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to pieces by the owner, by separating the arms and other parts of it,
for the purpose of placing it in safety, but with a view to put it
together again; and it was destroyed, whilst in this disjointed state;
it was decided, that the offence was within the statute of the 7 & 8
G. 4. c. 30. s. 3. R. v. Hutchins, Reading Special Commission,
December 1830, cor. Park, Bolland, and Patteson, Js. And see
R. v. Tacey, ante, 1367. So, where certain side-boards were
wanting to the machine at the time it was destroyed, but which did
not render it so defective as to prevent it altogether from working,
though it would not work so effectually, as if those boards had
been made good; it was held, that it was still a threshing machine,
within the meaning of the statute. R. v. Barlett and others,*
Salisbury Special Commission, cor. Vaughan, B. Parke and Alder-
son, Js. January 1831. So also, where the owner removed a wooden
stage belonging to the machine, on which the man who fed the
machine was accustomed to stand, and had also taken away
legs; and it appeared in evidence, that though the machine could
not be conveniently worked without some stage for the man to
stand on, yet that a chair, or table, or a number of sheaves of
corn, would do nearly as well, and that it could also be worked
without the legs; it was held, that the machine was an entire one,
within the act, notwithstanding the stage and legs were wanting.
R. v. Chubb, Salisbury Special Commission, January 6, 1831, cor.
Vaughan, B. and Parke, J.

the

An indictment under sect. 4. of the statute for breaking a machine may be sustained, although at the time the machine was broken it had been taken to pieces, and was in different places, only requiring the carpenter to put those pieces together again. R. v. Mackerel and another, 4 C. & P. 448. Park, J. Bolland, B. and Patteson, J.

Thus where a threshing machine was worked by water, the prose- Breaking part cutor, the owner, took the machine in pieces and put it into an ad- of a machine. joining barn for safety, leaving only the water-wheel standing, which was broken by a mob; it was held that the water-wheel was part of the threshing machine, (it being the part to which the power was applied and not the power itself,) and that the breaking the wheel was felony under sect. 4. of the statute. R. v. Fidler and others, 4 C. & P. 449. Park, J. Bolland, B. and Patteson, J.

But where the prosecutor had not only taken the machine to pieces, but had broken the wheel of it before the mob came to destroy it, for fear of having it set on fire and endangering his premises; and it was proved, that, without the wheel, the engine could not be worked; in this case it was held, that the remaining parts of the machine, which were destroyed by the mob, did not constitute a threshing machine, within the meaning of the statute. R. v. West, Salisbury Special Commission, January 6, 1831, cor. Alderson, J.*

*The above cases of R. v. Hutchins, R. v. Bartlett, and R. v. West, are here inserted verbatim as inserted by Mr. Deacon in the Addenda, which has been cancelled.

Means of death.

Poisoning.

What is an administering.

Misdemeanor.

Page 891.

The word misdemeanor is nomen collectivum. The first count of an indictment charged a defendant with an assault with intent to commit a rape, and the second with a common assault. The record stated the finding of the jury that "the said H. P. is guilty of the misdemeanor and offence in the said indictment specified in manner and form," &c. And the judgment of the court was, that "the said H. P. for the said misdemeanor be imprisoned," &c. It was held upon writ of error that the word misdemeanor was nomen collectivum, and that the finding of the jury that the defendant was guilty of the misdemeanor, was in effect that he was guilty of the whole matter charged by the indictment; and therefore that the judgment was warranted by the verdict. R. v. Henry Powell, 2 B. & Ad. 75. See Attempts and Endeavours, ante, p. 1497.

Murder.

II. Of the Means by which, and the Time when the Death is effected.

Page 900. § 4. An indictment (for manslaughter) charged a wound (as the means of death) to have been given by a blow with a hammer, but there was no direct evidence how it had been given. The prisoner had at the time a hammer in his hand, but the surgeon stated that the wound might have been inflicted, either by a blow with a hammer, or by a fall against the lock or key of a door. Park, J. said to the jury, in summing up,-"The kind of instrument is immaterial. There is no count which describes the injury to have been occasioned by her being struck against the door in the struggle. If, therefore, you are of opinion, that the injury was occasioned by a fall against the door, produced by the act of the prisoner, it will not do; but, if you think that the injury was occasioned by a blow given with a hammer, or with any other hard substance held in the hand, then the indictment will be sufficiently proved." R. v. Martin, 5 C. & P. 128.

