very important news of this day, upon which Mr. Fox begs leave to take this opportunity of congratulating your Majesty; but, in general, Mr. Fox thinks it his duty to submit it to your Majesty, that your Majesty's servants have proceeded upon this occasion rather upon the supposition that the present negotiation for peace will fail, and that the measures which they humbly recommend to your Majesty upon this occasion are directed more with a view to the use which may be made of them, for the purposes of detaching from France her present allies, and of conciliating the powers of Europe to this country, than to the object of success in the present treaty with the Court of Versailles. If Monsieur de Vergennes should reject Mr. Grenville's proposals, and should either decline making any on his part, or make such as should be evidently inadmissible, your Majesty's servants cannot help flattering themselves that such a conduct, on the part of the Court of Versailles, may produce the most salutary effects with regard both to Europe and to America, and possibly to the exertions of Great Britain herself.

No 28.-1782, May 23: British Cabinet Minute.

CLARGES STREET, May 23rd, 1782. Present-Lord Chancellor, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Rockingham, Lord Shelburne, Lord John Cavendish, Lord Keppel, Lord Ashburton, General Conway, Mr. Fox.

It is humbly recommended to your Majesty to direct Mr. Fox to instruct Mr. Grenville to propose the independency of America in the first instance, instead of making it a condition of a general treaty.

No. 29.-1782, May 26; Letter, Mr. Fox to Mr. Grenville.

ST. JAMES 26th May 1782

SIR: I had the honour of laying your letter of the 14th instant before the King. His Majesty was pleased to refer it to the consideration of his confidential servants and in consequence of their advice has commanded me to signify to you his pleasure that you should lose no time in making all the advantage possible of the concession which His Majesty has from his ardent desire of peace been induced to make with respect to the Independency of the thirteen States; and in order to this end I have it in command from His Majesty, to authorize you to make the offer of the said Independency in the first instance of making it a conditional article of a general treaty. I need not point out to you the use that may be made of this method of commencing the business, as you seem to have a very just idea of the advantages that may be derived from it. The principal one appears to me to be this: that the American agents must clearly perceive if there should now be any obstacle to the recognition which they have so much at heart, and which after all must be a matter infinitely interesting to them that the difficulty comes from the Court of Versailles and not from hence, and that it is chiefly owing to the number of allies with

which that court thinks fit to encumber America in the negotiation for a peace, although she was never benefited by their assistance during the war. When this point shall have been reasoned and understood I cannot help flattering myself that it will appear upon the face of the thing unreasonable and intolerable to any honest American, that they having gained the point for which they contested should voluntarily and unnecessarily submit to all the calamities of war without an object, till all the Powers in Europe shall have settled all the various claims and differences which they may have one with the other, and in which it is not even pretended that America has any interest whatever either near or remote. You will not fail to press Mr. Franklin's own idea, that the object of the treaty of Alliance with France being attained, the treaty determines to which, if that gentleman should adhere, we may fairly consider one of the ends of your mission as attained.

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As to the good faith which is supposed to be pledged by Congress to France not to make a separate peace, I think it can only be understood that Congress is bound not to enter into any treaty separately or without the knowledge and consent of France, but surely not that, when a general peace is proposed, Congress is bound to support every claim set up by the Court of Versailles and her allies, which would be a kind of engagement that never was, I believe, entered into by any State at any time. It has often been stipulated between two allied Powers that one shall not make peace till the other has attained some specific object named in the treaty, but that one country should bind herself to another to make war till her ally shall be satisfied with respect to all the claims she may think fit to set up, claims undefined and perhaps unthought of at the time of making the engagement, would be a species of treaty as new, I believe, as it would be monstrous. If this view of the thing should produce the effects you seem inclined to hope from it, I need not observe to you how greatly all the advantages of a separate peace would be increased by the late events in the West Indies; but I have the satisfaction to assure you that those events have in no degree abated His Majesty's most ardent and sincere desire for a general pacification, and I concur with you in your conjecture that the extravagance of the French expectations arises chiefly from the support they expect from America, and consequently will be considerably abated whenever they see reason to fear the loss of that support; so that if things should take a right turn with respect to the American agents, the best road may probably be opened to a general as well as a separate peace. I send you inclosed last night's "Gazette," containing an account of two more ships of the line and one frigate which Sir Samuel Hood has taken from the enemy. I am commanded by His Majesty to direct you to communicate with Mr. Oswald with the greatest freedom and openness upon the concerns of your mission, which are connected more and more every day with the business of America. With respect to Mr. Franklin if he continues in those friendly dispositions which your letter and Mr. Oswald's account seem to indicate the more confidence you show to him, the better chance there will be of bringing this business either in one way or in the other to a successful issue. I am, Sir, &c.

