1. A question of fact, under the
46th section of the Collection
Law of the 2d of March, 1799,
c. 128. exempting from duty
the wearing apparel, and other
personal baggage, of persons
arriving in the United States.
The Robert Edwards,
2. Where the res gesta, in a reve-
nue cause, are incapable of ex-
planation consistently with the
innocence of the party, con-
demnation follows, although
there be no positive testimony
of the offence having been com-
mitted.
3. Although a mere intention to
evade the payment of duties be
not, per se, a cause of forfeiture,
yet when a question arises,
whether an act has been com-
mitted which draws after it that
consequence, such intention
will justify the Court in not
putting on the conduct of the
party, in respect to the act in
question, an interpretation as
favourable as under other cir-
cumstances it would be disposed
to do. Ib.
4. In all proceedings in rem, on an
appeal, the property follows the
cause into the Circuit Court,
and is subject to the disposition
of that Court. But it does not
follow the cause into the Su-
preme Court, on an appeal to
that Court. The Collector, 194
5. After an appeal from the Dis-
trict to the Circuit Court, the
former Court can make no or-
der respecting the property,
whether it has been sold, and
the proceeds paid into Court,
or whether it remains specifi-
cally, or its proceeds remain, in
the bands of the Marshal. ib.
6. It is a great irregularity for the
Marshal to keep the property,
or the proceeds thereof, in his
own hands, or to distribute the
same among the parties entitled,
without a special order from the
Court; but such an irregulari-
ty may be cured by the assent
and ratification of all the parties
interested, if there be no mala
fides. The Collector,
194
7. Under the 67th section of the
Collection Act of the 2d of
March, 1799, c. 128. where
goods were entered by an agent
of the owner on his behalf, and
the entry included only a part
of the goods which the packages
contained, and the owner sub-
sequently made a further, or
post entry of the residue of the
goods; and the packages being
opened several days afterwards
and examined by the Collector
in the presence of two mer-
chants, and their contents found
to agree with the two entries
taken together, but to differ
materially from the first entry;
held, that the Collector was not
precluded from making a seizure
of the goods after the second
entry, for a variance between
the contents of the packages and
the first entry, and that such
seizure must be followed by
confiscation, unless it should
appear that such difference pro-
ceeded from accident and mis-
take, and not from an intention
to defraud the revenue. The
United States v. Six Packages of
Goods,
H. and others, merchants in Balti-
more, consigned a vessel and
cargo to W. and others, mer-
chants in Amsterdam, with io-
structions to them respecting
her ulterior destination, which
showed, that on the failure of
getting a freight to Batavia, or
of selling the vessel at a price
limited, she was to proceed to
St. Petersburg, and there take
in a return cargo of Russia
goods for the United States, but
with instructions to the master
committing to him the manage-
ment of the ulterior voyage.
No freight to Batavia could be
obtained, and the vessel could
not be sold for the price limit-
ed at Amsterdam; and W. and
others, purchased in Amsterdam,
with the concurrence of the
master, a return cargo of Rus-
sian goods, partly with the mo-
ney of H. and others, and partly
with money advanced by them-
selves. On the return of the
vessel to Baltimore, H. and
others objected to the purchase
of this cargo in Amsterdam, as
being contrary to express or-
ders, and gave notice to W. and
others, of their determination
to hold them responsible for all
losses sustained in consequence
of this breach of instructions;
but received the goods and sold
them. W. and others brought
an assumpsit against H. and
others, to recover from them
the moneys advanced. The de-
claration contained the three
usual money counts. Held, 1st.
That the plaintiffs had a demand
in law against the defendants,
which could be maintained in
this form of action. 2dly. That
whether the plaintiffs could, or
could not, be made responsible in
any form of action which might
be devised for the possible loss
1. Where the second day of grace
falls on Saturday, it is the last
day of grace; and notice of non-
payment given to the drawer of
a bill on that day, after a de-
mand upon the acceptor on the
same day, is sufficient to charge
the drawer. Bussard v. Lever-
ing,
102
2. Notice to the drawer, by putting
the same into the post-office,
where the persons live in diffe-
rent places, is good.
ib.
