assed and hampered Burgoyne that at last he could neither advance nor retreat. He therefore after an ineffectual struggle surrendered his entire command at Saratoga.

This event was the turning point in the war. The alliance with France was now openly consummated, and henceforth the American army lacked not stores nor the presence of troops thoroughly up in European drill and methods. This alliance also took from the British the free use of the adjacent sea.

No reconciliation was now possible, no terms could be discussed while there was a hostile soldier within the boundary of the new nation. From the day of Burgoyne's surrender no American had any fear of losing, and the timid, the lukewarm and the time serving hastened to line up with the new flag, earnestly striving to atone for their record.

The struggle had now reached a second well defined stage. With the British practically sealed up in the seaports in the north, the continental government in working order, with a civil government, envoys abroad, a small navy at sea, and a system of currency, it was no longer a revolt of colonies, but a war between two nations. The one old and rich but hampered by distance, dissension at home and European foes; the other young, lusty and hopeful. The British army was no longer in the role of a force putting down a revolt; it had become an invader in a land becoming day by day more bitterly hostile, more actively and unitedly warlike. The situation was so patent to the leaders on both sides that the British could only hope for an honorable peace; the Americans demanded the annihilation of their presumptuous foe.

The war was fought, and fought out in the northern colonies. Except Virginia, the south was not sufficiently populous, not rich enough, and too largely agricultural to be a vital factor in the struggle and it was only in these southern colonies that the tory element was either strong or respectable. In the north the tory leader was a smug merchant, a royal official or grant-land owner; the tory rank and file were animated only by the most sordid motives and always failed at the supreme test. The south, on the other hand, being made up of large land holdings, was still feudatory, and the tory leaders, as did the patriot leaders, had their feudal following.

The warfare in these colonies had been carried on with fluctuating success, the country being at first about equally divided-but in the mountains and forests back from the sea was a population not tied to any land, not bound by any traditional loyalty to England. These men, trained riflemen all, had fought under Morgan, Cresap and others, through all of Washington's campaigns, and soon knew both the scientific and the American modes of warfare. These veterans, with Gen. Greene, Washington's most skillful lieutenant, were sent to clear the south of the invader. By a series of remarkable feats of logistics this officer, although at times in dire straits, finally forced the British under Cornwallis to take refuge at Yorktown. Greene was not a little aided by the partisan warfare carried on by Marion, Washington, Sumter and Pickens, whose operations were a constant source of danger and confusion to the British. in that they ignored all the rules of the science of war.

Although, as previously stated, the war was fought out in the northern colonies, including Virginia, the operations in the south should not be underestimated, nor their results measured by numbers. The moral effect of the failure of the British to hold even the weaker provinces was very great in England and throughout Europe.

Washington, as soon as he learned that the British were driven to the coast, gave up the pretense of trying to capture New York and hastened south with his entire command, which now included a French army under Rochambeau. The siege of Yorktown and its defense were conducted by entirely conventional methods and the surrender marked the end of the war as far as the continental army was concerned.

In looking back over the years of the war of the Revolution it is well to remember that, after all, the only thing required of an army is results. Brilliant marches and spectacular battles are certainly not called for in a contest for national life. No army in history ever fought a better fight, no army ever had a greater responsibility, and no army ever asked or expected a more modest reward.

Yet again, no army in history was ever more fortunate in that, all through the struggle, incompetency, dilatoriness and

worse seemed to pursue its enemy. A good English commander would find himself tied by failure of proper support or stupid instructions, or when the English ministry would succeed in organizing and sending over a strong column, it would be placed at the disposal of a sluggard in war, or an incompetent in statesmanship. Moreover, chance and weather almost invariably declared for the colonials.

