tion from the Act of Parliament in the Commission he supposed it was meant, that independence was to be treated upon, and was to be granted perhaps as the price of peace. That it ought to be no part of a treaty. It ought to have been expressly granted by Act of Parliament; and an order for all troops to be withdrawn; previous to any proposal for treaty. As that was not done, the King, he said, ought to do it now by proclamation, and order all garrisons to be evacuated; and then close the American war by a treaty. He said many things of a retrospective kind, such as the happy effects a declaration of that nature at earlier periods would have produced; if Great Britain had handsomely, & nobly made this grant before such deep wounds had been given to that bias and attachment, which till then subsisted all over that country in favour of Great Britain even in spite of their petitions being repeatedly rejected. That in such case they would undoubtedly have concerted such plan of treaty, as would have not only restored peace; but would have laid a solid bottom of amity and conciliation, and such as would have obliterated from their memory in a short time all remembrance of preceding acts of distress and violence.

But by the continued enforcement of the same cruel measures the minds of the people in general all over that continent were almost totally alienated from Great Britain so that they detested the very name of an Englishman.

That it was true a number of the older people had not forgot their former connections; & their inclinations might still lean towards England. But when they were gone, & the younger generation came to take their place, who had never felt any of those impressions, those inclinations would be succeeded by a grudge and resentment of every kind, upon reflecting on what they had seen & their parents had suffered; that few of them but could recollect the loss of blood of some relation or other, devastation of their estates, & other misfortunes.

On which occasion he ran into a detail of particulars, as unnecessary as unpleasant here to be repeated, and which I would not have touched upon, if I did not think that a free exposure of the features of this conversation may help to form a judgment of what may be expected in the issue, from the determination of this commissioner, and consequently what concessions on this very critical occasion it may be safe and proper to propose or insist upon.

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But the great point was to make such a peace as should be lasting.

This brought back my attention to the same expression in Monsr. de Vergennes's discourse in April, when I first had the honour of waiting on him, and the more so, that almost in every conversation I have had with Dr. Franklin, he has made use of the same words, & delivered as in the way aphorism, and as an indispensable principle in the foundation of a final settlement with them and France.

I never at these times chose to ask for an explanation, having no right to do so; I thought it was then too early to venture on such delicate ground; and so I remained at a loss as to the intended meaning of the words, although I strongly suspected the expression pointed at some unpleasant or unfavourable limitations on the conduct of Great Britain.

But now being in a somewhat different situation, and having so fair an opportunity, which I wished not to miss of, in order to guess at the meaning of this phrase, I replied that such long intermission of war was certainly very desirable. But what security could there be given for a continuance of peace, but such as generally put an end to all wars, being that of treaty? But which was often found to be a very inadequate security; as was the case of the last treaty concluded at this place, only about 20 years ago.

To this Mr. Jay replied, he would not give a farthing for any parchment security whatever. They had never signified anything since the world began; when any Prince or State, of either side, found it convenient to break through them. But the peace he meant was such, or so to be settled, that it should not be the interest of either party to violate it. This, he said, was the only security that could be proposed to prevent those frequent returns of war, by which the world was kept in perpetual disturbance.

I could guess what he meant by the present parties being bound by motives of interest to be quiet; and asked for no explanation.

I thought it remarkable that so soon after I left Dr. Franklin, I should have found this gentleman's plan of settlement with Great Britain, so much less liberal, or at least so much more encumbered with relative connections, concerns, and interests than had been insinuated in any conversation I had ever had with Dr. Franklin, or rather, on the contrary, seemingly very materially different: excepting only in that of making such a peace as should be lasting, which the doctor always said he aimed at.

When we set out upon this business of peace, we justly thought that a relinquishment of the sovereignty of America, which France so strongly pleaded for, would have had some weight in the scheme of pacification with them: and that such grant of independence would have also fully satisfied the Colonies; and then, that by a few exchanges or concessions of little consequence, in the course of the negotiation with France, the whole might have been quickly ended. But the affair seems to have taken a different turn. France very wisely, I don't say consistently, disowns the Grant of Independence as being no concern of hers, and Mr. Jay will not allow them to share in the merit of it lest, the Colonies should be brought under a greater obligation to France, than they would choose; or more than they can easily discharge, by a repayment of the money they borrowed of them, which his colleague some time ago told me could be easily done, as their taxes were coming in fast.

