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absence of legislative authority, may be con pellant purchased his lots there was a fence structed at any heigh*..

about 5 feet high along the boundary line of Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 264, 28 Am. the respondent's lot, but on the land of the Dec. 461; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 152; appellant, extending from the front of her Western Granite & Marble Co. v. Knicker- house to the sidewalk; but at that time the bocker, 103 Cal. 111, 37 Pac. 192.

back part of the lots of both parties seems All the fence ordered removed by the de- not to have been inclosed, and the people recree is built about a foot on appellant's own siding in the neighborhood were in the habit premises. The legislature could not give the of passing over that portion of appellant's court power to remove such a fence.

premises in going to and returning from the Triplett v. Jackson, 5 Kan. App. 777, 48 business portion of the city. The appellant, Pac. 931; Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, having concluded to inclose his premises 44 Am. Rep. 642; Lapere v. Luckey, 23 Kan. with a more substantial fence, requested the 534, 33 Am. Rep. 196; Dawson v. Kemper, respondent to join him in erecting such a 32 Ohio L. J. 15.

fence on the line dividing their respective Jlessis. W. H. Harris and Ernest lots. This the respondent declined to do; Hoppe, for respondent:

claiming that she had no need of another If the title fairly gives notice, so as to lead fence, and that she could not afford to build to inquiry, it is sufficient.

one. Appellant at the same time also reNichols v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 391, quested the respondent to so alter the roof of 23 S. W. 680; People ex rel. Rochester v. her house that water would not fall thereBriggs, 50 N. Y. 564; State ex rel. Terre from upon his land and damage his lawn and Haute v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 14 L. R. A. flowers, which she also refused to do. These 566, 29 N. E. 595; Bell v. Maish, 137 Ind. refusals greatly provoked and irritated the 236, 36 N. E. 358, 1118; State v. Shaw, 22 appellant, ard, according to the testimony of Or. 287, 29 Pac. 1028; Baker v. Seattle, 2 the respondent, he became very angry and Wash. 576, 27 Pac. 462; Lancey v. King said to her: "You will do nothing. Never County, 15 Wash. 9, 34 L. R. A. 817, 45 Pac. mind. I will fix you." Thereafter the ap645; State ex rel. Dustin v. Rusk, 15 Wash. pellant commenced to construct a high board 403, 47 Pac. 435.

fence upon his own land, along and close to Conceding that the act was unconstitu- the boundary line between his lot and that tional when passed, such unconstitutionality of the respondent. The respondent therewas certainly cured by the act of Congress. upon instituted this action for the purpose

The civil and common laws recognize the of restraining the appellant from further moral law, and do not permit the owner of proceeding with the erection of the fence, land to do an act upon his own premises for averring in her complaint, among other the express purpose of injuring his neighbor, things not necessary to be mentioned, that especially when the act brings no profit or the fence was maliciously commenced for the advantage to himself.

purpose of annoying and spiting the plainBurke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. tiff by shutting off the light from the three 838; Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 8 L. R. windows on the north side of her dwelling A. 183, 45 N. W. 381: Kirkwood v. Finegan, house, and for no other purpose; that, if the 95 Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 457; Hunt v. Coggin, defendant is allowed to erect and maintain 66 N. H. 140, 20 Atl. 250; Greenleaf v. Fran- said fence, her house will be darkened there cis, 18 Pick, 117; Wheatley v. ugh, 25 Pc. by in such a manner as to shut out and ab528; 2 Beach, Inj. § 1076.

scure the light almost entirely from the said

three windows, and her house greatly damAnders, J., delivered the opinion of the aged on account thereof; and that the tenant court:

now occupying said house is threatening to, The respondent and the appellant are own- and will, vacate the same if the plaintiff is ers of adjoining lots fronting on G street, in permitted to erect and maintain said fence. the city of Tacoma. There is situated on the She prayed that, in case the fence should respondent's premises a dwelling house, have been completed before the final hearing which is some distance back from the street, and disposition of the cause, a mandatory inbut so near the side of her land next to that junction might issue, compelling its removal. of the appellant that the roof projects over The defendant, after denying the material althe boundary line thereof, causing the rain legations of the complaint, alleged affirmawater falling thereon to be discharged on the : tively in his answer that he was constructappellant's lot. The appellant's dwelling, ing the fence on his own land, as an improvehouse is located about 25 feet from the re- ment thereon, and for the proper use and spondent's lot, and the intervening portion enjoyment of the same, and denied that it of his land is used for a flower garden and was being constructed wantonly or malilawn. The surface of the lots of both of the ciously, with the intent to injure or annoy parties contiguous to the street is about 4 the plaintiff. Before the cause came on for feet below the grade of the sidewalk, and trial the fence had been completed. It was gradually descends to the alley in the rear. 8 feet high at the street, and something more The respondent's house, it appears, was than 9 feet high opposite respondent's winerected several years before the appellant dous, owing to the fact that the soil had been owned or occupied his premises, and has usu- "dug out" considerably in that locality. It ally been occupied by tenants; the respond was constructed of inch boards nailed to ent herself residing in another house located stringers attached to posts set in the ground, on her land. Before and at the time the ap- and unplaned on the side next to respondent's house, and extended up to the top of sufficient; but under the rule announced by the lower sash of respondent's windows. this court in the subsequent case of Marston

At the trial the court found, among other v. Ilumes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 Pac. 520, and facts, that the plaintiff used the house in which has since been followed, it would seem question for the purpose of renting to ten- that the title is not open to the objection ants: that at the time of erecting said fence here urged aginst it. But whether this said dwelling house was occupied by a ten- statute was originally valid or invalid under ant, who afterwards vacated it on account of the organic act is now quite immaterial, for the darkening of the windows by said fence; the act of which it is a part was expressly that said fence, owing to the unusual height ratified and confirmed, as a whole, by an act and character of the same, was and is a nui- passed by Congress in July, 1984. See 23 U. sance to the plaintiff and her tenants; that S. Stat. at L. 122, chap. 226. said fence was not erected by said defendant The appellant also contends that, even if for any useful or ornamental purpose, but the statute is not invalid upon the ground of for the sole purpose of spiting and annoying insufliciency of title, still it does not cover plaintiff ; that a fence 5 feet high would have this case, for the reason that a fence is not answered for any lawful, useful, or ornamen- a structure, within the meaning of the act. tal purpose, or for the protection of defend- Webster defines a structure to be “that ant's said premises; and that, if said fence which is built; a building; especially a buildis allowed to remain at the height it now ing of some size or magnificence; an edifice.” is, plaintiff will suffer great injury and Webster, Int. Dict. And hence it is argued damage on account thereof. After filing its that the term "structure," as used in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the statute, must mean an offensive building of court adjudged and decreed that "upon the some kind, apparently serving no purpose plaintiff's constructing a sufficient gutter or but to spite and annoy an adjoining owner. eaves trough under the eaves of the roof of In support of the position that a fence is not her said dwelling described in the pleadings a structure, in contemplation of this statute, and findings of fact on file herein, to prevent the appellant cites the case of Rutherfoord the water from running off of her roof onto v. Cincinnati & P. R. Co. 35 Ohio St. 559 ; the defendant's premises, she have a per- and it is true that in that case the supreme emptory injunction ordering and compelling court of Ohio held that a railroad was not the defendant to remove or cause to be re- a structure, within the meaning of a statute moved the said fence described in the plead- providing for mechanics' liens on “any ings on file herein, or cause the same to be house, mill, manufactory or other building, eut down to a height not exceeding 5 feet all | fixture, bridge, or other structure.” But the way from G street to a point at the rear that conclusion was arrived at by the appliend or northeast corner of said dwelling; cation of the well-known rule of statutory that, if said defendant shall neglect or refuse construction, that, where general words folto so remove or cut down said fence as herein low an enumeration of specific persons or directed for a period of thirty days after the things, they are limited to the same class of plaintiff shall have constructed the eaves persons or things as those specifically mentrough herein specified, the sheriff of Pierce tioned. But here the word “structure” county be, and is hereby, directed to cut stands alone, and is not confined to any class down or remove the same at the cost and ex- of erections, and therefore the above-menpense of the said defendant.