No. 30.-1782, June 3: Extract from Dr. Franklin's Journal.

On Monday, the 3d, Mr. Oswald came according to appointment. He told me he had seen and had conversations with Lord Shelburne, Lord Rockingham, and Mr. Fox; that their desire of peace continued uniformly the same, though he thought some of them were a little too much elated with the late victory in the West Indies, and when observing his coolness, they asked him if he did not think it a very good thing; yes, said he, if you do not rate it too high. He went on with the utmost frankness to tell me that the peace was absolutely necessary for them; that the nation had been foolishly involved in four wars, and could no longer raise money to carry them on, so that if they continued it would be absolutely necessary for them to stop payment of the interest money on the funds, which would ruin their future credit. He spoke of stopping on all sums above £1,000 and continuing to pay on those below, because the great sums belonged to the rich, who could better bear the delay of their interest, and the smaller sums to the poorer persons, who would be more hurt and make more clamor, and that the rich might be quieted by promising them interest upon their interest. All this looked as if the matter had been seriously thought on.

Mr. Oswald has an air of great simplicity and honesty, yet I could hardly take this to be merely a weak confession of their deplorable state, and thought it might be rather intended as a kind of intimidation, by showing us that they had still that resource in their power, which he said would furnish five millions a year. But, he added, our enemies may do what they please with us; they have the ball at their foot, was his expression, and we hope they will show their moderation and magnanimity. .

Mr. Oswald also gave me a copy of a paper of memorandums, written by Lord Shelburne, viz.:—

1. That I am ready to correspond more particularly with Dr. Franklin, if wished.

2. That the Enabling Act is passing with the insertion of commissioners recommended by Mr. Oswald; and, on our part commissioners will be named, or any character given to Mr. Oswald, which Dr. Franklin and he may judge conducive to a final settlement of things between Great Britain and America, which Dr. Franklin very properly says requires to be treated in a very different manner from the peace between Great Britain and France, who have always been at enmity with each other.

3. That an establishment for the loyalists must always be on Mr. Oswald's mind, as it is uppermost in Lord Shelburne's, besides other steps in their favor to influence the several States to agree to a fair restoration or compensation for whatever confiscations have taken place.

4. To give Lord Shelburne's letter about Mr. Walpole to Dr. Franklin.

On perusing this paper I recollected that a Bill had been some time since proposed in Parliament, to enable his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with the revolted provinces in America, which I supposed to be the enabling bill mentioned that had hitherto slept and, not having been passed, was perhaps the true reason why the

Colonies were not mentioned in Mr. Grenville's commission. Mr. Oswald thought it likely, and said that the words, "Insertion of commissioners recommended by Mr. Oswald," related to his advising an express mention in the bill of the commissioners appointed by Congress to treat of peace, instead of the vague denomination of any person or persons, &c., in the first draft of the bill.

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As to the loyalists, I repeated what I had said to him when first here, that their estates had been confiscated by the laws made in particular States where the delinquents had resided, and not by any law of Congress, who, indeed, had no power either to make such laws or to repeal them, or to dispense with them, and therefore could give no power to their commissioners to treat of a restoration for those people; that it was an affair appertaining to each State. That if there were justice in compensating them, it must be due from England rather than America; but in my opinion England was not under any very great obligations to them, since it was by their misrepresentations and bad counsels she had been drawn into this miserable war. And that if an account was to be brought against us for their losses, we should more than balance it by an account of the ravages they had committed all along the coasts of America.

