ject. This power the common council of that city seems to have exercised by establishing a board of health, under the ordinance of 1881, and investing it with authority to make and enforce such rules and regulations as the board might deem necessary "to promote, preserve, and secure the health of the city, and to prevent the introduction and spreading of contagious, infectious, or pestilential diseases." Rule 11 of the state board of health, which appears to have been adopted and promulgated in 1891, soon after the organization of that board, provides, as we have seen, that, in all cases where an exposure to smallpox is threatened, it shall be the duty of the board of health within whose jurisdiction such exposure shall have occurred, or danger of such epidemic ensuing, to compel the vaccination or revaccination of all exposed persons. Pursuant to this rule, and in the exercise of the powers with which it was generally invested, this local board, after expressly finding that there had been and was an exposure to and danger of an epidemic of smallpox within the limits of the city of Terre Haute, made and promulgated the order in controversy, to the effect that no person be allowed to attend the public schools of that city without being vaccinated. In obedience to this order, it appears, the superintendent of the city's public schools directed appellees not to permit any person to attend the school over which they were in charge unless such person had been vaccinated. That the rule or by-law adopted by the state board of health, and the order of the local board, were each intended to secure and protect the public health, by preventing the spread, in its virulent form, of the contagious and loathsome disease of smallpox, there certainly can be no doubt. That the preservation of the public health is one of the duties devolving upon the state, as a sovereign power, cannot be successfully controverted. În fact, among all of the objects to be secured by governmental laws, none is more important than the preservation of the public health; and an imperative obligation rests upon the state, through its proper instrumentalities or agencies, to take all necessary steps to promote this object. This duty finds ample support in the police power, which is inherent in the state, and one which the latter cannot surrender. the case of State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 439. 33 L. R. A. 313, 44 N. E. 469, on page 451 of the opinion, and page 473, 44 N. E., in speaking in reference to the police power, it is said: "The police power of a state is recognized by the courts to be one of wide sweep. It is exercised by the state in order to promote the health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of the public. The right to exercise this power is said to be inherent in the people in every free government. It is not a grant derived from or under any written constitution. It is not, however, without limitation, and it cannot be invoked so as to invade the fundamental rights of a citizen. As a general proposition, it may be asserted that it is the province of the legis tion. Consequently, in our holding in this appeal, it cannot be said that we affirm the arguments of those who disbelieve in the efficacy of vaccination, or that we deny the arguments of those who assert that it is a failure, and an outrage upon personal liberty. With this statement, we pass to the consideration of the real question involved. There is no express statute in this state making vaccination compulsory, or imposing it as a condition upon the privilege of children attending our public schools; and, in the absence of such a law, the act of appellees in excluding Kleo Blue from the public schools in question must, under the facts, be justified, if at all, as a public emergency, under the rules and orders of the respective boards of health as set out in the answer. In 1891 the legislature of this state passed a statute creating and establishing a state board of health, and investing it with certain powers. See Burns's Rev. Stat. 1894, §§ 6711 et seq. By 8 5 of the original act (Burns's Rev. Stat. § 6715), this board is expressly authorized and empowered to adopt "rules and by-laws, subject to the provisions of this act and in harmony with other statutes in relation to the public health, to prevent outbreaks and the spread of contagious and infectious diseases." Section 6718 provides that it shall be the duty of local boards of health to protect the public health by the removal of causes of disease, when known, and in all cases to take prompt action to arrest the spread of contagious diseases, to abate and remove nuisances dangerous to the public health, and to perform such other duties as may from time to time be required of them by the state board of health, pertaining to the health of the people. By 6719 it is provided that “it shall be the duty of county boards of health to promulgate and enforce all rules and regulations of the state board of health, in their respective counties, which may be issued from time to time for the preservation of the public health and for the prevention of epidemic and contagious diseases. And the secretary of any board of health, who shall fail or refuse to promulgate and enforce such rules and regulations, and any person or persons, or the officers of any corporation who shall fail or refuse to obey such rules and regulations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, and upon a second conviction the court or jury try ing the cause may add imprisonment in the county jail, for any period not exceeding ninety days." By 8 6725 the governor of the state is empowered to draw a warrant upon the state's treasury for money, in any sum not exceeding $50,000, to be expended in preventing the introduction into the state, and the spread, of cholera and other contagious and infectious diseases. Under the general law, by which the city of Terre Haute is governed, the legislature expressly conferred upon its common council the power to establish a board