CHAP. IV. place of greater security, to be erected for 1777. the troops; and the meadow banks, from the

mouth of the Schuylkill up to the mouth of Hollander's creek, to be cut in several places, so as to inundate the adjacent ground, and stop the progress of the works the enemy were raising. But the garrison was not sufficient to effect this service, and the commodore had too little confidence in the seamen to trust them on shore., In a few nights, the enemy constructed a long breastwork on the high ground of the island, which enfiladed the principal battery, and rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on the platform, to protect the men who worked the guns.

The aids expected by the garrison from the Jersey militia were not received. "Assure yourself," said lieutenant colonel Smith in a letter pressing earnestly for a re-enforcement of continental troops, "that no dependence is to be put on the militia; whatever men your excellency determines on sending, no time is to be lost." The garrison of fort Mifflin was now reduced to one hundred and fifty-six effectives, and that of Red Bank did not much exceed two hundred.

In consequence of these representations, it was determined to send a re-enforcement of continental troops to both forts. Colonel Angel with his regiment from Rhode Island was ordered to Red Bank, and lieutenant colonel

1777.

John Green of Virginia, with about two hun- CHAP. IV. dred men of his regiment, was ordered to fort Mifflin. The baron D'Arendt, whose service in Europe led to the opinion that he possessed some considerable skill in the art of defending fortified places, and who had now recovered his health, was directed to repair to the latter fort, and take command of it.

The general appears to have felt some apprehension that this order might wound lieutenant colonel Smith, who had heretofore conducted the defence of the place. In his letter, communicating the intelligence of the re-enforcement sent under lieutenant colonel Green, and the arrangement relative to the commanding officer, he says "colonel D'Arendt having now recovered from his indisposition will, this day, proceed to fort Mifflin to take the command there, agreeably to my first intention. Your conduct since you have been vested with it, has been such as to merit my entire approbation; and I am assured it will continue to be such as will finally preserve to you an equal claim to it. Colonel D'Arendt's knowledge and experience in war fully entitle him to the confidence of every officer and man under his command.” Lieutenant colonel Smith, however, desired leave to rejoin his regiment, but on receiving an answer to that request, in which the commander in chief, after stating the difficulty of sending the necessary re-enforcements without

CHAP. IV. an officer of superior rank, and that he was 1777. induced by that circumstance, and not by a

wish to supersede him, whose conduct he approved, to order colonel D'Arendt on that service, left it in his choice to continue in the fort or rejoin his corps. These explanations, added to the ill health of colonel D'Arendt, which obliged him to retire for a few days from the unwholesome damps of Mud island to Red Bank, determined lieutenant colonel Smith to remain in fort Mifflin.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, admiral Howe, who supposed the army to be unquestionably secured by that event, from any circumstance which could render the immediate aid of the fleet essential to its safety, sailed for the Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to meet and co-operate with the land forces in and about Philadelphia. But the winds were so unfavourable, and the navigation of the bay of Delaware so difficult, that his van did not get into the river until the fourth of October. The ships of war and transports which followed, and which came up from the sixth to the eighth, anchored from Newcastle to Reedy island.

The frigates in advance of the fleet had not yet succeeded in their endeavours to effect a passage for the ships through the lower double row of chevaux-de-frize. Though no longer protected by the fort at Billingsport, they were

defended by the water force above, and the CHAP. IV. work was found to be more difficult than had 1777. been expected. Although the scarcity of ammunition restrained in some degree the fire from the gallies and floating batteries, it was not until about the middle of October that the impediments were in part removed, so as to afford a narrow and intricate passage through them up to the forts. In the mean-time, the fire from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected from it, and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary for the reduction of the works, than could safely be made in the present relative situation of the armies, under this impression, general Howe, soon after the American army had returned to its old camp on Skippack, retired from Germantown, and concentred his troops in Philadelphia.

This movement was preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on forts Mercer, and Mifflin, which had been agreed on by the admiral and general.

After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river at Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered by the ships of war. Several rows of Chevaux-defrize had been sunk about half a mile below Mud island, which were protected by the guns of forts Mifflin and Mercer, as well as by the moveable water force, so that to raise the

CHAP. IV. frames and clear the channel was impracticable, 1777. without having first taken the forts.

October.

On the 21st, colonel count Donop a German officer who had gained great reputation in the course of the war, crossed the Delaware at Cooper's ferry opposite Philadelphia, at the head of a detachment of Hessians, consisting, besides light infantry and chasseurs, of three battalions of grenadiers and the regiment of Mesbach, amounting to about twelve hundred men, in order to proceed next day to the attack of the fort at Red Bank.

It was a part of the plan that, so soon as the attack should be made by colonel count Donop, a heavy cannonade on fort Mifflin should commence from the batteries on the Pennsylvania shore, and that the Vigilant, a ship of war, should pass through a narrow and very confined channel between Hog island, next below Mud island, and the Pennsylvania shore so as to attack the fort in the rear. Mean-while, to divert the attention of the garrison, and of the marine force, from the Vigilant and from other more serious attacks, the advanced frigates, together with the Isis and Augusta, were to approach fort Mifflin in front, up the main channel, as far as the impediments in it would admit, and from thence batter the works.

The fortifications at Red Bank consisted of extensive outer works, within which was an intrenchment eight or nine feet high, boarded