plates upon which the switch was to move, in being opened and closed, were not oiled, but were impeded by the presence of loose cinders or slag, which prevented the prompt closing of the switch. It is shown that this character of switch had been in use upon other railroads for many years; that the one in use here was well constructed and of good quality, and that it had been carefully selected, and was up to the standard of such appliances. It also appears that the railroad track was in good condition at the time. Upon these facts the master reported that the receiver should pay the administratrix of Gray the sum of $8,000 as damages, the circuit court approved this action of the master, judgment was entered accordingly, and, a petition for rehearing having been denied, the case comes here upon appeal from that judgment. Messrs. Harmon, Colston, Goldsmith, & Hoadly and Spotswood D. Bowers, for appellant: There was a well-known and well-understood regulation prohibiting running through switches. The rule governing switches generally was understood by employees as applying to these automatic switches also. The receiver was not bound to assume that any employee would treat this particular switch as an exception to the rule. The receiver was not bound to assume that, because the switch would work automatically, it would be used automatically without instructions so to use it. On the contrary, the receiver had the right to assume that this switch would not be used automatically by employees unless they were told so to use it. Wolsey v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 33 Ohio St. 227. The duty of an employer to instruct an employee as to the mode of using any machinery or any implement is based upon the proposition that to use the implement or machinery the wrong way is dangerous to the servant; otherwise, there is no need, as between master and servant, of any regulation concerning its use. 2 Bailey, Personal Injuries Relating to Master & Servant, § 2700; Shearm. & Redf. Neg. § 202. There was no reason why the receiver should have supposed that the use of this switch automatically involved danger to the employees. Between master and servant the mere hap-| pening of an accident is not of itself even prima facie proof of negligence. Trinity County Lumber Co. v. Denham, 85 Tex. 56, 19 S. W. 1012; Stern v. Michigan C. R. Co. 76 Mich. 591, 43 N. W. 587; Werbowlsky v. Fort Wayne & E. R. Co. 86 Mich. 236, 48 N. W. 1097; Toomey v. Eureka Iron & Steel Works, 89 Mich. 249, 50 N. W. 850; Yarnell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. 113 Mo. 570, 18 L. R. A. 599, 21 S. W. 1; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301, 13 Átl. 286; Melchert v. Smith Brewing Co. 140 Pa. 448, 21 Atl. 755; Ash v. Verlenden Bros. 154 Pa. 246, 26 Atl. 374; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. 188, 23 N. E. 537; Sack v. Dolese, 137 Ill. 129, 27 N. E. 62; Knight v. Cooper, 36 W. Va. 232, 14 S. E. 999; Brymer v. Southern P. Co. 90 Cal. 496, 27 Pac. 371; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Binion, 98 Ala. 570, 14 So. 619; De Vau v. Pennsylvania & N. Y. Canal & R. Co. 130 N. Y. 632, 28 N. E. 532; Robinson v. Charles Wright & Co. 94 Mich. 283, 53 N. W. 938; Bailey, Personal Injuries Relating to Master & Servant, § 1597. The use of an appliance which experience has shown to be safe is not negligence, though an accident results from its use. La Pierre v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 99 Mich. 212, 58 N. W. 60; Burke v. Witherbee, 98 N. Y. 562; Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N. Y. 188, 1 L. R. A. 483, 18 N. E. 870; Sjogren v. Hall, 53 Mich. 274, 18 N. W. 812; Loftus v. Union Ferry Co. 84 N. Y. 455, 38 Am. Rep. 533; Cleveland v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 68 N. Y. 306; Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co. 56 N. Y. 1; Crocheron v. North Shore Staten Island Ferry Co. 56 N. Y. 656; Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co. 136 Pa. 618, 20 Atl. 517; Mississippi River Logging Co. v. Schncider, 34 U. S. App. 743, 74 Fed. Rep. 195, 20 C. C. A. 390. Even if there were any dangers connected with the use of this switch automatically, they were obvious dangers, and as well known to Cook as to anybody else. The whole modus operandi of the switch was ascertainable at a glance. It was all open to observation, nothing concealed, and nothing that a child could not understand. The servant of mature age and of experience is charged by law with knowledge of obvious dangers, and of those things that are within common observation and are according to natural law. Mississippi River Logging Co. v. Schneider, 34 U. S. App. 743, 74 Fed. Rep. 197, 20 C. C. A. 390. The court erred in deciding the case against the receiver on a ground of negligence not raised by the pleadings, and in allowing the intervener to file her third amended petition in order to set out facts consistent with its opinion and which had not been alleged in any of her previous three petitions. Greer v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 94 Ky. 169, 21 S. W. 649; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McGary, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 691, 47 S. W. 440; Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 59 Fed. Rep. 394; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Beall (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 605; Werbowlsky v. Fort Wayne & E. R. Co. 86 Mich. 236, 48 N. W. 1097; Yarnell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. 