of health, and to invest it with the necessary power to attain its ob In lature to decide when the exigency exists for the exercise of this power, but as to what are the subjects which come within it is evidently a judicial question." See also Champer v. Greencastle, 138 Ind. 339, 24 L. R. A. 768, 35 N. E. 14. In order to secure and promote the public health, the state creates boards of health, as an instrumentality or agency for that purpose, and invests them with the power to adopt ordinances, by-laws, rules, and regulations necessary to secure the objects of their organization. While it is true that the character or nature of such boards is administrative only, still the powers conferred upon them by the legislature, in view of the great public interest confided to them, have always received from the courts a liberal construction; and the right of the legislature to confer upon them the power to make reasonable rules, by-laws, and regulations is generally recognized by the authorities. Parker & W. Public Health & Safety, § 79; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. 2d ed. p. 597; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. James, 10 Ind. App. 550, 35 N. E. 395, and 38 N. E. 192. When these boards duly adopt rules or by-laws by virtue of legislative authority, such rules and bylaws, within the respective jurisdictions, have the force and effect of a law of the legislature; and, like an ordinance or by-law of a municipal corporation, they may be said to be in force by authority of the state. Salem v. Eastern R. Co. 98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. Dec. 650; Metropolitan Bd. of Health v. Heister, 37 N. Y. 661; Gregory v. New York, 40 N. Y. 273; Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65; Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544; Swindell v. State ex rel. Maxey, 143 Ind. 153, 168, 35 L. R. A. 50, 42 N. E. 528; People ex rel. Cor v. Special Sessions Ct. Justices, 7 Hun, 214; Parker & W. Public Health & Safety, § 85; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 599. It is true that such rules and by-laws must be reasonable, and boards of health cannot enlarge or vary, by the operation of such rules, the powers conferred upon them by the legislature; and any rule or by-law which is in conflict with the state's organic law, or antagonistic to the general law of the state, or opposed to the fundamental principles of justice, or inconsistent with the powers conferred upon such boards, would be invalid. Parker & W. Public Health & Safety, § 86. As a general proposition, whatever laws or regulations are necessary to protect the public health and secure public comfort is a legislative question, and appropriate measures intended and calculated to accomplish these ends are not subject to judicial review. But nevertheless such measures or means must have some relation to the end in view, for, under the mere guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative department; and consequently its determination, under such circumstances, is not final, but is open to review by the courts. If the legislature, in the interests of the public health, enacts a law, and thereby interferes with the personal rights of an individual,-destroys or impairs his liberty or property,-it then, under such circumstances, becomes the duty of the courts to review such legislation, and determine whether it in reality relates to, and is appropriate to secure, the object in view; and in such an examination the court will look to the substance of the thing involved, and will not be controlled by mere forms. Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Weil v. Ricord, 24 N. J. Eq. 169. It is affirmed by the authorities, as a general proposition or rule, that no one has a right to do any act which will cause injury to the health of another, or which will disturb his bodily comfort. Still, this right of security to health or comfort cannot remain absolute in a state of organized society, but is sometimes required to give way to the demands of trade or other vital public interests. Tiedeman, Pol. Power, § 16. It cannot be successfully asserted that the power of boards of health to adopt rules and by-laws subject to the provisions of the law by which they are created, and in harmony with other statutes in relation to the public health, in order that the "outbreak and spread of contagious and infectious diseases" may be prevented, is an improper delegation of legislative authority, and a violation of article 4, § 1, of the Constitution. It is true, beyond [controversy, that the legislative department of the state, wherein the Constitution had lodged all legislative authority, will not be permitted to relieve itself of this power by the delegation thereof. It cannot confer on any body or person the power to determine what the law shall be, as that power is one which only the legislature, under our Constitution, is authorized to exercise; but this constitutional inhibition cannot properly be extended so as to prevent the grant of legislative authority to some administrative board or other tribunal to adopt rules, bylaws, or ordinances for its government, or to carry out a particular purpose. not be said that every grant of power to executive or administrative boards or officials, involving the exercise of discretion and judg ment, must be considered a delegation of legislative authority. While it is necessary that a law, when it comes from the lawmaking power, should be complete, still there are many matters relating to methods or details which may be by the legislature referred to some designated ministerial officer or body. All of such matters fall within the domain of the right of the legislature to authorize an administrative board or body to adopt ordinances, rules, by-laws, or regulations in aid of the successful execution of some general statutory provision. Cooley, Const. Lim. 114. The rule in respect to the delegation of legislative power is admirably stated in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716, as