The clause of the fourth resolution, "to receive fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for their services," being considered, As Gen. PINCKNEY proposed, that no salary should be allowed. this (the senatorial) branch was meant to represent the wealth of the country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be made, the wealthy alone would undertake the service. He moved to strike out the clause. Dr. FRANKLIN seconded the motion. He wished the Convention to stand fair with the people. There were in it a number of young men who would probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be recommended, we might be chargeable with having carved out places for ourselves. On the question, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, ay, 5; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no, 6. Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to change the expression into these words, to wit, "to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service." The motion was seconded by Mr. ELLSWORTH, and agreed to by all the states except South Carolina. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of the word "fixed," and leave greater room for modifying the provision on this point. Mr. ELLSWORTH moved to strike out, "to be paid out of the national treasury," and insert, "to be paid by their respective states." If the Senate was meant to strengthen the government, it ought to have the confidence of the states. The states will have an interest in keeping up a representation, and will make such provision for supporting the members as will insure their attendance. Mr. MADISON considered this as a departure from a fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of six years. They would, if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the state legislatures. One great end of the institution was, that, being a firm, wise, and impartial body, it might not only give stability to the general government, in its operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among different states. The motion would make the Senate, like Congress, the mere agents and advocates of state interests and views, instead of being the impartial umpires and guardians of justice and the general good. Congress had lately, by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual claims between the United States and the individual states, fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of the business referred to them by the Confederation. Mr. DAYTON considered the payment of the Senate by the states as fatal to their independence. He was decided for paying them out of the national treasury. Quare, whether Connecticut should not be, no, and Delaware, ay. J. M. On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the states, as moved by Mr. ELLSWORTH, it passed in the negative, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 5; Massa chusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 6. 144 Col. MASON. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for consideration. One im portant object in constituting the Senate was, to secure the rights of property. To give them weight and firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in office was thought necessary. But a longer term than six years would be of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He suggested, therefore, the propriety of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought this would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man. J A question was then taken, whether the words "to be paid out of the national treasury," should stand, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, ay, 5; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 6. Mr. BUTLER moved to strike out the ineligibility of senators to state offices. Mr. WILLIAMSON seconded the motion. Mr. WILSON remarked the additional dependence this would create in the senators on the states. The longer the time, he observed, allotted to the officer, the more complete will be the dependence, if it exists at all. Gen. PINCKNEY was for making the states, as much as could be conveniently done, a part of the general government. If the Senate was to be appointed by the states, it ought, in pursuance of the same idea, to be paid by the states; and the states ought not to be barred from the opportunity of calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would also discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate. Mr. WILLIAMSON moved a resolution, so penned as to admit of the two following questions, first, whether the members of the Senate should be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, offices under the United States; secondly, whether, &c., under the particular states. On the question to postpone, in order to consider Mr. Williamson's resolution, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 8; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, no, 3.145 Mr. GERRY and Mr. MADISON move to add to Mr. Williamson's first question, "and for one year thereafter." On this amendment, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay, 7; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no, 4. On Mr. Williamson's first question as amended, viz., "ineligible and incapable, &c., for one year, &c."- agreed to unanimously. On the second question, as to ineligibility, &c., to state offices,Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, ay, 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8. The fifth resolution, "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was agreed to, nem con.146 Adjourned. WEDNESDAY, June 27. In Convention. Mr. RUTLEDGE moved to postpone the sixth resolution, defining the powers of Congress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth, which involved the most fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches; which was agreed to, nem con. A question being proposed on the seventh resolution, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch should be according to an equitable ratio, - Mr. L. MARTIN contended, at great length, and with great eagerness, that the general government was meant merely to preserve the state governments, not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits: that if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed that individuals, as such, have little to do but with their own states: that the general government has no more to apprehend from the states composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a government over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects: that to resort to the citizens at large, for their sanction to a new government, will be throwing them back into a state of nature that the dissolution of the state governments is involved in the nature of the process: that the people have no right to do this, without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for state purposes: through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears only they can hear that the states have shown a good disposition to comply with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak, as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief causes of this inability that he did not conceive the instances mentioned, by Mr. Madison, of compacts between Virginia and Maryland, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of troops raised by Massachusetts for defence against the rebels, to be violations of the Articles of Confederation that an equal vote in each state was essential to the federal idea, and was founded in justice and freedom, not merely in policy that though the states may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not that the states, like individuals, were, in a state of nature, equally sovereign and free. In order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally free and independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with states, till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke, and Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the states, being equal, cannot treat or : confederate so as to give up an equality of votes, without giving up their liberty that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for ten states: that as Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, have forty two ninetieths of the votes, they can do as they please, without a miraculous union of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do but to gain over one of the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest: that they can then appoint an executive, and judiciary, and legislature for them, as they please: that there was, and would continue, a natural predilection and partiality in men for their own states: that the states, particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no state, in ratifying the Confederation, had objected to the equality of votes: that the complaints at present ran not against this equality, but the want of power: that sixteen members from Virginia would be more likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from different states: that, instead of a junction of the small states as a remedy, he thought a division of the large states would be more eligible. This was the substance of a speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he said, to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should to-morrow resume them Adjourned. THURSDAY, June 28. In Convention. -Mr. L. MARTIN resumed his discourse, contending that the general government ought to be formed for the states, not for individuals: that if the states were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by the legislatures or the people; the smaller states would be equally enslaved, that if the large states have the same interest with the smaller, as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal vote: they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the large ones, on that supposition, without injuring themselves; and if the interests were not the same, the inequality of suffrage would be dangerous to the smaller states: that it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the states, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large states were weak at present in proportion to their extent, and could only be made formidable to the small ones by the weight of their votes: that, in case a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small states would have nothing to fear from their power: that if, in such a case, the three great states should league themselves together, the other ten could do so too; and that he had rather see partial confederacies take place than the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his discourse, which was delivered with much diffuseness, and considerable vehemence.147 Mr. LANSING and Mr. DAYTON moved to strike out "not," so that the seventh article might read, "that the right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation." Mr. DAYTON expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till to-morrow, Governor Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of New Jersey thereby suspended. Mr. WILLIAMSON thought that, if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was, that if the states. were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller states would be injured in the case, and wished some gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small states, if they had a plurality of votes, would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new states from the westward might be taken into view. They would be small states; they would be poor states; they would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers, their distance from market rendering the produce of their labor less valuable; they would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on commerce and consumption, which would fall with greater weight on the old states. Mr. MADISON said, he was much disposed to concur in any expedient, not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor that it was necessary for the safety of the small states against the large states. That it was not just, had been conceded by Mr. Brearley and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the United States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of sovereign states, in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, and making laws for the government of them. If France, England, and Spain, were to enter into a treaty for the regulation of commerce, &c., with the Prince of Monacho, and four or five other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal. Would the case be the same, if a council were to be formed of deputies from each, with authority and discretion to raise money, levy troops, determine the value of coin, &c.? Would thirty or forty millions of people submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they did, it would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble associates. Why are counties of the same states represented in proportion to |