tioned case is not an authority in favor of This action is based upon Ballinger's appellant's contention. Of course, it is true Anno. Codes & Statutes, $ 5433 (2 Hill's that a house is a structure, but it is also Anno. Stat. & Codes, § 268), which reads as true that there are many other things which follows: “An injunction may be granted to may properly be designated as structures, restrain the malicious erection, by any owner such, for instance, as a telegraph line, a or lessee of land, of any structure intended wharf, or a bridge. “In the widest sense, a to spite, injure, or annoy an adjoining pro- structure is any production or piece of work prietor. And where any owner or lessee of artificially built up or composed of parts land has maliciously erected such a structure joined together in some definite manner; any with such intent, a mandatory injunction construction.” Century, Dict. And will lie to compel its abatement and remov- | have no doubt that a fence is a structure, al." This sertion of the statute was enacted within the meaning of this statute. in the year 1883, and embodied in an act en- It is further contended that this section is titled "An Act to Correct Errors and Sup- unconstitutional because it empowers the ply Omissions in the Code of Washington" courts to restrain by injunction the commis(Laws 1883, p. 44), and it is contended on sion of an act not prohibited by any law of the part of the appellant that the section is the state or of the United States. This povoid for the reason that it is in contraven- sition is clearly not tenable. Although the tion of the organic act of the territory of legislature has not in express words declared Washington (U.S. Rev. Stat. § 1924), which it illegal for an owner or lessee of land malideclares that every law shall embrace but ciously to erect any structure intended to one object, and that shall be expressed in the spite, injure or annoy an adjoining owner, title; and the case of Harland v. Territory, it has in legal effect done so, by providing a 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 13 Pac. 453, is cited in remedy in favor of a party thus injured. To support of this contention. It is, no doubt, say that the commission of a certain act may true that under the decision in the Harland be enjoined is to decl:- re, substantially, that Case the title of the act in question was in- 'such act is illegal. If, therefore, this section

we

is unconstitutional, it is not so because it au- upon her property constitutes a cause of acthorizes the enjoining of an act not prohibit-tion in her favor unless they are the result ed by law, but because it is inimical to some of an unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, provision of the Constitution, or, in other use by the appellant of his own premises. words, because the legislature exceeded its 1 Wood, Nuisances, 3d ed. pp. 2, 3. "At comconstitutional power in its enactment. “The mon law a man has a right to build a fence reasonable enjoyment of one's real estate," or other structure on his own land as high says Mr. Tiedeman, “is certainly, a vested as he pleases, although he thereby complete. right, which cannot be interfered with or ly obstructs his neighbors' light and air, and limited arbitrarily. The constitutional the motive by which he is actuated is immaguaranty of protection for all private prop-terial. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 2 erty extends equally to the enjoyment and L. R. A. 81, 19 N. E. 390; Mahan v. Brown, the possession of lands. An arbitrary inter- 13 Wend. 261, 28 Am. Dec. 461; Letts r. ference by the government, or by its author. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 40 L. R. A. 177, 42 ity, with the reasonable enjoyment of private N. E. 765; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. lands, is a taking of private property with 294; Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, 44 out due process of law, which is inhibited by Am. Rep. 642; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. the Constitutions. But it is not every use 49; Lord v. Langdon, 91 Me. 221, 39 Atl. which comes within this constitutional pro- 552; Phelps v. Noulen, 72 N. Y. 39, 28 Am. tection. One has a vested right to only a Rep. 93; 2 Washb. Real Prop. 5th ed. p. 362. reasonable use of one's lands. It is not dif- | The only exception to this rule of law is ficult to find the rule which determines the found in cases where one has acquired, hy limitations upon the lawful ways or manner long user, a right, in the nature of an easeof using lands. It is the rule which furnish- ment, to have light pass to his windows es the solution of every problem in the law across the land of his neighbor. But in the of police power, and which is comprehended United States the courts have, with very few in the legal maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum exceptions, repudiated the doctrine of annon lædas." Tiedeman, Pol. Power, p. 423. Ac- cient lights, as recognized in England, as cording to this maxim, everyone must so use "unsound in principle, and unsuited to the his own property as not to injure the rights habits and rapid growth of the country.” of others. Subject to this qualification, 1 Wood, Nuisances, $ 150, p. 196; 6 Am. & every person has the right to exercise com- Eng. Enc. Law, p. 152; Tiedeman, Real Prop. plete control over his own land, to the exclu- ! Enlarged ed. $ 613; Cooley, Torts, 2d ed. pp. sion of all others, and this right has been rec- | 832, 833; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309; ognized from the earliest times by the courts. Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 46 Am. Dec. 1 Wood, Nuisances, 3d ed. 127. Upon the 573; Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478, 18 Am. common-law maxim above quoted rests, as Rep. 570; Lapere v. Luckey, 23 Kan. 534, 33 we have seen, what is termed the “police pow- Am. Rep. 196. An easement of light and er of the state,” which, in its broadest accep- air can be acquired in this country only by tation, means the general power of the state grant, either expressed or implied, and no to preserve and promote the public welfare, such grant is claimed by the respondent in even at the expense of private rights. 18 this case. Whatever right, therefore, she Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, pp. 740, 741. It has may have to an injunction, is derived solely often been said that it is difficult, if not im- from the statute, and not from the common possible, to give an exact and satisfactory law; and, in order to ascertain such right: definition of "police power;" but it is said it is necessary to determine the meaning by an eminent text writer that this power, and validity of the statute. The language “like that of taxation, pervades every de- en ployed by the legislature is sufficiently partment of business, and reaches to comprehensive to authorize an injunction every