follows: "Then the true distinction, I conceive, is this: The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the It can law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things, upon which wise and useful legislation must depend, which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." That the power granted to administrative boards, of the nature of boards of health, etc., to adopt rules, by-laws, and regulations reasonably adapted to carry out the purpose or object for which they are created, is not an improper delegation of authority, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition in controversy, is no longer an open question, and is well settled by a long line of authorities. See Jasper County Comrs. v. Spitler, 13 Ind. 235; Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 252, 2 N. E. 722: Madison v. Abbott, 118 Ind. 337, 21 N. E. 28; Farley v. Hamilton County Comrs. 126 Ind. 468, 26 N. E. 174; Eastman v. State, 109 Ind. 278, 10 N. E. 97; State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 7 L. R. A. 240, 23 N. E. 946; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 523, 18 L. R. A. 729, 33 N. E. 421; State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. ed. 243, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896; Woodruff v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 59 Conn. 63, 20 Atl. 17; Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R. Co. 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226; Atlantic Exp. Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. 111 N. C. 463, 18 L. R. A. 393, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 294, 16 S. E. 393; State ex rel. Port Royal Min. Co. v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519, 3 L. R. A. 841, 9 S. E. 686; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495. tagious diseases, and to perform such other duties as may from time to time be required by the state board, are expressly enjoined upon all local health boards. It is certainly evident that the health board of the city of Terre Haute, regardless of the rule of the state board, had, under the law, ample power to protect the public health, and to prevent the spread of contagious and infectious diseases, and for such purposes had the right to adopt such appropriate and reasonable means or methods as its judgment dictated. This being true, and an emergency on the account of danger from smallpox having arisen, and the board believing, as we may assume, that the disease would spread through the public schools, and further be lieving that it would be prevented, or its bad effects lessened, by the means of vaccination, and thereby afford protection to the pupils of such schools and the community in general, it would certainly have the right, under the authority with which it was invested by the state, to require, during the continuance of such danger, that no unvaccinated child be allowed to attend the public schools; or the board might, under the circumstances, in its discretion, direct that the schools be temporarily closed during such emergency, regardless of whether or no the pupils thereof refused to be vaccinated. If vaccination was the most effective means of preventing the spread of the disease through the public schools, and this the local board seems to have determined,—it then became, not only the right, but the duty, of the board to require that the pupils of such schools be vaccinated, as a sanitary condition imposed upon their privilege of attending the schools during the period of the threatened epidemic of smallpox. This power, as previously asserted, under the circumstances, was lodged in the local board of health, irrespective of the rule of the state board. The rule or by-law of the latter merely emphasized what was already the duty of local boards, in their respective jurisdictions, in times of danger of a smallpox epidemic,-to enforce vaccination, if that was believed to be the best and most effective method or means known of arresting or preventing the spread of the disease. That this was the belief of the state board when it adopted its by-law, and also of the local board when it made its rule or order in question, is certainly evident. It is declared in the order of the latter that "vaccination is the only preventive of the disease of Under the ordinance of the city's common smallpox." The local board did not attempt, council establishing the local board of under its order, to compel appellant's son health, the latter was, as we have seen, in- to be vaccinated. Under a reasonable intervested with power to adopt and enforce such pretation of its order, the board simply gave rules and regulations as it might deem nec him the option or choice to be either vacessary to secure, promote, and preserve the cinated, or remain out of school until the public health, and to prevent the spread of danger of smallpox had passed. The facts contagious and infectious diseases. By the alleged in the answer show that there had provisions of the statute creating the state been an exposure in the community to smallboard of health, the imperative duty to pro- pox, and that there was danger of an epidemtect the public health by the removal of ic of that disease within the city of Terre causes of diseases when known, and to take Haute. Evidently, then, under the circumprompt action to arrest the spread of constances, prompt action upon the part of the It would seem that the power of the boards of health of this state, under the laws relating thereto, to make and adopt all reasonable by-laws, rules, and regulations to carry out and effectuate the great interests of the public health confided to them by the legislature, is so well affirmed by the authorities that we may dismiss this feature of appellant's contention without further consideration. In the light of the firmly-settled principles of the law to which we have referred, we may proceed, under the facts, to test thereby the acts of appellees in excluding Kleo Blue from school. health