3. After demand of the maker of a`
note, on the third day of grace,
notice to the endorser on the
same day, is sufficient by the
general law merchant. Linden-
berger v. Beall,
104
4. Evidence of a letter, containing
notice, having been put into the
post-office, directed to the en-
dorser, at his place of residence,
is sufficient proof of the notice
to be left to the jury, and it is
unnecessary to give notice to
the defendant to produce the
letter before such evidence can
be admitted.
5. No protest of a promissory note,
or inland bill of exchange, is
necessary. Young v. Bryan,
146
6. A protest of an inland bill or
promissory note is not necessa-
ry, nor is it evidence of the
facts stated in it. The Union
Bank v. Hyde,
572
7. The following undertaking of
the endorser of a promissory
note, "I do request that here-'
after any notes that may fall due
in the Union Bank, in which I
am, or may be endorser, shall
not be protested, as I will con-
sider myself bound in the same
manner as if the said notes had
been or should be legally pro-
tested," held to be ambiguous
as to whether it amounted to a
waiver of demand and notice;
and parol proof admitted to
show that it was the understand-
ing of the parties, that the de-
mand and notice required by
law to charge the endorser,
should be dispensed with.
1. There is no difference in re-
spect to the conclusiveness of a
judgment at law and of a decree
in Chancery. Both are conclu-
sive as to the facts directly in
controversy. Hopkins v. Lee,
2. A decree cannot be pronounced,
on the testimony of a single
witness, unaccompanied by cor-
roborating circumstances, against
a positive denial, by the defend-
ant, of any matter directly
charged by the bill, in the de-
fendant's answer, or answer in
support of his plea. Hughes v.
Blake,
3. A replication to a plea is an ad-
mission of the sufficiency of the
plea, as much as if it had been
set down for argument, and al-
lowed; and all that the defend-
ant has to do, is to prove it in
point of fact, and a dismission of
the bill on the hearing is then a
matter of course.
ib.
4. Under what circumstances a
plea of a former judgment at
law, for the same cause of ac-
tion, is a good bar in equity. ib.
5. To establish the existence of a
trust, the onus probandi lies on
the party who alleges it. Pre-
vost v. Gratz,
481
6. In general, length of time is no
bar to a trust clearly establish-
ed to have once existed; and
where fraud is imputed and pro-
ved, length of time ought not to
exclude relief. Ib.
7. But as length of time necessarily
obscures all human evidence,
and deprives parties of the
means of ascertaining the nature
of the original transactions, it
operates, by way of presump-
tion, in favour of innocence,
and against imputation of fraud.
ib.
8. The lapse of forty years, and
the death of all the original
parties, deemed sufficient to
presume the discharge and ex.
tinguishment of a trust, proved
once to have existed by strong
circumstances; by analogy to
the rule of law, which after a
lapse of time presumes the pay-
ment of a debt, surrender of a
deed, and extinguishment of a
trust, where circumstances re-
quire it.
9. The general rule is, that time is
not of the essence of a contract
of sale; and a failure on the
part of the purchaser, or ven-
dor, to perform his contract, on
the stipulated day, does not, of
itself, deprive him of his right
to a specific performance, when
he is able to comply with his
part of the engagement. Bra-
shier v. Gratz,
528
But circumstances may be so
changed, that the object of the
party can no longer be accom-
plished, and he cannot be pla-
ced in the same situation as if
the contract had been perform-
ed in due time. In such a case,
a Court of equity will leave the
parties to their remedy at law.
ib.
11. Part performance will, under
some circumstances, induce the
Court to relieve.
ib.
But where a considerable length
of time has elapsed, where the
party demanding a specific per-
formance has failed to perform
his part of the contract, and the
demand is made after a great
change in the title and the value
of the land, and there is a want
of reciprocity in the obligations
of the respective parties, a
Court of equity will not inter-
fere.
ib.
13. Who are necessary parties in
equity. Kerr v. Watts, 550.
558
Application of the law of set-off
and lien in equity, under pecu-
liar circumstances. Leeds v.
The Marine Insurance Company,
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