Article 21, infra). The fact that the report is a fair and accurate account of what actually took place is no defence (c), though it may operate to mitigate the damages (Article 27).

ARTICLE 20.-Notices and reports published at request of government office or authority.

The publication at the request of (1) any government office or department; (2) officer of state; (3) commissioner of police; or (4) chief constable, of any notice or report issued by them for the information of the public, is privileged, provided that (i.) the matter complained of is not blasphemous or indecent; and (ii.) the matter complained of is of public concern, or the publication thereof is for the public benefit. But this privilege may be rebutted by proof (1) that such publication was published or made maliciously; or (2) that the defendant has, after request, refused or neglected to insert in his newspaper a reasonable letter or statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such publication (d).

NOTE.-It will be observed that this Article only deals with notices or reports published AT THE REQUEST OF ANY Two points should

GOVERNMENT OFFICE OR AUTHORITY. be noticed

(1.) That the publication of a notice or report issued by any other body, e.g., a vestry, is not privileged until officially published; and it would seem that this is so, even where official publication is authorized by Act of Parliament (e).

(c) Davison v. Duncan (1857), 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; 28 L. T. O. S. 265; 7 E. & B. 229; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253.

(d) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 4, set out on pp. 103-104, infra. (e) Popham v. Pickburn (1862), 31 L. J. Ex. 133; 5 L. T. 846 7 H. & N. 891; 26 J. P. 646; 8 Jur. N. S. 179; 10 W. R. 324.

(2.) That the publication of all reports, papers, votes, and proceedings by order of either House of Parliament is absolutely privileged (e).

ARTICLE 21.-Defence of apology under sect. 2 of Lord Campbell's Act, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96.

In an action for libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication, it shall be competent to the defendant to plead that such libel was inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication without actual malice, and without gross negligence, and that, before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication a full apology for the said libel; or if the newspaper or periodical publication in which the said libel appeared should be ordinarily published at intervals exceeding one week, had offered to publish the said apology in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff in such action (ƒ).

There must, however, be a payment of money into Court by way of amends at the time the plea is filed (8 & 9 Vict. c. 75, s. 2); and therefore, having regard to Order XXII. rule 1, no other defence denying liability can be pleaded together with such plea.

NOTE. It should be noticed that this defence is available to every action for a libel contained in any “PUBLIC NEWSPAPER OR OTHER PERIODICAL PUBLICATION," words which would apparently cover almost every kind of journal

(e) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9; supra, Article 15.

(ƒ) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (Lord Campbell's Act), s. 2.

istic publication. It is not enough for the defendant to plead that he inserted the apology "at the earliest opportunity after" the commencement of the action, if he had an earlier opportunity (g). Any defendant relying upon this defence must, as a rule, offer some evidence to prove positively that there was no gross negligence on his part (h).

The apology should be full and free, and published in a conspicuous part of the paper. It should be given at least as prominent a position as the words complained of.

ARTICLE 22.-Accord and satisfaction.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION is an agreement that the plaintiff will forego his right of action on the execution of a valuable consideration. Such agreement may be made by the defendant himself (i), or by one jointly liable with him (k), or by a third party (1), and is a good defence to an action for libel.

NOTE. Thus the defendant will escape liability by proving that the plaintiff agreed to accept from him certain apologies in full discharge of the plaintiff's cause of action, and that in pursuance thereof he published such apologies in the manner agreed upon (i).

(g) Per Keating, J., in Ravenhill v. Upcott (1868), 33 J. P. 229. (h) Per Wills, J., in Peters and another v. Edwards and another (1887), 3 Times L. R. 423.

(i) Lane v. Applegate (1815), 1 Stark. 97; Boosey v. Wood (1865), 34 L. J. Ex. 65; 3 H. & C. 484; Marks v. Conservative Newspaper Co. (1886), 3 Times L. R. 244.

(k) Hey v. Moorhouse and others (1839), 6 Bing. N. C. 52; Thurman v. Wild and another (1840), 11 A. & E. 453; Bainbridge v. Lax and others (1846), 9 Q. B. 819.

(1) Jones and another v. Broadhurst (1850), 9 Ç, B, 173,

ARTICLE 23.-Release.

The plaintiff may release his cause of action by executing a deed to that effect.

ARTICLE 24.-Previous action.

It is a good defence that the plaintiff has already brought an action in respect of the same libel against the defendant or a third person with whom the defendant was jointly concerned in the publication of the libel.

NOTE. This is so whether the plaintiff has failed or succeeded in the previous action. The defendant must be jointly not severally concerned with the third party. Thus, where the third person against whom the previous action has been brought is a partner of the defendant in a firm of printers or publishers, the liability being joint (Article 9), the fact that there has been a previous action against one of the partners is an answer to an action in respect of the same libel against the other partner. But where the liability is several, as, c. g., in the case of the author of a libel and the proprietor of the newspaper in which it has appeared (m), a previous action against one of them is no answer to an action against the other (n).

(m) See Article 8, supra.

(n) Creevy v. Carr (1835), 7 C. & P. 64: Frescoe v. May (1860), 2 F. & F. 123.

ARTICLE 25.-Statute of Limitations.

An action for libel must be brought within six years from the date of publication (o), unless the plaintiff was at that date an infant, a married woman, or a lunatic, or the defendant was beyond the seas, in the former of which cases the action must be brought within six years from the time at which such disability is removed (p), in the latter within six years from the time at which the defendant returns (9).

NOTE." Beyond the seas.' This expression does not include any part of the United Kingdom or the Channel Islands. Formerly, by 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, if at the date of publication of the libel the plaintiff were imprisoned or beyond the seas, he could bring his action at any time within six years from his freedom or return, but this right was abolished by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), sect. 10.

It should be noticed that if once the plaintiff cease to be under any disability—in which case the time begins to run -no subsequent disability can affect the operation of the statute or prevent the time from continuing to run against the plaintiff. A publication contrived by the plaintiff, e.g., a sale of the libellous newspaper to his agent for the express purpose of maintaining the action, is a fresh publication from the date of which the time will begin to run again, even though the real grievance be a publication many years before that date. Thus, in the case of The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer (r), a sale to the plaintiff's agent of

(0) Lord Saye and Sele v. Stephens (1628), cited Cro. Car. 535; Litt. 342.

(p) 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, s. 7; 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 [al. c. 16], s. 19; 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 7; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12.

(q) 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 [al. c. 16], s. 19; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12. (r) (1849), 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 3 C. & K. 10; 14 Jur. 110; 14 Q. B. 185.