authorities, in taking steps to arrest | nated, or furnish a certificate from a physior prevent the spread of the disease, was essential. The first step taken by the board, it appears, was to prevent the spread thereof throughout the community by the children who each day assembled at the public schools from all parts of the city. It is a well-recognized fact that our public schools in the past have been the means of spreading contagious diseases throughout an entire community. They have been the source from which diphtheria, scarlet fever, and other contagious diseases have carried distress and death into many families. Surely there can be no substantial argument advanced adverse to the reasonableness of a rule or order of health officials which is intended and calculated to protect, in a time of danger, all school children, and the families of which they form a part, from smallpox or other infectious diseases. In several of our sister states laws have been enacted expressly requiring vaccination, some requiring it, however, only as a prerequisite to the privilege of attending the public schools, while others enforce it against all persons. In the case of Abeel v. Clark, 84 Ĉal. 226, 24 Pac. 383, the supreme court of that state upheld the constitutional validity of a statute requiring that all children attending the public schools should be vaccinated. In sustaining the act, the court, in the course of its opinion, said: "The act referred to is designed to prevent the dissemination of what, notwithstanding all that medical science has done to reduce its severity, still remains a highly-contagious and much-dreaded disease. While vaccination may not be the best and safest preventive possible, experience and observation, the test of the value of such discoveries, dating from the year 1796, when Jenner disclosed it to the world, have proved it to be the best method known to medical science to lessen the liability to infection with the disease." In Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 29 L. R. A. 251, 32 Atl. 348, the validity of a law authorizing school trustees to make vaccination a condition upon the privilege of children attending the public schools was sustained. The court in that appeal said: "The question before us is not whether the legislature ought to have passed such a law; it is simply whether it had the power to pass it. In no proper sense can this statute be said to contravene the provisions of § 1 of the first article of our state Constitution, as claimed by the plaintiff. It may operate to exclude his son from school, but, if so, it will be because of his failure to comply with what the legislature regards, wisely or unwisely, as a reasonable requirement, enacted in good faith to promote the public welfare." In Duffield v. Williamsport School Dist. 162 Pa. 476, 25 L. R. A. 152, 29 Atl. 742, appellant's minor son had been excluded from the public schools of the city of Williamsport. The expulsion, it appears, was under the authority of an ordinance adopted by the city which provided that "no pupil shall attend the schools of this city except they be vacci cian that such vaccination has been performed." The school board in that case was notified by the board of health of an epidemic of smallpox prevailing in near-by cities and towns. Upon considering the communication from the board of health, and from the general alarm arising from a case of smallpox in that city, the school board adopted a resolution providing that no pupil should attend the public schools unless he had been vaccinated. The power to exclude appellant's son, under the circumstances in that case, was upheld. The court, in passing upon the question there involved, said: "It should be borne in mind that there is no effort to compel vaccination. The school board do not claim that they can compel the plaintiff to vaccinate his son. They claim only the right to exclude from the schools those who do not comply with such regulations of the city and the board of directors as have been thought necessary to preserve the public health. It would not be doubted that the directors would have the right to close the schools temporarily during the prevalence of any serious disease of an infectious or contagious character. This would be a refusal of admission to all the children of the district. They might limit the exclusion to children from infected neighborhoods, or families in which one or more of the members were suffering from the disease. For the same reason, they may exclude such children as decline to comply with the requirements looking to prevention of the spread of contagion, provided these requirements are not positively unreasonable in their character." In Re Rebenack, 62 Mo. App. 8, the St. Louis board of public schools ordered that all unvaccinated children should be excluded from the public schools of that city. In that case the charter law, under which the board of public schools was created, provided that the president and directors thereof should have the power "to make all rules, ordinances, and statutes proper for the government and management of such schools," etc., "so that the same shall not be inconsistent with the laws of the land." The court in that case held that the school board has the right to require the vaccination of children in attendance at school, and to exclude those therefrom who refused to comply with the order. In Morris v. Columbus, 102 Ga. 792, 42 L. R. A. 175, 30 S. E. 850, the supreme court of that state held that the legislature, in the exercise of the police power, may confer upon municipal corporations the authority to make and enforce ordinances requiring all persons who may be within the limits of such corporations to submit to vaccination whenever an epidemic of smallpox is existing or may be reasonably apprehended. See also Re Walters, 65 N. Y. S. R. 479, 32 N. Y. Supp. 322. In Parker & W. Public Health & Safety, § 123, the rule is stated as follows: "It is sometimes provided by law that persons who may have been exposed to contagion, or