113 Mo. 570, 18 L. R. A. 599, 21 S. W. 1; McCain v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 334. Cook, the yardmaster, was a fellow servant of Gray, the decedent. New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323, 44 L. ed. 181, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. Where a master furnishes appliances such as are in general use throughout the coun try in similar business, and employs them | the defendant to Gray; second, the delict of in the accustomed manner, he is not liable the defendant constituting the violation of for an injury caused by such appliances, and that duty. In the first petition the delict it is not negligent for him to use such ap- of the defendant was the negligence of Cook, pliances in such manner. Cook's act being made the act of the defendant on the principle of qui facit per alium facit per se, while in the last petition there was no negligence at all on the part of Cook his act was perfectly innocent, but the delict of the defendant was the failure to perform a personal duty by giving information to Cook, and prescribing rules. Mississippi River Logging Co. v. Schneider, 34 U. S. App. 743, 74 Fed. Rep. 195, 20 C. C. A. 390; Titus v. Bradford, B. & K. R. Co. 136 Pa. 618, 20 Atl. 517; Fritz v. Salt Lake & O. Gas & E. L. Co. 18 Utah, 493, 56 Pac. 90; Shadford v. Ann Arbor Street R. Co. 111 Mich. 390, 69 N. W. 661; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Allen, 78 Ala. 494; Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. 348, 13 L. R. A. 374, 22 Atl. 910; Hagan v. Chicago, D. & C. G. T. Junction R. Co. 86 Mich. 615, 49 N. W. 509; Schroeder v. Michigan Car Co. 56 Mich. 132, 22 N. W. 220. It is the nature of the duty performed by the servant, and not the rank of the servant performing it, that determines the liability of the master for the act of one servant towards another. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Schwabbe, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 573, 21 S. W. 706; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 28 L. ed. 787, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184; Northern P. R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349, 38 L. ed. 1009, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 983; Central R. Co. v. Keegan, 160 U. S. 259, 40 L. ed. 418, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Northern P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 Ū. S. 346, 40 L. ed. 994, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843; Oakes v. Masc, 165 U. S. 363, 41 L. ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345; Martin v. Atchison, T. & §. F. R. Co. 166 U. S. 399, 41 L. ed. 1051, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603; Northern P. R. Co. v. Poirier, 167 U. S. 48, 42 L. ed. 72, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; Alaska Treadwell Gold Min. Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86, 42 L. ed. 390, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; McGrath v. Texas 4 P. R. Co. 23 U. $. App. 86, 60 Fed. Rep. 555, 9 C. C. A. 133; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham, 27 U. S. App. 227, 25 L. R. A. 833, 63 Fed. Rep. 107, 11 C. C. A. 56; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Brown, 34 U. S. App. 759, 73 Fed. Rep. 970, 20 C. C. A. 147; Balch v. Haas, 36 U. S. App. 693, 73 Fed. Rep. 674, 20 C. C. A. 151; New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323, 44 L. ed. 181, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. Box v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 107 Iowa, 660, 78 N. W. 694; Rodgers v. Mutual Endowment Assessment Asso. 17 S. C. 407; Flatley v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 9 Heisk. 234; Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 73 Cal. 455, 15 Pac. 82; East Line & K. River R. Co. v. Scott, 75 Tex. 84, 12 S. W. 995; Sicard v. Davis, 6 Pet. 124, 8 L. ed. 342; Weldon v. Neal, L. R. 19 Q. B. Div. 394. The rule as to amendments in equity is the same as that in law, so far as the matter of limitation is concerned. Buswell, Limitations, 515; Dudley v. Price, 10 B. Mon. SS. Mr. Edgar W. Cist, with Messrs. C. M. Cist and Harlan Cleveland, for appellee: The duties to provide a safe system, adopt adequate rules, and warn employees of dangers are primary duties of a master. What his representative orders, or does, or leaves undone as to these matters, within the apparent scope of his delegated authority, are the orders, acts, and omissions of the master to the servants of the master. If there is negligence the master is negligent. 