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Page 900. § 6. An indictment (under 43 G. 3. c. 58.) charged the prisoner with having administered white arsenic to E. D. with intent to murder her. The prisoner had given a piece of cake containing the poison to the prosecutrix to eat, which she put into her mouth, but spit it out again, and did not swallow any part of it. The prisoner having been convicted, the case was reserved for the consideration of the judges, who were of opinion that a mere delivery to the woman did not constitute an administering; but they seemed to think swallowing not essential. R. v. William Cadman, R. & M. C. C. 114.

This case is however very differently reported by Mr. Carrington, in his Supplement, p. 237; after stating the case nearly as above, it

is said, "This was held to be not sufficient; and the twelve judges were of opinion that it was not an administering, unless the poison was taken into the stomach."

In the case of R. v. Hannah Harley, the above case of R. v. Cadman having been cited, as reported in Ryan and Moody's Crown Cases, Park, J. said-"There is another report of the case of R. v. Cadman, and the two reports differ materially. My memory is, that Mr. Carrington's report is accurate, and that the judges held that it was no administering unless the poison was taken into the stomach. If, according to the report you have cited, the delivery into the hand is not enough, and the taking into the stomach is immaterial, I can hardly say what would be enough in any case. If I call in a physician, and he writes his prescription, and I take the medicines, is not that an administering by him?" And his lordship afterwards added, "I have my own note of the case of R. v. Cadman. My note of the case is, that the judges were unanimously of opinion that the poison had not been administered, because it had not been taken into the stomach, but only into the mouth." R. v. Hannah Harley, 4 C. & P. 369.

In the above case of R. v. Cadman, in Ryan & Moody, the marginal note, by the learned reporters, is-"To constitute the offence of administering poison, or other noxious substance, under 43 G. 3. c. 58. s. 1., some of the poison, or noxious substance must be taken by, or applied to the person to whom it is administered; merely giving it, if no part is taken or applied, is not sufficient, but if any part is taken, it is not necessary that it should be swallowed." This note and the decision, as there reported, seem to be entirely inconsistent with the facts of the case as stated in both of the reports. It is clear that the prisoner gave the poisoned cake to the prosecutrix, urging her to eat it, and there can be no doubt, that if she had done so, she would have been his agent, and he would have been guilty of administering. It is also clear that the prosecutrix put the poison into her mouth at the solicitation of the prisoner, and if swallowing be not essential, what more could possibly be necessary to constitute an administering? The marginal note seems to draw a distinction between poison taken and poison swallowed, which hardly appears to be warranted by the decision as reported, and if it were, it does not seem to be very easy to define what the difference consists of, if indeed there be any.-It is difficult to say how such poison could be taken without being swallowed. Neither does the case appear to have decided anything respecting poison "applied" to a person.

Some error must have crept into the report of this case by Messrs. Ryan & Moody, and it is noticed at greater length, because many recent publications have stated the case from this report, and evidently from the marginal note of it.

The words of the statute, under which the prisoner was indicted, are "If any person shall wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully administer to, or cause to be administered to, or taken by any of his majesty's subjects, any deadly poison, or other noxious and destructive substance, or thing," with intent to murder, &c.

In order to constitute an administering, it is not necessary that there should be a delivery by hand. Thus where a servant put poison into a pot of coffee which was for her mistress' breakfast, placed it at the fire and told her mistress she had put it there for her

Poison must be taken into the stomach to con

stitute an administering.

Remarks.

Delivery by hand not neces

sary.

Attempt to ad

minister.

Poison taken by the person intended, or any other.

Laying poison.

All persons present are principals.

breakfast; the mistress having taken some of the poisoned coffee, it was held that there was an administering within the meaning of 9 G. 4. c. 31. s. 11. and also that it was a causing to be taken within the meaning of the same section of that act. R. v. Hannah Harley, 4 C. & P. 369. Park, J.

So in a case where the prisoner was indicted for attempting to administer poison to E. D. his own bastard child, it appeared that the mother of the child had bought some magnesia for the purpose of giving it to the child, and had given one dose to it. The prisoner came to the house where the mother and child were living and took an opportunity, when the mother was out of the room, of mixing the magnesia with arsenic. It having been objected that if the poison had been taken it would not have been an administering, Lord Lyndhurst, C. B. said, if the prisoner mixed the arsenic with the magnesia and placed it in such a situation that it would probably be administered to the child, and with intent that it should be taken by the child, that would be an attempt to administer within the meaning of the act of parliament. R. v. Rob. Yates, Lancaster Summer Assizes, 1834. MS.

