others when congregated together. It was this example of such drinking which the ordinance seeks to prohibit. There is no discrimination in the class of places selected, or the persons prohibited; whether it should have included other places or omitted some included, is a legislative, rather than a judicial question. That such provisions are reasonable, likewise not in violation of any constitutional provisions, either state or federal, in so far as any discrimination is concerned, must be conceded.

Walker v. The People, 5 Colo. 37, 37 Pac. 29; Adams v. Cronin, 29 Colo. 488, 69 Pac. 590, 63 L. R. A. 61; Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108; Commonwealth v. Price, 123 Ky. 163.

The claim that because subdivision 18 of section 6525 Rev. Stats., 1908 (in force when this ordinance was enacted) gave to towns and cities the right to license, regulate or prohibit the sale or giving away of intoxicating liquors, prevented them from passing this portion of this ordinance under the rule that "the expression of one power is the exclusion of others concerning the same general subject" is not well taken. It might be sound if this section was the only authority for the city's actions. This section says "license, regulate or prohibit the sale or giving away of any intoxicating * ** liquor." It does not attempt to cover the question of where they shall be drunk, for this reason does not include the question covered by this ordinance, under another well known rule, viz., that the enumeration in the statute of the powers which may be exercised by a municipal corporation excludes such powers as are not enumerated.

People v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16; People v. Village of Oak Park, 268 Ill. 256; Town of Cortland v. Larson, 273 Ill. 602.

It is not claimed that this portion of the ordinance was authorized by virtue of section 6525, supra, but by authority granted under section 6669, supra. Besides, the rule that "the expression of the one is the exclusion of the other" which counsel seek to apply to section 6525, supra,

is in no sense a fixed and unalterable one. If the question of its applicability to this contention is debatable, a complete answer to counsels' argument will be found in Schwartz v. The People, 46 Colo. 239, where a similar contention was made for a clause in the constitution which referred to the importation for and sale of poisonous or drugged liquors, etc., and where the authority to enact legislation prohibiting the sale of pure liquors was sustained, under the general legislative power clause in the Constitution.

In view of numerous recent decisions, both state and federal, concerning the liquor traffic, it is unnecessary to consider in detail the validity of this part of this ordinance from a constitutional standpoint concerning personal liberty, religious freedom, etc., or otherwise than what effect article XXII of the Constitution adopted at the 1914 election may have had upon it. This article, generally speaking, prohibits the manufacture for sale or gift; the importation into the state for sale or gift; the sale, or to be kept for sale, of any intoxicating liquors or the offering of same for sale, barter or trade. It provides that the handling and sale of such liquors for medicinal or sacramental purposes may be provided by statute, but it does not purport to prohibit the drinking of liquors within the state. After its adoption, the Twentieth General Assembly passed our present prohibitory act, pages 275-288, Laws 1915. This act prohibits the manufacture for sale or gift, or importation into the state for sale or gift, or the sale or keeping for sale, or offering for sale, barter or trade, of any such liquors, but like the constitutional amendment, does not attempt to prohibit the drinking of such liquors, and permits of their sale, for medicinal and sacramental purposes, under regulations as provided in the act. It exempts private residences occupied as such from its search and seizure provisions. It gives to cities and towns the right to co-operate regarding the matters therein referred to. Section 27 reads as follows: "Municipality may enact.-Any municipality may enact ordinances in

conformity with the provisions of this act." Just what kind of legislation is authorized by this section need not be determined. It indicates, however, a legislative construction of article XXII of the Constitution, as well as of the act itself, to the effect that neither was intended to prohibit towns and cities from enacting ordinances concerning intoxicating liquors. We are likewise of opinion that there is nothing in article XXII of the Constitution, or the 1915 prohibitory act, which conveys any intention of withdrawing from towns and cities the power granted them under section 6669, supra, to enact and enforce such an ordinance as that portion of the one under consideration, when, as here, it is not in conflict with the state law. The court committed error in refusing to admit the ordinance in evidence.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

Decision en banc.

Reversed and remanded.

No. 8859.

FORT MORGAN RESERVOIR & IRRIGATION COMPANY ET AL. v. STERLING IRRIGATION COMPANY ET AL.

1. CONTRACTS-Ratification. Several irrigation companies associated together for the protection of their rights, appointed a board of directors, and a president, authorizing the latter to have entire charge of the affairs of the association, under the supervision of the directors. The president employed attorneys who conducted litigations over several years, greatly to the advantage of the members of the association. There was no vote of the directors approving the selection of the attorneys but the president reported their employment, at a formal meeting of the board, and no objection was made then or afterward, during the pendency of the litigation. Held a ratification binding each member of the association.

The result is the same though the association be treated as having no legal existence.

2. CORPORATIONS-Partnership of. Several private corporations having similar interests formed an association for the protection

of the rights common to all. By the authority of those to whom they committed the management of their common affairs, attorneys were employed and a litigation carried on for several years, with the knowledge, and to the profit of all. All are liable to the attorneys' bill, even though the association be regarded as without legal existence.

Error to Morgan District Court, Hon. H. P. Burke, Judge. En banc.

Messrs. JOHNSON & ROBISON and STEPHENSON & STEPHENSON, for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. C. M. ROLFSON, Mr. T. E. MUNSON, for defendants in

error.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Teller.

THE parties to this action were defendants below in an action to recover attorney's fees and disbursements in a course of litigation alleged to have been brought for and at the instance of said defendants. The plaintiffs in error admitted the allegations of the complaint and alleged that the other defendants were jointly and severally liable.

The defendants in error, by their answer, denied that the plaintiffs had been employed by them in said litigation.

On the trial, at the close of plaintiff's case, the court sustained a motion by the Julesburg Irrigation District for a non-suit as against it, directed a verdict in favor of the other defendants who now appear as defendants in error, and entered judgment against the defendants which had admitted liability. They bring the case here for review, and allege error in the court's rulings in favor of the other defendants.

The litigation for which the attorneys' fees are claimed grew out of the following circumstances.

The defendants in that suit were members of an organization known as "The Lower Platte Protective Association," an unincorporated body, formed by various ditch companies in Water Districts No. 1 and No. 64, and the Julesburg Irrigation District, for the announced purpose of protecting the irrigation rights of its members.

The plaintiffs acted as attorneys for the association in an adjudication of water rights, and in various suits in which the rights of these parties as appropriators were involved through claims by others for seepage, waste and flood waters by which said rights are in great part satisfied. All of the litigation resulted in favor of the members of said association.

The constitution of the association provided for a board of directors consisting of three members from each of the two districts, four of whom should constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. It further provided that the president was to "have general executive control over all the officers, agents and employes of the association," and that he should "have entire charge of the operation and conduct of the business and affairs of the association, under the direction and supervision of the board of directors."

The trial court held that, as against the defendants in error, the plaintiffs had failed to show an employment; this for the reason that they failed to show any formal action by the board in the matter.

That was the ground of defense below, as it is here.

The president of the association testified-and it is undisputed that there was, from the inception of the movement to organize the association, a general understanding among the parties in interest that the plaintiffs were to be employed as attorneys of the association; and that in pursuance of such understanding, and after consulting a majority of the board, he employed the plaintiffs.

It appeared also from the testimony of the president and of two other directors that at least five of the directors had knowledge of plaintiffs' employment and of the work they were doing for the association. The president testified that he reported to the board, at a formal meeting, the fact that plaintiffs had been so employed, and that no objection was made thereto. It appeared, also, that the board allowed and paid a number of bills for services and expenses of other parties, rendered at the instance of the president