interest and every subject of against the erection by a landowner of a profit enjoyment.” Cooley, Const. dwelling house or a business block on his own Lim. 5th ed. p. 706. In the exercise land, providing his motive in so doing is of police power the legislature may, to a rea- malevolent. If it was the intention of the sonable extent, and with due regard to the legislature to prohibit the erection of such public welfare, prohibit or regulate the use structures, we are clearly of the opinion that of private property; but any provision or the statute is, to that extent, at least, unconregulation of the use and enjoyment of land stitutional; for the reason that to prohibit by the owner which is not limited to the pre- such a use of real estate would, in effect, devention of nuisances is opposed to constitu- prive the owner of his property without due tional principles, and the power of the legis process of law and compensation. But, inlature to prohibit nuisances is confined to the asmuch as it must have been well known to prohibition or regulation of such acts as vio- the legislature that useful and valuable late or materially interfere with the rights of structures, such as houses, are rarely or others. Tiedeman, Pol. Power, p. 426. See never erected merely to annoy or injure an also 2 Wood, Nuisances, 3d ed. p. 1098. adjoining owner, we feel justified in holding

The respondent, as we have stated, bases that it was not the intention to prohibit the her claim to an injunction upon the allega- erection of such structures as really enhance tion in her complaint that the light has been the value, usefulness, or enjoyment of land, cut off from her windows, and her house but such only as are primarily or solely inmade less rentable, and consequently dam- tended to injure or annoy an adjoining ownaged, by the erection of the fence by the ap- er, and which serve no really useful and reapellant. But neither nor both of these effects sonable purpose. It is well settled that it

or

is the duty of the courts to go construe a Harbison v. White, 46 Conn. 106, the peti. statute, if practicable, as to give it force and tioner sought the abatement of a structure validity, rather than to render it inoperative erected of rough boards at a distance of litor roid. Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. pp. 220, tle more than 3 feet from his block of houses, 2.22. and we think the construction we have and which was 18 feet high, and of a nature placed upon this section is not inconsistent to exclude the light and air, to a great exwith its language, and is such as brings it tent, from the basement, lower story, and within the power of the legislature, and, as one half of the second story of the block, on thus construed, the statute is constitutional. the ground that it was erected maliciously

