design, if I mistake not, not so ordinary and usual, as useful and neceffary.

Belief in general I define to be an Affent to that which is credible, as credible. By the word (a) Affent is expreffed that act or habit of the understanding, by which it receiveth, acknowledgeth and embraceth any thing as a truth; it being the (b) nature of the Soul fo to embrace whatsoever appeareth true unto it, and fo far as it fo appeareth. Now this Affent, or judgment of any thing to be true, being a general act of the understanding, and fo applicable to (c) other habits thereof as well as to Faith, muft be specified by its proper object, and fo limited and determined to its proper act, which is the other part left to complete the definition.

This object of Faith is expreffed by that which is credible; for every one who believeth any thing, doth thereby without queftion affent unto it as to that which is credible; and therefore all belief whatsoever is fuch a kind of Affent. But though all belief be an Affent to that which is credible, yet every fuch Affent may not be properly Faith; and therefore those words make not the definition complete. For he which fees an action done, knows it to be done, and therefore affents unto the truth of the performance of it because he fees it: but another person to whom he relates it, may affent unto the performance of the fame action, not because himself fees it, but because the other relates it; in which cafe that which is credible is the object of Faith in one, of evident knowledge in the other. To make the definition therefore full, befides the material object or thing believed, we have added the formal object, or that whereby it is properly believed, expreffed in the laft term, as credible, which being taken in, it then appears, that, firft, whofoever believeth any thing, affenteth to fome thing which is to him credible, and that as it is credible; and again, whofoever affenteth to any

thing which is credible, as it is credible, believeth fomething by fo affenting: which is fufficient to fhew the definition complete.

But for the explication of the fame, farther obfervations will be neceffary. For if that which we believe be fomething which is credible, and the notion under which we believe be the credibility of it, then must we firft declare what it is to be credible, and in what credibility doth confift, before we can understand what is the nature of Belief.

Now that is properly credible which is not apparent of itself, nor certainly to be collected, either antecedently by its caufe, or reverfely by its effect; and yet, though by none of these ways, hath the atteftation of a truth. For those things which are apparent of themselves, are either fo in refpect of our sense, as that fnow is white, and fire is hot; or in respect of our understanding, as that the whole of any thing is greater than any one part of the whole, that every thing imaginable, either is, or is not. The first kind of which being propounded to our fenfe, one to the fight, the other to the touch, appear of themselves immediately true, and therefore are not termed credible, but evident to sense; as the latter kind, propounded to the understanding, are immediately embraced and acknowledged as truths apparent in themselves, and therefore are not called credible, but evident to the understanding. And fo thofe things which are (d) apparent, are not faid properly to be believed, but to be known.

Again, other things, though not immediately apparent in themselves, may yet appear most certain and evidently true, by an immediate and neceffary connection with fomething formerly known. For, being every natural cause actually applied doth neceffarily produce its own natural effect, and every natural effect wholly dependeth upon, and abfolutely prefuppofeth its own proper caufe; therefore

there

there must be an immediate connection between the cause and its effect. From whence it follows, that, if the connection be once clearly perceived, the effect will be known in the cause, and the cause by the effect. And by these ways, proceeding from principles evidently known by confequences certainly concluding, we come to the knowledge of propofitions in mathematics, and conclufions in other sciences: which propofitions and conclufions are not faid to be credible, but scientifical; and the comprehenfion of them is not Faith, but Science.

Befides, fome things there are, which, though not evident of themselves, nor feen by any neceffary connection to their caufes or effects, notwithstanding appear to moft as true by fome external rela-. tions to other truths; but yet fo, as the appearing truth ftill leaves a poffibility of falfhood with it, and therefore doth but incline to an Affent. In which cafe, whatsoever is thus apprehended, if it depend upon real arguments, is not yet called credible, but probable; and an Affent to fuch a truth is not properly Faith, but Opinion.

But when any thing propounded to us is neither apparent to our fenfe, nor evident to our understanding, in and of itself, neither certainly to be collected from any clear and neceffary connection with the cause from which it proceedeth, or the effects which it naturally produceth, nor is taken up upon any real arguments, or reference to other acknowledged truths, and yet notwithstanding appeareth to us true, not by a manifeftation, but atteftation of the truth, and fo moveth us to affent not of itself, but by virtue of the teftimony given to it; this is faid (e) properly to be credible; and an Affent unto this, upon fuch credibility, is in the proper notion Faith or Belief.

Having thus defined and illuftrated the nature of Faith in general, fo far as it agreeth to all kinds of belief whatsoever; our method will lead us on to

defcend, by way of divifion, to the feveral kinds thereof, till at laft we come to the proper notion of Faith in the Chriftian's Confeffion, the defign of our present difquifition; and being we have placed the formality of the object of all belief in credibility, it will clearly follow, that diverfity of credibility in the object will proportionably cause a diftinction of affent in the underftanding, and confequently a feveral kind of Faith, which we have fuppofed to be nothing else but fuch an affent.

Now the credibility of objects, by which they appear fit to be believed, is diftinguishable according to the diverfities of its foundation, that is, according to the different authority of the teftimony on which it depends. For we having no other certain means of affuring ourselves of the truth, and confequently no other motives of our affent in matters of mere belief, than the teftimony upon which we believe; if there be any fundamental diftinction in the authority of the teftimony, it will cause the like difference in the affent, which must needs bear a proportion to the authority of the teftimony, as being originally and effentially founded upon it. It is therefore neceffary next to confider, in what the authority of a teftimony confifteth, and fo to defcend to the feveral kinds of teftimonies founded upon feveral authorities.

The ftrength and validity of every teftimony muft bear proportion with the (f) authority of the Teftifier ; and the authority of the Teftifier is founded upon his ability and integrity: his ability in the knowledge of that which he delivereth and afferteth; his integrity in delivering and afferting according to his knowledge. For two feveral ways he which relateth or teftifieth any thing may deceive us; one, by being ignorant of the truth, and fo upon that ignorance miftaking, he may think that to be true which is not fo, and confequently deliver that for truth, which in itself is falfe, and fo

deceive

deceive himself and us; or if he be not ignorant, yet if he be dishonest or unfaithful, that which he knows to be false he may propound and affert to be a truth, and fo, though himself be not deceived, he may deceive us. And by each of these ways, for want either of ability or integrity in the Teftifier, whofo grounds his affent unto any thing as a truth, upon the testimony of another, may equally be deceived.

But whofoever is fo able as certainly to know the truth of that which he delivereth, and fo faithful as to deliver nothing but what and as he knoweth, he, as he is not deceived, fo deceiveth no man. So far therefore as any perfon teftifying appeareth to be knowing of the thing he testifies, and to be faithful in the relation of what he knows, fo far his teftimony is acceptable, fo far that which he teftifieth is properly credible. And thus the authority of every Teftifier or Relater is grounded upon thefe two foundations, his ability and integrity.

Now there is in this cafe, fo far as it concerns our prefent defign, (g) a double teftimony: the teftimony of Man to Man, relying upon human authority, and the testimony of God to Man, founded upon divine authority: which two kinds of teftimony are respective grounds of two kinds of credibility, Human and Divine; and confequently there is a twofold Faith distinguished by this double object, a Human and a Divine Faith.

Human Faith is an Affent unto any thing as credible merely upon the teftimony of man. Such is the belief we have of the words and affections one of another. And And upon this kind of Faith we proceed in the ordinary affairs of our life; according to the opinion we have of the ability and fidelity of him which relates or afferts any thing we believe or disbelieve. By this a friend affureth himself of the affection of his friend: by this the (b) Son acknowledgeth his Father, and upon this is his obedience wrought.

B 4