5 H. & N. 513;

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