CHAP. VIIL gilant enemy,* ready to strike where the occa1778. sion presented itself. He never fought without

the fairest prospects of victory, and then relied much on stratagem to increase the advantage his numbers gave him, and diminish the loss with which even victory must be accompanied. By this circumspect, cautious system, he maintained to the last moment of his command, a superiority of military force.†

He probably supposed, that the extreme difficulties under which America laboured; the failure of her funds by the regular and rapid depreciation of paper money; the annual dispersion of her army by the expiration of the terms of their inlistment; the uncommon pri. vations to which every class of society was under the necessity of submitting in consequence of the entire destruction of commerce; would of themselves create, in the public mind, a disposition to return to the ancient state of things, if the operation of these causes should not be counteracted, by brilliant successes obtained over them, or the manifest inferiority of his army to that opposed to him.

*He departed from this system in the winter cantonment of his troops on the Delaware, in 1776; but Washington was then supposed to be in a situation incapable of any offensive operation.

For a very short time after the union of the northern army with that of the middle department, there appears to have been an equality of force, but the baneful system of short inlistments soon destroyed this equality.

Experience has certainly demonstrated the CHAP. VIII. fallacy of this reasoning; but we have not the 1778. same evidence that an opposite course of conduct would have been more successful, A country situated like America is invincible, while the mind remains unsubdued.

Whatever opinion may be entertained of the general plan by which sir William was regulated, it must be admitted that its particular parts were executed with judgment; and that, whenever he did act, a very considerable share of military skill was displayed. The officers he had commanded, testified, on his leaving the army, their sense of his services, by one of those splendid and triumphal processions which only an uninterrupted course of victory could be supposed to have occasioned.

About the time the command of the army devolved on sir Henry Clinton, orders were received for the evacuation of Philadelphia. The part it was now evident France was about to take in the war, the naval force which had been prepared by that power before she declared herself, and which was now ready to act, rendered Philadelphia a position extremely dangerous, and determined the administration entirely to abandon the Delaware.

The preparations for this movement could not be made unobserved. The design was very soon penetrated by the commander in chief, and had constituted one motive for detaching the marquis de La Fayette over the Schuylkill.

CHAP. VIII.

It was, however, not easy, absolutely to de1778. termine the precise object, or course of the enemy. The preparations making in Philadelphia, were such as equally denoted an expedition to the south, an embarkation of the whole army for New York, or elsewhere, or an intention of marching to that city through New Jersey. The latter was, in the opinion of the commander in chief, the plan contemplated; but those were not wanting who were sanguine enough to hope that the war in the United States was no longer to be prosecuted.

In the mean-time, every exertion was made by general Washington to strengthen his army. The detachments were called in, and the state governments pressed to expedite the march of their new levies.

Although this subject had been taken up immediately after going into winter quarters, and an army of forty thousand men agreed on for the campaign; although the strongest representations were made to the states, of the importance of bringing their quotas into the field early in the spring, and of the dangers to which America had already been exposed from their delaying to furnish their recruits by the time the season would admit of action; yet such were the real difficulties to be encountered by the states in raising men; and such the waste of time unavoidable in a system where the essential powers of government were vested in so many distinct bodies, that the spring was far

advanced before the ranks were strengthened CHAP. VIII. by any new levies; and in some instances, 1778. when the soldiers should have been in camp, the legislature was yet deliberating on the means of raising them.

Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast importance of a superiority in point of cavalry; and calculating on the patriotism of the young, and the wealthy, if the means should be furnished them of serving their country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with that pride of station which exists every where; it was earnestly recommended by congress to the young gentlemen of property and spirit in the several states, to embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay until the close of the year. Provisions were to be found for themselves and horses, and compensation to be made for any horses which might be lost in the service. This resolution did not produce the effect expected from it. The volunteers were few, and late in joining the army.

In the mean-time, the preparations for the evacuation of Philadelphia were expedited as much as possible, and the opinion that it was intended to reach New York through the Jerseys, gained ground.

General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, was ordered over the Delaware to take post about Mount Holly, and to join major general

CHAP. VIII. Dickenson, who was beginning to assemble 1778. the militia of that state, for the purpose of co

operating with the Continental troops, in breaking up the bridges, falling trees in the roads, and otherwise embarrassing the march of the enemy, should he attempt to reach New York by land. These troops were ordered to be careful not to expose themselves to a coup de main, and general Dickenson was advised to keep his militia in small light parties, hovering on the flanks of the enemy, so as to gall them on their march, without exhibiting an object of sufficient magnitude to induce any concerted plan against him.

A stronger detachment was requested, and general Gates, who now again commanded in the northern department, called earnestly for a re-enforcement to enable him to guard the highlands on the Hudson: but the state of the army did not admit of such a division. The enemy had given out, that they designed a visit to Valley forge, before they took leave of Pennsylvania; and, although this threat was not to be regarded while the army was kept entire, it was very probable that such a distribution of the troops as was solicited, would induce them to realize it. The determination, therefore, to keep the army in force, and in its present station, until Philadelphia should be absolutely evacuated, was rigidly adhered to; and while the means to that end were taking, magazines were