fish and game within a federal reservation is contained in 16 U. S. Code 661-666, which provides that the Secretary of the Interior may issue rules and regulations in accordance with general plans approved jointly by the Secretary of the Interior and the head of the department or agency primarily concerned, provided that such rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the laws for the protection of fish and game of the States in which such area is situated. Whether jurisdiction be exclusive or concurrent, in order to establish effective federal regulations of hunting and fishing upon a federal reservation, it would be necessary under existing law to enlist the services of the Department of the Interior. Furthermore, if federal regulations were accomplished, they could not be inconsistent with state law. With respect to a state regulation closing the area to hunting for the reason that state officers are unable to police the area, however, it would appear that, once the federal regulations came into existence, such a state regulation would constitute an unconstitutional interference with the lawful function of the federal government to administer and enforce its own laws and regulations. OP JAGN 1952/133. 2 December 1952. § 29. Motor Vehicles and Traffic Regulations § 29.1. Generally. Five privately owned vehicles were abandoned at a U. S. Naval Base and inquiries directed to possible owners and the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state wherein the base is located have produced negative results. Held: Lost or unclaimed personal property should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 14 April 1949 (63 Stat 44, 5 USC 150e) and par 17400-17408, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual, vol 1, ch 7. Personal property, including vehicles, determined to have been abandoned to the United States, as distinguished from lost or unclaimed personal property, should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of para 421, Navy Property Redistribution and Disposal Regulation No. 1. Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, the General Services Administrator could also exercise authority over unclaimed property on government lands. However, since the Administrator has not spoken with respect to unclaimed property not determined to be abandoned, it is proper to dispose of such property as stated above. Op JAGN 1954/207. 16 February 1954. Charges and Specifications. § 28. Instructions to Court. II. TREATMENT, MAINTENANCE, AND ACTIVITIES. § 49. Labor and Employment. § 71. Transportation and Transfer. IV. RELEASE OR DISCHARGE. § 83. In General. I. IN GENERAL § 23. Escape from Confinement § 25. Charges and Specifications § 25.3. Time or place of offense. The specification under a charge of escape from confinement alleged the place of escape but failed to allege the time or date the escape occurred. As the accused pleaded guilty to the offense the record did not contain any evidence which could establish such time. Held: Since the date of the offense was not supplied in the proceedings, the total absence of any indication as to when the alleged offense occurred, effectively precludes the accused from urging former jeopardy at another trial for the same offense and accordingly findings of guilty of the charge and specification must be set aside. (Citing MCM, 1951, par 87a (2).) NCM 248, Anderson (1953) 13 CMR 519. § 27. - Evidence § 27.7. Weight, effect and sufficiency. The accused pleaded not guilty to but was found guilty of escape from lawful confinement. The evidence disclosed that the accused actually assisted another prisoner to escape by releasing the bolt on the latter's cell door. Held: Since the accused aided his fellow prisoner to escape, the accused, by operation of law, became a principal to the crime, and, accordingly, was properly chargeable with escape from confinement. It is of no consequence that the substantive crime, i.e., the escape of the fellow prisoner could be directly committed by the fellow prisoner only. Even though an accused be personally incapable of committing a particular offense directly, he may, by aiding and abetting another, render himself criminally liable therefor. (See 5 ALR2d 782, 74 ALR 1110, and 131 ALR 1324.) Escape from confinement may be charged as a joint offense. (Citing ACM 2891, Henderson & Jaramillo (JC), 4 CMR(AF) 1051, 1074; ACM 3143, Stephens (BR), 4 CMR (AF) 223, 232.) ACM S-6765, MacQuarrie (1953) 12 CMR 855. The procedures set forth in par 20d, MCM, 1951, for effecting apprehension, arrest, or confinement are intended as informative directives and are a restatement of practices currently followed in the armed forces and are in no sense intended or required as conditions precedent to a lawful confinement. Accordingly, a contention that the evidence on a trial for escape from confinement failed to establish a lawful confinement where it showed that the procedural steps set forth in the Manual were not complied with was held without merit. (Citing Legal and Legislative Basis, MCM, 1951, pp 35-37. Not following CGCM 9762, Samuelson, 4 CMR 473.) ACM 7613, Austin (1953) 13 CMR 734. The accused was found guilty of escape from confinement. The evidence disclosed that the accused was duly confined in a confinement facility at an Air Force base. At the time of the alleged offense, the accused was outside the confinement facility on a work detail. A prosecution witness testified that he was in charge of the detail. He had no weapon, was told to just watch the prisoners, was instructed not to touch the prisoners, and also instructed that if one of the prisoners ran "to tell him to halt, and if he did not, to round up the rest of the prisoners and take them to the guardhouse." Held: The accused at the time of his departure was not under that physical restraint which is required to sustain the finding of guilty. It is apparent that the enlisted man in charge of the detail was to exercise no degree of physical restraint to prevent the escape of prisoners, although he could command or try to persuade or induce them to remain. He not only had no duty to physically oppose an escape, but had an affirmative duty not to physically oppose an escape. In fact, he would definitely have breached his specific orders had he done so. (Distinguishing CM 369374, Lorey, 14 CMR 393.) ACM 8233, Holcomb (1954) 16 CMR § 28. Instructions to Court § 28.4. Time or place of offense. Where the accused pleaded guilty to escape from confinement, the failure of the law officer to instruct as to the elements of either the time or place of escape was error but not prejudicial. (Citing U. S. v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 USCMA 19, 1 CMR 19.) NCM 248, Anderson (1953) 