who came from places believed to be infected, and particularly children at tending the public schools, shall submit to vaccination, under the direction of the health authorities. This requirement is a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state, which can be sustained as a precautionary measure in the interest of the public health." tends that, under the order of the local board, his son was to be permanently expelled from the public schools of the city of Terre Haute unless he submitted to vaccination. No such unreasonable interpretation can be placed upon the rule or order in question. The order was the offspring, as we have seen, of an emergency arising from a reasonable apprehension upon the board's part that smallpox would become epidemic or prevalent in the city of Terre Haute. The rule or order could not be considered as having any force or effect beyond the existence of that emergency; and Kleo Blue, by virtue of its operation, could only be excluded from school upon his refusal to be vaccinated, until after the danger of an epidemic of smallpox had disappeared. Any other construction than this would render the rule or order absurd, and place the board in the attitude of attempting to usurp authority. Such an interpretation is not authorized when a more reasonable one can be applied. In the case of Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 39 L. R. A. 152, 47 N. E. 81, it is held, in the absence of an express authority from the legislature, that a rule of the state board of health requiring the vaccination of children as a prerequisite to their attending the public schools is unreasonable when smallpox does not exist in the community, and there is no reasonable ground to apprehend its appearance. The same doctrine is reaffirmed in the case of Lawbaugh v. Dist. No. 2, Bd. of Edu. 177 Ill. 572, 52 N. E. 850. In the appeal of State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 37 L. R. A. 157, 70 N. W. 347, it is also affirmed that in the absence of a statute authorizing compulsory vaccination, or making it a condition to the privilege of attending the public schools, a rule of the state board of health which excludes from the public and other schools all children who do not present a certificate of vaccination is unreasonable, if at the time of its adoption there was no smallpox epidemic in the city, and no sufficient cause for the school authorities to believe that the disease would become prevalent in the city where the rule was sought to be enforced. The court in that case, speaking in respect to the powers of health boards, said: "It cannot be doubted but that, under appropriate general provisions of law in relation to the prevention and suppression of dangerous and contagious diseases, authority may be conferred by the legislature upon the state board of health or local boards to make reasonable rules and regulations for carrying into effect such general provisions, which shall be valid, and may be enforced accordingly. The making of such rules and regulations is an adminis- There is nothing disclosing that appeltrative function, and not a legislative power, lant's son was in a condition of health but there must first be some substantive which would exempt him from the requireprovision of law to be administered and car-ments of this order, but, upon the contrary, ried into effect. The true test and distinc- it was shown that he was "well and tion whether a power is strictly legislative, healthy." It is said in appellant's brief that or whether it is administrative, and merely relates to the execution of the statute law, 'is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.' The first cannot be done. To the latter no valid objection can be made." Neither the holding of the supreme court of Illinois nor Wisconsin in the cases mentioned can, under the facts, be said to militate against the conclusion which we reach in the case at bar. In fact, there is much asserted in both cases which may be said to be in harmony with our holding herein. We are not called upon, however, to decide whether a rule of either the state board or local board of health can be carried beyond the limits of the facts in this case. Appellant con It is true, as insisted, that the privilege of children in this state to attend the public schools is guaranteed by the Constitution,at least to the extent that tuition shall be free, and such schools shall be equally open to all. Article 8, § 1, of the Constitution; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 733. It is equally true, however, that they are frequently denied this privilege, by reason of their refusal to submit to the proper rules of school discipline. There is no express law in this state authorizing the expulsion from school of boisterous or disobedient pupils. That a rule to this effect upon the part of school officials or teachers may be enforced, no one will controvert. If expulsion can result from the violation of a rule, the object of which is to promote the morals of the scholars and the efficiency of the school in general, certainly one which is intended and calculated to promote the health of the scholars ought to be sustained. there was no investigation upon the part of the health authorities to ascertain whether his son had been exposed to smallpox. It appears, however, that there had been an exposure upon the part of the community; and it would be an absurdity, under such circumstances, to require the health officials, before taking action to prevent the spread of the disease, to investigate in order to determine the degree of exposure to which every person in the community had been subjected. The question as to what is an exposure to smallpox, so as to be affected thereby, is certainly one which, in the main, must be left to the sound discretion or judgment of the health officers. The supreme court of Massachusetts, in Salem v. Eastern R. Co. 98 Mass. 443, 96 Am. Dec. 650, in speaking in regard to the right of boards of health to make general orders, and enforce them |