I never chose to tease Dr. Franklin with many questions, yet at different times he has freely declared, that having got the grant of independence, their treaty with France was at an end: and on the 10th July explicitly specified the conditions which he thought must necessarily be granted, to obtain a peace of any kind with the Colonies; but if granted, would have that effect: adding at the same time others, as discretionary or advisable; which if complied with, would not fail to diffuse a temper of reconciliation all over the country.

These were the doctor's sentiments and conditions of settlement on the said 10th July; and which he read to me from 2 minute in writing, and only declined putting it into my hands from a motive of delicacy regarding his colleague then just arrived. And so consistent the doctor still appears to be, that upon the production of my Commission on the 7th instant, he repeated the words which he had used on a former occasion, " that he hoped we should do well enough, and not be long about it," as already mentioned. That could not but be very agreeable to me; if my expectations had not been so soon after damped by the said unpleasant reception from Mr. Jay.

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Dr. Franklin, as I have said, had often touched upon this subject in a general way: "that peace could not be too dearly bought "; and always ending with a wish that it could be made lasting, and at the same time observing that England, in a state of peace for a hundred years, would become a perfect garden. I did not clearly perceive the meaning of proposal; yet I own I did not much like any of these prescriptions of quietism, as believing they would not be entirely suitable to the English taste or interest; nor did I foresee any benefit intended for England, by what M. de Vergennes, in Dr. Franklin's hearing, humanely proposed in April, of settling the peace solidement, and for a long standing; which I then suspected as an intimation of an intended scheme of some sort for putting the naval power of England under some unusual and particular limitation.

On these occasions with Dr. Franklin, I never chose to say much, or ask for an explanation as to his idea of the effectual means of preventing the return of war.

But upon Mr. Jay's mentioning the same proposal the other day of their design of settling the depending treaty on such a solid foundation, as that the peace should be lasting, I asked him how a sufficient security could be found to make it so.. He answered as before mentioned; The best security in the world, viz., that it shall not be the interest of either party to break it.

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There was no explanation necessary here, as I knew he could not mean treaty, since he had just before declared, that he made no account of any treaty whatever, when any Prince or State found it convenient to break it, and therefore I concluded he must mean a guarantee of some intermediate Power who he thought would not chose to be principals in any war, and yet (in that state of neutrality respecting their own concerns) might be capable of controlling other States, by adopting the cause of those in whose safety they might be particularly interested, or to whom protection was due, under the stipulations of a general guarantee.

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As yet, their intention has come out only in the unexplained manner which I have mentioned; but as something (as has been said) was hinted by M. de Vergennes so early as in April, and has been from time to time since then repeated by Dr. Franklin in the same way, and at last in a manner openly declared by Mr. Jay upon the first perusal of my Commission, I think it my duty to lay the same (as far as I can yet judge of it) before His Majesty's Ministers, so as

such resolutions may be taken, and the necessary instructions given in consequence thereof, as to their wisdom may seem fit. Paris, 9th Augst, 1782

To the Right Honble THOMAS TOWNSHEND,

RICHARD OSWALD

One of His Majestys Principal Secretaries of State.

No. 56.-1782, August 13: Letter, Mr. Adams to Mr. Jay.

THE HAGUE, August 13, 1782.

DEAR SIR: The public papers announce Fitzherbert's commission to be to treat with " the four powers at war with Great Britain." But whether they mean Hyder Ali or the Mahrattas is uncertain. I have obtained intelligence of a paper addressed lately from the court of St. James to the courts of Vienna and Petersburg, as well as that of Paris, in which are the following words, namely:" Sa majesté britannique dit qu'il ne préjuge, ni ne veut préjuger aucune question quelconque, et qu'il ne prétend exclure personne de la négotiation qu'on a en vue, qui pourrait s'y croire intéressé, soit qu'il soit question des états généraux, soit qu'on y veuille faire entrer les colonies américaines." You, perhaps, may have seen the whole; if you have I beg a copy.