2 Shearm. & Redf. Neg. 5th ed. §§ 203a, 204; Bailey, Personal Injuries Relating to Master & Servant, p. 128; Hough v. Texas & P. R. Co. 100 U. S. 213, 25 L. ed. 612; Northern P. R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 755, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Union P. R. Co. v. Daniels, 152 U. S. 684, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. Snyder, 38 L. ed. 597, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Northern P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 Ù. S. 353, 40 L. ed. 997, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. Moseley, 12 U. S. App. 514, 56 Fed. Rep. 1012, 6 C. C. A. 225; Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co. 110 Mass. 240, 14 While the making of amendments is un-Am. Rep. 598; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. doubtedly a matter within the sound discretion of the court, yet the abuse of that discretion is proper matter for appeal. Wright v. Hollingsworth, 1 Pet. 165, 7 L. ed. 96; Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623, 34 L. ed. 1086, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453. Ward, 18 U. S. App. 683, 61 Fed. Rep. 927, 10 C. C. A. 166; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Iron Min. Co. 99 N. Y. 368, 2 N. E. 24; Mann v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 91 N. Y. 495; Bailey v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co. 139 N. Y. 302, 34 N. E. 918; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. La Rue, 55 U. S. App. 20, 81 Fed. Rep. 148, 27 C. C. A. 363; Smith v. Baker [1891] A. C. 325. It is a personal duty of a master in a dangerous and complicated business to prescribe rules sufficient for its orderly and safe management, and to keep his servants informed thereof so far as needful for their guidance. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Camp, 31 U. S. App. 213, 65 Fed. Rep. 952, 13 C. C. A. 233; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, 39 Am. Rep. 627; Shearm. & Redf. Neg. 5th ed. § 202; Frost v. Oregon Short Line & U. N. R. Co. 69 Fed. Rep. 936; Norman v. Wabash R. Co. 22 U. S. App. 505, 62 Fed. Rep. 727, 10 C. C. A. 617; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Archibald, 170 U. S. 665, 42 L. ed. 1188, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777; Holman v. Kempe, 70 Minn. 422, 73 N. W. 186; Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 391, 39 L. ed. 464, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 464; Wheeler v. Wason Mfg. Co. 135 Mass. 294; Lynch v. Allyn, 160 Mass. 248, 35 N. E. 550. None of these duties can be so delegated as to relieve the master for a failure on the part of his subordinates to whom the duty is delegated to exercise proper care for their discharge. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Henthorne, 43 U. S. App. 113, 73 Fed. Rep. 634, 19 C. C. A. 623; Smith v. Hillside Coal & 1. Co. 186 Pa. 28, 40 Atl. 287; Alton Paving, Bldg. & Fire Brick Co. v. Hudson, 74 Ill. App. 612; Gowen v. Bush, 40 U. S. App. 349, 76 Fed. Rep. 349, 22 C. C. A. 196; Wabash Western R. Co. v. Brow, 31 U. S. App. 192, 65 Fed. Rep. 941, 13 C. C. A. 222. Gray was led by the receiver into danger through the instructions of the receiver's agent acting within the scope of his authority. Gowen v. Bush, 40 U. S. App. 349, 76 Fed. Rep. 349, 22 C. C. A. 196. The amendments setting up additional grounds of negligence did not introduce any new cause of action, and the action of the court in allowing the amendments, as well as its action in denying the petition for rehearing, is discretionary, and not assignable for error. Smith v. Missouri P. R. Co. 12 U. S. App. 426, 56 Fed. Rep. 458, 5 C. C. A. 557; Columb v. Webster Mfg. Co. 50 U. S. App. 264, 43 L. R. A. 195, 84 Fed. Rep. 592, 28 C. C. A. 225; Cross v. Evans, 52 U. S. App. 720, 86 Fed. Rep. 1, 29 C. C. A. 523; Sherman Oil & Cotton Co. v. Stewart, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 59, 42 S. W. 241; Greer v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 94 Ky. 169, 21 S. W. 649; Northern P. R. Co. v. Craft, 29 U. S. App. 687, 69 Fed. Rep. 124, 16 C. C. A. 175. The action of the trial court in allowing or disallowing amendments is discretionary, and not reviewable on appeal or error. Bullitt County v. Washer, 130 U. S. 142, 32 L. ed. 885, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Chapman v. Barney, 129 U. S. 677, 32 L. ed. 800, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Mandeville v. Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15, 3 L. ed. 23; Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 253, 3 L. ed. 215; Walden ex dem. Denn v. Craig, 9 Wheat. 