There was no time when the destruction of the continental army would not have ended the war; but such was its wonderful coherence and resiliency, such was the military genius of its commander, that in not one battle was it completely routed or even disorganized. In few of its battles was the number anywhere equal to that of the enemy, in few were the supplies adequate; yet it beat the British on scientific lines frequently, and always in any style of fighting that involved a departure from accepted military tradition. In fact this ability to evolve new methods, this genius for innovation, was a source of growing strength to the Americans, and at Yorktown Washington commanded the finest army the world had ever seen. The men in the ranks were of high intelligence and some education and, like the officers, actuated by the highest motives. They were men of fine physique and all accustomed to arms and skilled in their use many of them woodsmen and marksmen by trade and all having that wonderful American trait, initiative. Many a small fight was won, many a battle influenced, by the individual American soldier and his deadly rifle. Quick to see and to act, the American officer felt that he could call for more from his men than could an officer in the British or Hessian forces.

The Americans endured more hardships and privation than ever fell to any army in history that was making an offensive campaign. Months without pay, lack of food, and sickness and cold-these were the routine thing in the continental army, yet the war went on. The army was created in oppression, nurtured in hardship, and held together by sentiment alone. And more bitterly was felt the indifference of the people at large than all material troubles.

Few realize that in addition to founding a republic and sowing the seed that produced another-for there is no doubt

the French who had been in America during the war carried the germs of freedom to France-the continental army revolutionized warfare. Previous to this it had been customary for hostile forces to go into winter quarters, and war being more or less of a pastime for the ruling caste in Europe it was very bad form to interfere with the social amenities and festivities of winter quarters. Washington's two most startling feats were performed in the depth of winter.

It was first in the American army that the question was asked as to the personal ability of the individual recruit. He was first, last, and all the time required to be a marksman. The object of all practice was not to have the guns all go off at the same instant, but to have the bullets each go to a selected mark. The Americans wasted very little ammunition and generally had little to waste. At the battle of Bunker Hill fifteen hundred marksmen with less than twenty rounds of ammunition, repulsed three attacks and killed more than a thousand English, paying particular attention to the officers.

It was first in the American army that the man was required to be able to take care of himself. In any emergency or emeute a British or Hessian soldier, if he got out of touch with his officer, was worse than helpless-he was a joke; even small detachments, if suddenly confronted by anything unusual or unexpected, either herded dumbly or stampeded.

The continental army was the first one in modern history to be officered on merit. A commissioned officer had nothing of caste or social prestige to give his commands weight, and little of discipline. If he did not prove himself a leader because he could lead he soon sought other lines of work. Moreover, as the pay and emoluments of an American officer were from little to nothing, only an ability to lead and a desire to devote this ability to his country was the inducement to take service. The results that may be expected when even a poor army is so officered were seen in the wars carried on by the first French republic; and the astounding results attained by a good and well equipped army so officered were seen in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5.

At no time during the Revolution was the continental

army as large as fifty thousand and at times it was less than ten thousand. Yet there was a continuous organization, made up of brave, devoted and skillful fighters who knew not how to give up the struggle and who felt that British dominion in the rebel colonies was doomed, could they but hold out. And hold out they did, demonstrating to the world that the volunteer army of a free people is the master of warfare. Nothing less that an overwhelming preponderance in men and treasure can hope to resist it.

Thrice armed is he who hath his quarrel just, but ten times armed is the nation whose army is of its best, fighting for love of country, and not as a profession or because driven to the shambles. Leaving aside the question of years, the flower of America was in the Revolutionary army. It is estimated that twenty five thousand would cover the number of respectable tories who took arms. Only the old, the timid and the timeserving rich remained out of the struggle. From the day the veterans of England were repulsed at Bunker Hill farseeing men on both sides knew that the contest was hopeless for England. The riflemen who scourged the British column back from Concord were material upon which an invincible army could be and was built. The settler in the forests of New York, on the hills of Pennsylvania, in the brakes of the Carolinas-they were all of the same fiber and a Washington could mold them.

In the history of the world there is no tale of an army which made a better fight or whose work was of such grand and lasting benefit to humanity.

The American army of the Revolution was not the first army that had fought for freedom. The Greeks, the Swiss and the English Round Heads had done this, and successfully. The English at home during these very times were silently and peacefully striving to attain what their government refused the colonies. It was more than freedom the Americans fought for-it was the right to enjoy this freedom, to regulate it in their own way and to say who should share it, and the right to provide that freedom should come to all alike without license or privilege. Wrongs which had become vested rights, authority and privilege based on a past and not justified by