For my own part, I am not the minister of any "fourth state 99 at war with Great Britain, nor of any "American Colonies," and, therefore, I should think it out of character for us to have anything to say with Fitzherbert or in the congress at Vienna until more decently and consistently called to it. It is my duty to be explicit with you and to tell you sincerely my sentiments. I think we ought not to treat at all until we see a minister authorized to treat with "the United States of America," or with their ministers. Our country will feel the miserable consequence of a different conduct if we are betrayed into negotiations, in or out of a congress, before this point is settled; if gold and diamonds and every insidious intrigue and wicked falsehood can induce anybody to embarrass us and betray us into truces and bad conditions, we may depend upon having them played off against us. We are, and can be, no match for them at this game. We shall have nothing to negotiate with but integrity, perspicuity, and firmness. There is but one way to negotiate with Englishmen, that is clearly and decidedly; their fears only govern them. If we entertain an idea of their generosity or benevolence towards us, we are undone. They hate us universally, from the throne to the footstool, and would annihilate us, if in their power, before they would treat with us in any We must let them know that we are not to be moved from our purpose, or all is undone. The pride and vanity of that nation is a disease, it is a delirium; it has been flattered and inflamed so long by themselves and by others that it perverts everything. The moment you depart one iota from your character and the distinct line of sovereignty, they interpret it to spring from fear or love of them, and from a desire to go back. Fox saw we were aware of this and calculated his system accordingly. We must finally come to that idea and so must Great Britain. The latter will soon come to it if we do not flinch. If we discover the least weakness or wavering the blood and

way.

treasures of our countrymen will suffer for it in a great degree. Firmness! firmness and patience for a few months will carry us triumphantly to that point where it is the interest of our allies, of neutral nations, nay, even of our enemies, that we should arrive. I mean a sovereignty universally acknowledged by all the world. Whereas the least oscillation will, in my opinion, leave us to dispute with the world and with one another these fifty years.

With great respect, &c.,

JOHN ADAMS

No. 57.-1782, August 11 and 13: Extract from Mr. Oswald's Minutes of a Conversation with Dr. Franklin.

PARIS Sunday 11th & 13th August 1782.

I went out this forenoon to Dr. Franklin, to know whether he was inclined to enter upon business. He told me he had carried 58 the copy of the commission I gave him, to Versailles, the day

before, and had some conversation on the subject with M. de Vergennes; who was of opinion with him, that it would be better to wait until a real commission arrived; this being neither signed nor sealed, and could be supposed as only a draft or order, in which there might be alterations; as in the preamble it said only "to the effect following," &c. To this objection I had nothing to say, as I did not incline to show them the instructions though signed and sealed.

Finding no alteration in the doctor's manner, from the usual goodnatured and friendly way in which he had formerly behaved to me (as I had reason to apprehend from what had lately passed with his colleague), and having a quiet and convenient opportunity, I was anxious to learn whether the doctor entertained those ideas, which, in the preceding papers, I suspected Mr. Jay had in view, regarding the means of preventing future wars, by settling the peace in such manner as it should not be the interest of the parties to break it. With that intent, I told the doctor I had had a long conversation with Mr. Jay, of which no doubt he had been informed; and in which he had not spared us in his reflections on what had passed in the American war; and that I could not but be sorry he had such just reason for the severity of some of them. At same time I was pleased to find he was equally well disposed to peace, and to bring it quickly to a conclusion as we were; and also that it should be a lasting one, as he, the doctor, had always proposed. And that I was only at a loss as to how that could be ascertained other ways than by treaty; which Mr. Jay declared he paid no regard to; and said it could be only depended upon as lasting by its being settled so as it should not be the interest of any of the parties to break it. I told the doctor this was certainly the best security, if one could tell how to accommodate the terms so justly to the mutual interest of the parties, as to obviate every temptation to encroachment or trespass. The doctor replied, the method was very plain and easy, which was to settle the terms in the first projection on an equal, just, and reasonable footing; and so as neither party should have cause to complain; being the plan which M. de Vergennes had in view, and had always recommended in his conversations with him on the subject of peace.