576, 6 L. ed. 164; Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 6 L. ed. 474; Wright v. Hollingsworth, 1 Pet. 165, 7 L. ed. 96; United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 12, 7 L. ed. 585; Murphy v. Stewart, 2 How. 263, 11 L. ed. 261; Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634, 8 L. ed. 810; Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623, 34 L. ed. 1086, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453; Sheffield & B. Coal, I. & R. Co. v. New man, 41 U. S. App. 766, 77 Fed. Rep. 787, 23 C. C. A. 459; Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. National Nickel Co. 86 Fed. Rep. 491. Evans, District Judge, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court: Error is assigned by appellant upon the action of the court below in permitting the filing of certain amended petitions, but, as these were matters entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court, the authorities are uniform to the effect that such action is not reviewable upon appeal. This rule applies quite as forcefully to the amended petition permitted to be filed at or near the final hearing of the case as to the others. Corrections and amendments of pleadings are liberally allowed in order to subserve the ends of justice, and to secure a thorough presentation of the claim or defense, so that its merits may be fully disclosed. There was therefore no reviewable error in the action of the circuit court in this respect. After the judgment in the court below the appellant's counsel presented a petition for a rehearing, which was denied, and error is also assigned upon that action of the court. We need not do more than say that the cases all agree that the action of the trial court, upon petitions of this character and upon motions for new trials, is not assignable for error. They are matters of discretion entirely. It is unnecessary to cite authorities upon this point. Nor do we think that the Kentucky statute of limitations bars the claim of the petitionr. The claim arose when the injury occurred, on March 26, 1893. The original petition was filed September 18, 1893, much less than the required one year after the injury. The second amended petition was filed on December 26, 1895, a former one not appearing in the record, and the third was, by express leave of the court, filed on April 25, 1899. The last amendment was possibly designed rather to make the pleadings conform to the proof than for any other purpose. It may be, and doubtless is, true that, when an and distinct cause of action, time, under the amended petition sets up an entirely new statute, will not cease to run until the date of filing it. Cecil v. Sowards, 10 Bush, 96: Leatherman v. Times Co. 88 Ky. 292, 3 L. R. A. 324, 11 S. W. 12. But this rule by no means applies to a case such as we have before us, in which the original and real cause of action, namely, the negligence by which Gray was injured, was never departed from nor abandoned. The plaintiff only restated the circumstances of the injury as the investigation appeared to develop them; but these were the particulars, the details merely, of the substantive claim, stated in general terms, that the injury to Gray was due to the inculpating negligence of the receiver. The action itself, to recover damages for that negligence and its results, was the principal thing, whatever may have been the details incident thereto, and was commenced within one year, and was not barred by the statute of limitations by reason of the supplying, by amendment, of any omission, or by correcting any error in the original statement of the petitioner's claim that her intes tate was injured by the receiver's negligence, | upon which it might become most dangerous, whether the details of its happening were and these were unknown to Gray. They exone way or another. For the injuries com- isted, but he was not notified of it. Though plained of the suit was, without any objec- possibly unfortunately called an "automatic tion to its form, instituted before the master switch," it was not intended to do its own in the way already mentioned, and, although work, but was intended always to be set by the means and manner of the infliction of hand, though its automatic feature was exthese injuries were variously stated, the ap- pected to be a useful safeguard in any time pellee, as we have seen, always relied upon of emergency due to a negligent or accidentthe original claim that her intestate was in- al omission to set it by hand. In this sense, jured by the negligence of the receiver. It and in this sense only, it was an emergency does not appear, therefore, that this assign- switch. It is not shown that Gray had noment of error is well taken. The action was tice of these facts. On the contrary, the little brought within the year allowed by the Ken- information he had about the operations of tucky statute. It has been prosecuted con- the switch tended rather to show him that tinuously from that time until now, and the it was a labor-saving device, which was degeneric cause of action has always been the signed to avoid the work of setting it by hand, and leave it to be operated upon by the force of moving cars and engines as they came upon it, thus doing its own work. same. It was insisted in the circuit court, as it is here, that Cook was not a fellow servant of Gray, but a vice principal, and that his negligence in running the train through the switch when it was open, and his failure to accurately instruct the employees of the receiver as to the limitations upon its use, were