13 CMR 519. § 28.15. Participation in offense; aiding and abetting. Although the prosecution based its case throughout the trial upon the proposition that the accused as aider and abettor to the escape of his fellow prisoner was chargeable as a principal to that offense, the law officer instructed the court that the elements of the offense of escape from confinement were that the accused was duly placed in confinement as alleged, that he knew of his confinement and, at the time and place alleged, he freed himself from the restraint of his confinement before being released by proper authority. Held: Such instructions were erroneous and prejudicial to the accused, in asmuch as the instructions failed to provide the court with a framework of legal issues to which the evidence could be fitted in order to render intelligent findings. If the court had, in fact, followed the instructions as given it had no alternative but to acquit the accused since it is uncontradicted that the accused did not himself escape. (Citing U.S. v. Ginn (No. 263), 1 USCMA 453, 456, 4 CMR 45, 48; U. S. v. Clay (No. 49), 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74, 79; U. S. v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 USCMA 19, 24, 1 CMR 19, 24.) Appropriate instructions upon the elements of the offense proven in this case would have been that the accused's fellow prisoner was duly placed in confinement, that at the time and place alleged he freed himself from restraint of his confinement before released by proper authority, and that the accused aided and abetted the fellow prisoner to free himself from said restraint by unlocking the door to the former's cell. Held also: The fact that the court was fully and correctly instructed upon the subject of aiders and abettors did not cure the defect in the instructions. ACM S-6765, MacQuarrie (1953) 12 CMR 855. II. TREATMENT, MAINTENANCE, AND ACTIVITIES § 49.1. Generally. § 49. Labor and Employment There is no policy objection to the employment of military prisoners from a stockade on a parolee status in the Quartermaster laundry at an Army base due to the excessive turnover of civilian laundry employees in the area. This permission, however, is limited by the prohibition against use of labor resulting in financial gain without the authorization of the Secretary of the Army (subpar 13b (2), SR 600-330-1), and by the prohibition against doing laundry work of a personal nature (subpar 13b(1), SR 600-330-1). It should be noted that sec 2, Act of 4 March 1915 (38 Stat 1085; 10 USC 1455; ML 1949, sec 1058), governing the labor of prisoners at United States disciplinary barracks, while not specifically applicable to stockade prisoners, has been construed as permitting the employment of prisoners to convert Army barracks at a branch disciplinary barracks to housing units (see JAGA 1947/5046, 29 May 1947). Further, prisoners at disciplinary barracks are engaged in laundry and dry cleaning work and earn extra "good time" for such work. JAGA 1952/9271. 3 December 1952. § 50. Guards § 50.5. Use of force or weapons. The question was submitted as to the civil and criminal liability of a civilian guard at a named branch United States disciplinary barracks, located in Georgia, in the event that he shot an escaping prisoner. The barracks are located in an area over which Georgia retains both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In addition, inquiry was also made as to whether the guard would be defended at public expense. Held: The guard may be held criminally and civilly liable by reason of the death or injury inflicted on the prisoner. The general rule in cases of this nature is well settled to the effect that an officer entrusted with the custody of felon may use such force as is reasonably necessary, even to the extent of inflicting injury or death, in order to prevent an escape, but that if more force than is reasonably necessary is used, criminal liability and civil liability will attach (Jackson v. State, 76 Ga 473 (1886); 1 Wharton's Criminal Law (12th ed, 1932), sec 534; 4 Am Jur, Prisons and Prisoners, § 15). While, in most jurisdictions, homicide to prevent the escape of a misdemeanant is not justified (Mullis v. State, 196 Ga 569, 27 SE2d 91 (1943); Newkirk v. State, 57 Ga App 803, 807, 196 SE 911 (1938); Paramore v. State, 161 Ga 176, 129 SE 772 (1925); Holmes v. State, 5 Ga App 166, 170, 62 SE 716 (1908); 6 CJS Arrest § 13; 18 ALR 200), except when done in self-defense (1 Wharton's Criminal Law (12th ed 1932), sec 540), the differentiation between felonies and misdemeanors is of doubtful application here (see United States v. Clark, 31 F 710 (1887, DC Mich). In the event either civil or criminal proceedings are commenced in a Georgia Court against the guard, the procedings may be removed to a federal court if the guard was acting under cover of office (Act of 25 June 1948, 62 Stat 938, 28 USC 1442). Held also: Although there appears to be no statute which requires that the guard in question be defended by the government as a matter of right and at public expense (6 Op Atty Gen 75, 220; 9 Op Atty Gen 52, 146; SPJGA 1945/9457, 3 Oct 1945), a liberal policy exists with respect to the defense by the government of suits against employees acting within the scope of their employment, and accordingly, in the absence of extreme and unusual circumstances, a civilian guard in cases of this nature would be defended at public expense (see par 12, AR 27-5, 3 Apr 1951). JAGA 1952/9705. 19 December 1952. [See 41 Am Jur, Prisons and Prisoners, § 15; 14 ALR2d 353, 360; 61 ALR 569.] The question arose as to whether the receiving of mail by prisoners is a right which cannot be denied, or whether it is merely a privilege and therefore within the power of the confinement authorities to withdraw for certain stated periods, or for an indefinite period, as a disciplinary measure for misconduct for actions prejudicial to good order and discipline. The regulations provide that administrative disciplinary measures may be imposed upon prisoners by the commander of an installation, and that prisoners must sign a statement approving or disapproving inspection of their mail, and in the absence of a consent to inspection the incoming mail of such prisoner is to remain unopened until his release or transfer (pars 22 and 24, SR 210–188–1, 31 May 1951). It is further provided that "prisoner's mail privileges will be limited only by security requirements and the facilities available for the proper inspection, handling and supervision of mail" (par 22, AR 600-330, 8 May 1951). While commanding officers are authorized to impose certain administrative measures upon persons within their jurisdiction for misconduct or action prejudicial to good order |