was tremendous. The journals and magazines were filled with letters and essays, with minute calculations aiming to show the enormous advantage possessed by the vessels they had derided. The naval administration was attacked, and called upon to take more energetic measures. Ships of line were razed, for the express purpose of fighting the President and the Constitution to advantage, and the squadron on the American coast was reinforced by some of the most powerful ships in the navy. As a Boston paper wittily put it, the English, in the spring of 1813, were sending out frigates to America under convoy of line-of-battle ships. But the most important effect of the American victories was to show the hollowness of the English pretensions to the control of the ocean. In view of the possibility of future wars, it was idle any longer to advance the theory so arrogantly put forth by English writers, that the frontier of England was high water mark on every shore, and the British seas were wherever a 32-pounder could be floated.

The course of events had produced a result no less marked in America. Doubtless in the enthusiasm of the moment, the circumstances were exaggerated and distorted; but however they might be presented, the fact remained that American ships had beaten their enemies. The navy suddenly became the most popular branch of the public service; and its popularity was redoubled by comparison with the reverses of the army, whose campaigns in the north had been one long series of almost uninterrupted disasters. The war party, the party of the democratic republicans, was now only too ready to pet and patronize the navy, which it had hitherto so steadily opposed; while the justification of the "high federal measure" of former years had reconciled the federalists to the war. the news came of victory after victory, each one so decisive and so unexpected, the most bitter partisan could not help feeling a glow of enthusiasm; and the country at last learned to look upon the navy as its only real protection, as the securest defense of the national honor.

As

THE NAVY IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

BY IRA NELSON HOLLIS.

[Ira Nelson Hollis, engineer and educator; born Mooresville, Ind., March 7, 1856; graduated from the United States naval academy, 1878; entered the United States navy as cadet engineer in 1874; commissioned assistant engineer of the United States navy in 1880; passed assistant engineer, 1888; resigned from the navy, October 1, 1893; has been professor of engineering at Harvard since 1893. Author: History of the Frigate Constitution, War College Lectures on Naval Ships, etc.]

The success of our navy in the war is only what we had reason to expect, considering the difference between the resources of the two countries and the qualities of the men engaged on the two sides. The ships did their work so quickly and with such precision that we are likely to be led into erroneous conclusions, if the conditions which made their victories possible are not very carefully studied. It will not be safe to draw too many lessons from the results. In the first place, we must not forget that our enemy was so weak and unprepared that it seems almost pitiful to glory over him. Military prowess passed away from Spain many years ago, and her organization to manage the modern ship, composed principally of machinery, is wretchedly deficient. In the next place, our ships were never even severely tested, as they would have been against a stronger foe with greater staying power. We have only to imagine the situation if a northern port had been attacked by a good sized fleet while our whole effective navy was off the coast of Cuba, to obtain some idea of what might have been our condition in a contest with a maritime country. Let us hope that self confidence over our victories may not lead us to early disaster.

The great triumph of the British navy under Nelson was achieved when the naval administration was utterly corrupt, and the whole system of promotion formed a bitter grievance. Success came only through the entire inadequacy of the other side. Yet the British acquired convictions of their invincibility which made them the easy prey of American seamen in the war of 1812. Not that our navy is at all corrupt or lacking in good judgment, but it may suffer from false notions instilled

into the minds of our congressmen by an easy success. The price of achievement is constant effort.

To a certain extent, the lesson that we have learned is practically the same as that stated briefly by a French admiral writing of our victories in 1812: "There is success only for those who know how to prepare it." Our chief glory, therefore, is careful preparation and in accurate fitting of means to end. This remark applies mainly to the individual ships in service before the war broke out, and not to the general preparedness of the country for a severe struggle. There are many elements which go toward success in war, and the commonest of these is courage. Most nations, with proper training and good leadership, will produce good soldiers; it is only a question of time. Thorough familiarity with the weapons and instruments placed in their hands is one of the requisites even of courage. The lack of mechanical instinct accounts for the failure of some nations to produce first rate seamen, especially in these days of machinery upon the sea. This quality is perhaps the vital difference between Americans and Spaniards. The latter seem incapable of grappling with the construction and management of guns and machinery. The war, therefore, sets clearly before our people the value of education and technical training to a specific end, and the lesson is applicable as well to the vocations of peace as to the preparations for war.