not the negligent acts merely of a fellow servant in the same employment with the decedent, but were those of the master himself, in whose employ as vice principal it was claimed Cook in these respects stood. We cannot accept this view, but agree with the learned circuit judge in his opinion that Cook was the fellow servant of Gray, and that no liability arose out of what he did at the time of the accident nor previously in reference to the switch. This conclusion seems unavoidable upon the authority of many cases. Among them we need only cite Northern P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, 40 L. ed. 994, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 369, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Camp, 31 U. S. App. 236, 65 Fed. Rep. 952, 13 C. C. A. 233. In accepting a voluntary employment, a servant, as is well understood, assumes all the ordinary and obvious risks of such employment, including those arising from the negligence of his fellow servants; but, in the view we take of the facts of this case, our decision must rest upon another phase of it. As we have seen, the form of switch, which is called automatic, while long, successfully, and safely used by other roads, had been in use in the yards of this railroad, when Gray was injured, only two or three days, and it is not shown that he personally had any previous knowledge of the workings or operations of such a switch, particularly in so far as they differed from the old one, which it had replaced. No instructions had been given by the receiver explaining the uses of this had replaced. No instructions had been given of the possible dangers of its use under certain altogether probable circumstances; nor had any regulations whatever been promulgated respecting its operations, although in some important respects they were very different from those of the old one. True, the switch cannot be regarded as dangerous per se, but certainly there were conditions It is true that the general purpose and operations of an ordinary railroad switch were perfectly understood by Gray, and that if there had been nothing more in this case than the act of a fellow servant in running a train through a switch, known and seen to be open, there would not be the slightest right to recover for the injury inflicted in that way. But here there was a new kind of switch, very recently put in. The methods of its operation, particularly wherein they differed from those of the former switch, had not been explained to Gray, and were not obvious. The name "automatic" possibly, and even probably, carried an idea which gave weight to the general yard master's statement to the employees that the new switch would work itself, though, in fact, the receiver never intended that it should be operated in that manner. No notice was given that put the employees generally, or Gray especially, in possession of the fact that the switch, while automatic in name, did not operate, and was not intended to operate, of itself, nor otherwise than in such manner as required it always to be set by hand; nor had there been made or published any general regulations upon the subject for the guidance of the servants who were to use the new switch. It is by no means certain that the name or description of the new switch as "automatic" was not so far misleading and dangerous as to give stress to the necessity for notice and instruction. Upon the facts shown, we think it is not difficult to deduce from the authorities the rules which fix the duties of the master in cases like this, and determine the tests of his responsibilities to his servants. The considerations which demand that the master shall furnish for his employees reasonably safe appliances for doing the work imposed upon them necessarily reach to and include the requirement that when new, and, so far as they differ and as far as the particular work is concerned, unknown and untried, appliances are substituted for old ones, he shall give full and plain instructions to employees as to the parts of such appliances which are new in operation, in order that a servant may have a fair opportunity, before incur ring danger, to understand the difference is not a hazard usually or necessarily atwhich might, if unknown, produce it. This tendant upon the business. Nor is it one obligation on the master is equally as strong which the servant, in legal contemplation, when appliances are put in which differ only is presumed to risk; for the obvious reason in some respects from old ones for which that the servant who is to use the instruthey are substituted as it is when there is mentalities provided by the master has, ordithe beginning of a work or when appliances narily, no connection with their purchase in are more radically or even entirely changed. the first instance, or with their preservation And, indeed, this duty of the employer is or maintenance in suitable condition after emphasized when ignorance of the points of they have been supplied by the master." novelty, either of design or of operation, in the substituted appliance may, as here, involve the most