The constitutionality of a statute of Mas- and with intent to injure and annoy the petisachusetts providing that "any fence or oth- tioner, as an adjoining proprietor of land; er structure in the nature of a fence unnec- and, it appearing to the court that it was in essarily exceeding 6 feet in height, malicious fact maliciously erected and was injurious ly erected or maintained for the purpose of to the petitioner, a mardatory injunction annoying the owners or occupants of adjoin. was sustained against its continuance, noting property, shall be deemed a private nui- withstanding the fact that it served to screen sance (Stat. 1887, chap. 348, § 1) was the defendant's premises from observation. called in question in Rideout v. Knox, 148 Upon the question of motive the court said: Mass. 368, 2 L. R. A. 81, 19 N. E. 390; and "The finding is that malice prompted the the act was held constitutional, for the rea- erection of the structure in question. That son, as stated by the court, that it simply it protected from observation must be regardrestrained a noxious use of the owner's prem- ed as an incident. The statute concerns itises, and, although the use was not directly self wholly with the motive; therefore it ininjurious to the public at large, there was a quires for that; that found to be malicious, public interest to restrain this kind of ag- the statute disregards the incident, and puts gressive nuisance of one neighbor by anoth- an inmediate end to the wrong by injuncer, and to mark a definite limit beyond which tion." In that case, however, nothing was it is not lawful to go. In that case it was said, except in a very general way, as to the also held that, in order to maintain an action quality or quantum of malice necessary to be under the statute, it must be shown that the shown in order to maintain an action under fence was erected or maintained from an ac- the statute; but in the subsequent and welltually malevolent motive, as distinguished considered case of Gallagher v. Dodge, 48 from mere technical malice, and that it is Conn. 387, the court held that the “malicious not enough to satisfy the words of the stat. intent must be so predominating as a motive ute that malevolence was one of the motives, as to give character to the structure," and that but that malevolence must be the dominant “it must be so manifest and positive that the motive, and motive without which the fence real usefulness of the structure will be as would not have been built or maintained. In manifestly subordinate and incidental.” As Lord v. Langdon, 91 Me. 221, 39 Atl. 552, to the proof of motive, the court was of the which was a case involving the construction opinion that the question whether the strucof a statute substantially like that of Massa- ture was maliciously erected is to be deterchusetts, the supreme court of Maine ap- mined by its character, location, and use, proved and applied the doctrine announced rather than by an inquiry into the actual in Rideout v. Knox, and accordingly held state of mind of the person erecting it. Upthat the gist of the action consists in the fact on this point the learned court observed : that the structure is maliciously kept and

We think no rule can be laid down maintained, and that, to entitle the plaintiff that is on the whole more easy of applicato recorer, it must be shown that malevo- tion, and more likely to be correct in its aplence was the dominant motive, and without plication, than that the structure intended which the fence would not have been built or by the statute must be one which, from its maintained. The Massachusetts statute was character or location or use, must strike an again held constitutional in the case of ordinary beholder as manifestly erected with Smith v. Morse, 148 Mass. 407, 19 N. E. 393 ; the leading purpose to annoy the adjoining but the court there decided that, notwith owner or occupant in his use of his premisstanding the use of the word “nuisance,” the es." Although we concede that this rule will statute did not create an easement in favor of generally be more correct in its application the plaintiff's land, but only made it unlaw. than any other general rule that could be ful to do maliciously what the defendant laid down, it is apparent that it cannot be still had a right to do from other motives. relied on in all cases, to the exclusion of And the same thing may properly be said as other legitimate evidence. The fence in to the scope and intention of our statute. In question in this case is much higher than Connecticut there is a statute providing that boundary fences usually are in cities, but it "an injunction may be granted against the would be very difficult for us to say that an malicious erection by an owner or lessee of ordinary observer would, from its appearland of any structure upon it, intended to ance or character or location, conclude that annoy or injure any proprietor of adjacent it was manifestly erected, for the leading land in respect to his use or disposition of purpose, to spite ard annoy the respondent; the same.” Revision 1875, p. 477, $ 4. This and yet we are clearly of the opinion, from statute, it will be observed, is in substance all the evidence in the record, including the similar to the first provision of our statute, character and location of the fence, that and it has been construed by the supreme malevolence was the dominating motive in its murt of that state in at least two cases. In'erection. It is true that the appellant, as a

court:

power to

V.

witness in his own behalf at the trial, testi- In cases of this kind, the only strictness fied that he built the fence to keep out chil required is in proof of paternity. dren and chickens, and to support his vines Re Jessup, 81 Cal. 435, 6 L. Ř. A. 594, 21 and roses, and not for the purpose of annoy- Pac. 976, 22 Pac. 742, 1028; Blythe v. Ayres, ing or spiting the respondent. But he vir- 96 Cal. 532, 19 L. R. A. 40, 31 Pac. 915; Re tually admitted on cross-examination that a Gorkow, 20 Wash. 563, 56 Pac. 385. fence as high as the former one-5 feetwould have served as well for such purposes, and that he would not have built the fence as