In a case where the prisoner was indicted for administering poison to the prosecutrix, it appeared that the prisoner was at the shop of a Mrs. H. buying salt, and shortly after she left the shop Mrs. H. found a parcel on the counter containing half a pound of moist sugar and an ounce of tea. The parcel was directed" to be left at Mrs. Daws, Fownhope," Mrs. H. sent the parcel to Mrs. Davis, who used some of the sugar, which made her very ill, and was afterwards found to contain corrosive sublimate. Gurney, B. in summing up said, "The question is, whether the prisoner laid this poison on the shop counter intending to kill any one? If it was intended for Mrs. Daws, and finds its way to Mrs. Davis, and she take it, the crime is as much within this act of parliament as if it had been intended for Mr. Davis. If a person sends poison with intent to kill one person, and another person takes the poison, it is just the same as if it had been intended for such other person." R. v. Celia Lewis, 6 C. & P. 161.

III. Of Aiders, Abettors, and Accessories.-Page 902.

In a case of poisoning, if one layeth poison for one, or infuse it into broth, or the like, although he be not present when the same is taken, and either the party intended, or any other is poisoned,yet is he a principal felon, and guilty of murder, 3 Inst. 138.

And in such a case both the principal and procurer, or accessary, may be absent. Id.

In a case where the prisoners were indicted for maliciously wounding, it appeared that the prisoners had been out poaching when the prosecutor (who was a gamekeeper) and his assistant met them. The prisoners knocked the prosecutor and his assistant down and stunned them. When the prosecutor came to his senses he heard one of the prisoners say, "damn 'em, we have done 'em both," and when the prisoners had left the prosecutor two or three paces, one of them returned and wounded him in the leg, and then ran away.

It was objected (amongst other things) that the wounding was the act of one alone, and the prisoners having been convicted, the case was reserved for the opinion of the judges, who held the conviction to be right. R. v. James Warner and others, R. & M. C. C. 380.

Page 904. § 8.—A prisoner was indicted for wounding with intent to murder. It appeared that the prosecutor and another man were employed as private watchmen. In the course of the night they saw two carts driven by the prisoner and another man, which contained apples, and suspecting them to have been stolen, they walked on with the prisoner and his companion, intending to accompany him until they could obtain assistance to take them into custody. The prisoner's companion and the prosecutor being at some distance from the prisoner and the other watchman, and while they were all walking along, the prisoner's companion stepped back and wounded the prosecutor severely. Garrow, B. "To make the prisoner a principal, the jury must be satisfied that when he and his companion went out with a common illegal purpose of committing the felony of stealing apples, they also entertained the common guilty purpose of resisting to death, or with extreme violence, any persons who might endeavour to apprehend them; but if they had only the common purpose of stealing apples, and the violence of the prisoner's companion was merely the result of the situation in which he found himself, and proceeded from the impulse of the moment without any previous concert, the prisoner will be entitled to an acquittal." R. v. Collison, 4 C. & P. 565.

Prosecution of

a common pur

pose.

self-murder.

Page 905. § 15.-If a woman being with child takes a drug, Accessary to (which was given her by another person for that purpose) in order to procure miscarriage, and she dies from the effects, she will be guilty of self-murder. And the person who furnished her with the drug for that purpose, if absent at the time it is taken, will be guilty as an accessary to that murder before the fact. R. v. Henry Russell, R.

& M. C. C. 356.

IV. Where the Death is inflicted under slight Provocation.-p. 908.

"It is not every slight provocation, even by a blow, which will, Slight blow. when the party receiving it strikes with a deadly weapon, reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. But it depends upon the time elapsing between the blow and the injury, and also whether the injury was inflicted with an instrument at the moment in the possession of the party, or whether he went to fetch it from another place.' R. v. Daniel Lynch, 5 C. & P. 324. Lord Tenterden, C. J.

cool.

Page 911. § 10.—In a recent case the prisoner was indicted for Provocation no murder by stabbing. It appeared that the deceased had, at his excuse where mother's request, turned the prisoner out of her house, in doing there is time to which he gave the prisoner a kick, upon which the prisoner said to the deceased he would make him remember it. The prisoner (who was a butcher) instantly went to his lodgings, which were about two or three hundred yards distant, where he was heard to go into a pantry where he kept some knives, and then hastily return back into the street. Within five minutes after the prisoner left the house of deceased's mother, the deceased followed the prisoner to give him his

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