serious consequences affecting the safety and lives of the servants. The obvious fact is that if instruction or notice of the exact situation, in respect to the new switch and its operations, had been given in this case, the accident would not have occurred, at least in the way it did. This illustrates the extreme importance of the duty of the master in regard to making known the difference between the workings of the new and the old machinery, especially where that difference is the one which, if unknown, might bring about dangerous conditions or consequences. The servant in such cases is entitled to notice and information upon these points, and it is the duty of the master to give it. His failure to do so is negligence. In the case before us there was negligence in this respect, and we do not doubt that it was the proximate cause of the injury to Gray. In speaking of the general rule that the master is exempt from liability to one servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant in the same employment, and of certain exceptions thereto, the Supreme Court, in the case of Hough v. Texas & P. R. Co. 100 U. S. 217, 25 L. ed. 615, said: One, and perhaps the most important, of those exceptions arises from the obligation of the master, whether a natural person or a corporate body, not to expose the servant, when conducting the master's business, to perils or hazards against which he may be guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master. To that end the master is bound to observe all the care which prudence and the exigencies of the situation require in providing the servant with machinery or other instrumentalities adequately safe for use by the latter. It is implied in the contract between the parties that the servant risks the dangers which ordinarily attend or are incident to the business in which he voluntarily engages for compensation, among which is the carelessness of those, at least, in the same work or employment, with whose habits, conduct, and capacity he has, in the course of his duties, an opportunity to be come acquainted, and against whose neglect or incompetency he may himself take such precautions as his inclination or judgment may suggest. But it is equally implied in the same contract that the master shall supply the physical means and agencies for the conduct of his business. It is also implied, and public policy requires, that in selecting such means he shall not be wanting in His negligence in that regard proper care. In the case of Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 399, 39 L. ed. 470, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467, where the circumstances were such as to call for strong and emphatic language, the court said: "Indeed, we think it may be laid down as a legal principle that in all occupations which are attended with great and unusual danger there must be used all appliances, readily attainable, known to science for the prevention of accidents, and that the neglect to provide such readily attainable appliances will be regarded as proof of culpable negligence. If an occupation attended with danger can be prosecuted by proper precautions without fatal results, such precautions must be taken by the promoters of the pursuit or employers of laborers thereon. Liability for injuries following a disregard of such precautions will otherwise be incurred, and this fact should not be lost sight of. So, too, if persons engaged in dangerous occupations are not informed of the accompanying dangers by the promoters thereof, or by the employers of laborers thereon, and such laborers remain in ignorance of the dangers and suffer in consequence, the employers will also be chargeable for the injuries sustained. Both of these positions should be borne constantly in mind by those who engage laborers or agents in dangerous occupations, and by the laborers themselves as reminders of the duty owing to them. These two conditions of liability of parties employing laborers in hazardous occupations are of the highest importance, and should be in all cases strictly enforced. Further than this, it is plain from what has already been stated that the plaintiff knew nothing of the special dangers attending his work, or that he was at all informed by the defendants on the subject. His testimony is positive on this point, and is not contradicted by anyone. With that fact shown, there was no ground for any charge of contributory negligence on his part." While the facts of that case were quite different from those in the case before us, the general principles announced as to the duty of the master may well find application here to the extent, at least, that such application is called for. It may be that the principles enforced there would create a rule of liability beyond that demanded in this case, and they might establish a test of duty for the master much more exacting than is required in the operations of a railroad where the dangers to experienced employees are much less than those shown under the facts in that case. Still those principles do, in their scope, embrace cases like the pres |