Mr. Oswald agreed to the reasonableness of all this, and said he had, before he came away, told the Ministers that he thought no recompense to those people was to be expected from us; that he had also, in consequence of our former conversation on that subject, given it as his opinion that Canada should be given up to the United States, as it would prevent the occasions of future difference; and as the government of such a country was worth nothing and of no importance, if they could have there a free commerce; that the Marquis of Rockingham and Lord Shelburne, though they spoke reservedly, did not seem very averse to it, but that Mr. Fox appeared to be startled at the proposition. He was, however, not without hopes that it would be agreed to.

We now come to another article of the note, viz.: "On our part commissioners will be named, or any character given to Mr. Oswald, which Dr. Franklin and he may judge conducive to a final settlement of things between Great Britain and America.”

This he said was left entirely to me, for he had no will in the affair; he did not desire to be further concerned than to see it in train; he had no personal views either of honor or profit. He had now seen and conversed with Mr. Grenville; thought him a very sensible young gentleman and very capable of the business; he did not, therefore, see any further occasion there was for himself; but if I thought otherwise and conceived he might be further useful, he was content to give his time and service in any character or manner I should think proper. I said his knowledge of America, where he had lived, and with every part of which and of its commerce and circumstances he was well acquainted, made me think that in persuading the ministry to things reasonable relating to that country, he could speak or write with more weight than Mr. Grenville, and therefore I wished him to continue in the service; and I asked him whether he would like to be joined in a general commission for treating with all the powers at war with England, or to have a special commission to himself for treating with America only. He said he did not choose to be concerned in treaty with the foreign powers, for he was not sufficiently a master of their

affairs or of the French language, which probably would be used in treating; if, therefore, he accepted of any commission it should be that of treating with America. I told him I would write to Lord Shelburne on the subject; but Mr. Grenville having some time since despatched a courier, partly on account of the commission, who was not yet returned, I thought it well to wait a few days till we could see what answer he would bring or what measures were taken. This he approved of.

The truth is, he appears so good and so reasonable a man that, though I have no objection to Mr. Grenville, I should be loath to lose Mr. Oswald. He seems to have nothing at heart but the good of mankind and putting a stop to mischief; the other, a young statesman, may be supposed to have naturally a little ambition of recommending himself as an able negociator.

No. 31.-1782, June 4: Extract from letter, Mr. Grenville to Mr. Fox.

You will easily see from the tenor of the correspondence we have hitherto had, that what little use I could be of to you here, appeared to me to be in the communication that I had with Franklin. I considered the rest of the negotiation as dependent upon that, and · the only possible immediate advantages which were to be expected, seemed to me to rest in the jealousy which the French Court would entertain of not being thoroughly supported in everything by America. The degree of confidence which Franklin seemed inclined to place in me, and which he expressed to me, more than once, in the strongest terms, very much favoured this idea, and encouraged me in wishing to learn from him what might be, in future, ground for a partial connection between England and America; I say in future, because I have never hitherto much believed in any treaty of the year 1782, and my expectation, even from the strongest of Franklin's expressions, was not of an immediate turn in our favour, or any positive advantage from the Commissioners in Europe, till the people of America should cry out to them, from seeing that England was meeting their wishes. It was in this light, too, that I saw room to hope for some good effects from a voluntary offer of unconditional independence to America; a chance which looked the more tempting, as I own I considered the sacrifice as but a small one, and such as, had I been an American, I had thought myself little obliged to Great Britain in this moment for granting, except from an idea that if it was an article of treaty, it would have been as much given by France as by England.

I repeat this only to remind you that, from these considerations, the whole of my attention has been given to Franklin, and that I should have considered myself as losing my time here, if it had not been directed to that subject. I believe I told you in my last that I had very sanguine expectations of Franklin's being inclined to speak out, when I should see him next; indeed, he expressly told me, that he would think over all the points likely to establish a solid reconciliation between England and America, and that he would write his mind upon them in order that we might examine them together more in order, confiding, as he said, in me, that

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