Dunbar, J., delivered the opinion of the high as he did, if the respondent had helped

John Rohrer died intestate in the county him build a division fence, “as she should," and put an eaves trough'or gutter on the of Spokane on the 1st day of May, 1899; beroof of her house.

ing then a resident of said county, and leavThe judgment and decree are affirmed.

ing property therein. Respondent herein

filed her application to be appointed admin. Dunbar, J., concurs.

istratrix, setting out in said petition that

she was the daughter and the only child of Reavis, J., concurring:

the deceased, and that she was a married I concur in the conclusion viewing the woman and of age. The appellant, Joseph statute as meaning to confine

Rohrer, a brother of the deceased, filed his interfere where the motive is malevolent in application to be appointed administrator; the construction of the structure; and I setting out that the deceased was an unmarthink that malevolence must clearly appear that he left no other brother or sister in the

ried man, and had never been married, and as the dominating impulse, to make a case

state of Washington. within the statute.

He also filed objec. tions to the allowance of the petition of Theresa Muller on the grounds aforesaid. At the hearing of the case the appellant tes.

tified that the deceased was never married. Re Estate of John ROHRER, Deceased.

but that he believed Theresa Muller was the

daughter of the deceased. Respondent tes. Joseph ROHRER, Appt.,

tified that she was the daughter of the de

ceased, and that since 1885, and up to the Theresa MULLER, Respt.

time of her marriage, she had resided almost

continuously with her father in the city of (........Wash.........)

Spokane. Respondent offered in evidence &

complaint signed and sworn to by the deAn affidavit in a legal proceeding, ac- ceased in November, 1887, in a case brought

knowledging paternity of an illegitimate child. by the deceased against one Frank Hurliman is sufficient to satisfy a statute providing for the seduction of Theresa Muller, then that such a child shall be considered heir to seventeen years old, in which complaint it the person who shall in writing, signed in

was alleged that the said Theresa Muller was the presence of witnesses, have acknowledged the daughter of the said John Rohrer. The himself to be its father; and it is not necessary that the writing should have been made testimony showed that the deceased had expressly for the purpose of admitting the signed the said complaint in the presence of child to heirship.

witnesses. An affidavit was also introduced

in the same case where an attachment was (February 8, 1900.)

sought, in which it was alleged that the re

spondent was the daughter of the said John A

the Superior Court for Spokane County mony the court found that the deceased had granting letters of administration upon the acknowledged the respondent to be his daughestate of John Rohrer, deceased. Affirmed. ter, by written affidavits signed in the pres

The facts are stated in the opinion. ence of a notary and the husband of the reMr. Adolph Munter for appellant. spondent, and that she was entitled to letMr. John H. Roche, for respondent: ters of administration; and the petition of

If the fact of paternity can be proved in respondent was granted, and that of appelthe manner required by the statute, that is lant denied. From this order and judgment sufficient to place a child on equality in law Joseph Rohrer appeals to this court, and aswith the legitimate.

signs as error the admitting in evidence of Magee's Estate, 63 Cal. 414; Brock v. the complaint in the case of Rohrer against State es rel. Johnson, 85 Ind. 397; Re Jes- Hurliman, and in admitting in evidence the sup, 81 Cal. 435, 6 L. R. A. 594, 21 Pac. 976, allidavit in the same case, and the conclusion 22 Pac. 742, 1028; Crane v. Crane, 31 Iowa. of the court that the deceased had acknowl. 296; Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 19 L. R. edged the respondent to be his daughter, by A. 40, 31 Pac. 915; Remy v. Municipality instruments in writing subscribed by him in No. Two, 11 La. Ann. 159.

the presence of witnesses.

Section 4624, 1 Ballinger's Anno. Codes & NOTE.--As recognition of illegitimate Statutes provides that every illegitimate child, see Re Jessup (Cal.) 6 L. R. A. 594 ; child shall be considered as an heir to the Blythe v. Ayres (Cal.) 19 L. R. A. 40; Van Horn v. Van Horn (Iowa) 45 L. R. A. 93'; and person who shall, in writing signed in the Johnstone v. Taliaferro (Ga.) 45 L. R. A. presence of competent witnesses, have ae95.

knowledged himself to be the father of such

to

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