But at no time have we been prepared for a prolonged conflict against a well equipped navy, and our fortunate exodus from the affair should serve as a warning. We had at the outset only a few well selected types of ships manned by a first rate personnel, or what has been called the nucleus of a good navy. The smaller craft for picket, patrol, and supply duty had to be obtained and equipped in a great hurry. In not a few cases the money placed at the disposal of the president was squandered, to the minimum benefit of the country. This is doubtless inevitable in stress of emergency, when all the safeguards of purchase and inspection do not obtain. On the eve of the recent war the supply of powder for the navy was at a very low ebb, through the neglect of congress, and the bureau of ordnance deserves no small credit for making good the deficiency so quickly that not a ship lacked ammunition

when the demand for it came. This speaks volumes for the efficiency of the system prevailing in the navy department.

While our ships were individually well prepared for the conflict, the fleets as a whole were at first composed of ill assorted vessels. There had never been a settled policy in congress looking toward the development of the navy. As a consequence, we find monitors of ten knots speed and torpedo boats of twenty knots associated in the blockade of Cuba. The squadron that went to Porto Rico was made up of battleships, torpedo boats, and monitors, with an average speed pulled down from fifteen to ten knots for the benefit of the last named. It seems absurd to have expected vessels of little freeboard and of minimum coal capacity, designed especially for harbor defense, to cruise in squadron, and yet the department was forced into the selection of these ships for want of others. Then, again, we had no choice but to send two monitors on the long cruise across the Pacific. The torpedo boats suffered all kinds of ill usage, even taking part in the bombardment of shore fortifications. They served as tenders, dispatch boats, scouts, and in fact as anything except torpedo boats. Some of them carried only a few hours' supply of fresh water for their boilers, which would have been ruined by the free introduction of salt water; nevertheless, they were required to steam hundreds of miles. It seemed a pity, but the officers felt obliged to use what was at hand, rather than to delay the campaign for boats better adapted to the purpose. Later, the converted yachts and tugs, armed in great haste, arrived to take their places. And it may be added that these little boats rendered effective service; two of them participated in the battle of Santiago.

The history of the naval part of the war falls naturally into four chapters, the preparation, the blockade, and the total destruction of two fleets; but it is not the purpose of this article to give more than a passing glance at the two principal events. Our small fleet in the Pacific went from Hong Kong to Manila, destroyed a Spanish fleet, and held the bay until an American army arrived to control the situation on land. A fleet in the Atlantic closed up the harbors of Cuba, and de

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stroyed a second Spanish fleet off Santiago. Incidentally, there were many smaller conflicts in Cuban waters.

The problems which confronted the commanders on the two oceans were essentially different, and time will show them to have been solved with equal ability and good sense. The situation at Manila was very simple. Upon the declaration of war, Admiral Dewey was turned out of Hong Kong by Great Britain, and all other Asiatic ports were closed to him. He was seven thousand miles from home, a distance which none of his ships could make without recoaling, and his line of communication was liable to interruption at any time. Furthermore, the safety of our Pacific coast trade was in jeopardy so long as a hostile vessel remained in the orient. The duty was a plain one,—to obtain a base in the Philippines, and to capture or destroy every Spanish ship that could be found. With rare good judgment, Admiral Dewey made straight for Manila, and caught the whole fleet before they had time to scatter. He had already proven himself to be a man of foresight by loading up with provisions and coal before war was declared. When the English told him to go he was ready. His fleet passed through the fortified entrance of Manila bay by night, and attacked the ships and shore batteries simultaneously. The victory over what must be conceded to have been a weak and disorganized foe, although gun for gun there was not much difference between the two sides, was a great one, in the splendid management of the American ships, and in the results which must flow from our enforced entrance into Asiatic politics.

There was not an armored ship on either side, and the battle sheds little light upon construction for the future. We know that the Spaniards suffered fearfully from fire, and that our ships escaped with little damage. No victory was ever purchased more cheaply; not a man was killed on the American side.

The task before Admiral Sampson was immensely more complicated. He had to maintain the blockade over a long coast line, to be on the lookout for torpedo boats and ships whose whereabouts he could not fix, and to convoy troop ships. The sustained readiness and vigilance of the fleet, during its