lutely essential for uniformity of decision by the inferior tribunals. Without a common superior, they would be likely to establish different rules of construction, and the same case would be differently adjudicated in different courts. A common appellate tribunal may remedy this variance, and by the authority and uniformity of its decisions, reduce to consistency those of the inferior tribunals.

The same reason equally forbids the separation of the common law, equity, and admiralty jurisdictions, and the partition of them to several supreme courts. There would soon arise between them not only variances as to the fundamental doctrines of law, but questions concerning the jurisdiction of each, which could only be adjusted by a common superior.

In the state conventions, though no strenuous objections were made to the establishment of one supreme court of final jurisdiction; yet it was contended that it should have been a branch of the legislature. It was suggested, in support of this scheme, that the court, as a separate and independent body, would be superior to the legislature. The power to decide the constitutionality of laws would enable the judges to shape them as they should will. It was said that in Great Britain and in several of the states, the Legislatures might rectify by law the exceptionable decisions of the courts; but those of the supreme court, according to the plan adopted, would be without remedy. It was replied to this by the supporters of the Constitution-first, that it was not true that the British parliament or the Legislatures of the states, could rectify the decisions of their respective courts. They may, indeed,

alter a law that has been misconstrued, so that in future the courts must construe it differently; but they cannot effect their previous construction of it. This any Congress of the United States may likewise do. Secondly, that the power of courts to decide the constitutionality of laws was not recognized by any express provision to that effect, but it resulted from the republican theory that a constitution is superior to ordinary laws; and therefore, in a conflict between the two, the latter must give place. Otherwise, the acts authority to those of

of an agent would be of superior his principal, and the will of the Legislature, rather than the will of its constituents, would limit its authority. Thirdly, the separate and independent organization of the Judiciary was founded upon a maxim supported by sound reason, and universally received by the states, namely, that a separation of the departments of government is absolutely essential to public liberty and to the preservation of private rights. The maxim is, indeed, general in its character, and admits of a partial mixture of the powers of government, but not further than may be essential to their general separation. So far as it concerns the separation of the legislature from the other departments, the power of impeachment is fully sufficient. A connection of the judicial and legislative powers, therefore, so far as to invest a branch of the legislature with ultimate appellant jurisdiction, would be a violation of the maxim. This alone is an objection sufficiently conclusive against such a connection; but the reasoning of the Federalist on this point is so clear and pungent, that we are induced to add the following brief extract: "From a body which had even

partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt to influence their construction still less could it be expected that men who had infringed the Constitution, in the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in that of judges. Nor is this all: every reason which recommends the tenure of good behaviour for judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary power, in the last resort, in a body of men chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in referring the determinations of causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision and control of men who for want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information-so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and equity."

From the foregoing remarks not only the importance of one supreme court, but the necessity of its separate

and independent organization, is clearly apparent. The constitution of inferior courts also appears indis pensable. Without them, resort to the supreme court must necessarily have been had in all cases of federal jurisdiction, and it did not require the vision of proph ecy to foresee that these would be far too numerous and require too much time and labor, to be properly considered and decided by any single tribunal however it might be organized. Experience has since attested what reason then foresaw, that others than the supreme court were absolutely necessary to share the federal jurisdiction-and these, too, must of necessity, have been either state or federal courts. Could reason long hesitate which of the two to choose? The incompetency of the state courts has been previously hinted, and what is so apparent needs only to be binted to be perceived. We, therefore, deem a further notice of this point unnecessary. Assuming then what is evidently deducible from what has already been said and what is further established by actual experience-namely, that the establishment of inferior courts was of imperative importance, we proceed with the consideration of the subject.

The next points which claim our attention are the securities provided by the Constitution for the independence and efficiency of the judicial department. They are: First, the mode of appointing judges. Secondly, their tenure of office. Thirdly, the provision for their support. It is prescribed that judges shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This unexceptionable mode merits a eulogium which none acquainted with

its practical operation will fail to bestow. The high and commanding talents, the wisdom and virtue of those who have filled the judicial office, fully attest its excellence.

The exercise of this power of appointment by the people at large, all will admit would be highly improper. Men possessing those qualifications which are proper for the judicial station are not such as are apt to secure an election depending on popular favor. The unbroken habit of study, necessary to attain such qualifications, naturally withdraws men from that intercourse with the people which is generally essential to obtain their favor. It begets also a reserve and gravity of character which is not very attractive to the people, and which wholly unfits men to meet the impudent jeers and silly jests of demagogues, who, ever eager for the spoils of office, would frequently be opposing candidates. Some of these objections would apply with almost equal force to an appointment by a large deliberative assembly like Congress. Besides, party prejudice or sectional interest might not permit them to act with a single and steady regard either to the qualifications of the candidate or for the general welfare. It would enable candidates to originate cabals, intrigues, and coalitions, which would distract the attention of Congress from its legislative duties, and probably exercise a baneful influence even over legislative measures. Moreover, judges so chosen would not be likely to act with strict impartiality. They would probably be selected on account of party services rather than with a view to their qualifications, and would be apt to favor the party appointing them,