is not the law. The notice is required only when it is sought to declare the contract forfeited or lapsed. Neither was done here. We do not regard the waiver in the policy of the benefits of the net-reserve law as of any special significance, though appellee, in argument, claims something for it. Our holding would be the same if no such waiver had been made. Our conclusion is that this was a policy for a term that expired before Johnson's death, and therefore plaintiff has no right of recovery. The other questions discussed are rendered immaterial by this finding. Affirmed. Rehearing denied. KANSAS SUPREME COURT. Walter DENNING et al., Plffs. in Err., v. Mary A. YOUNT, Admrx., etc., of George W. Yount, Deceased. (........Kan.........) 1. That part of § 8, chap. 1, Gen. Stat. 1897, which provides that the repeal of a statute does not affect any right accrued, duty imposed, or penalty incurred thereunder, has no application to city ordinances. 2. Real-estate agents were denied the right to recover commissions for the sale of land upon the ground that their business was carried on in violation of a city ordinance requiring the payment of a license tax, with the provisions of which they had failed to comply. Pending a suit to recover such commissions, the ordinance was repealed, without a saving clause. Held, that the repeal did not act retrospectively, nor did it have the effect of giving validity to a transaction which was unlawful at the beginning. (July 7, 1900.) p. 469; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408. The effect of a repealed statute is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely as if it had never existed, except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted, and concluded while it was an existing law. Gordon v. State ex rel. Border, 4 Kan. 490; Naylor v. Galesburg, 56 Ill. 285; First National Bank v. Henderson, 101 Cal. 307, 35 Pac. 899; Key v. Goodwin, 4 Moore & P. 341. out offenses, but also blots out forfeitures The repeal of an ordinance not only blots incurred by individuals. 1 Beach, Pub. Corp. 526; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 245, 246; Kansas v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588. Where the suspension of a general law within a municipality results from a city ordinance passed in pursuance to law, the repeal of the ordinance will leave the general law in force within the city. Heinssen v. State, 14 Colo. 228, 23 Pac. 995: United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. ERROR to the Court of Appeals, South- 52, 30 L. ed. 559, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413. A repealed law without any reservation ern Department, Central Division, to takes away remedies given by the repealed review a judgment affirming a judgment of law. All suits must stop where the repeal the District Court for Cowley County in fa- finds them. vor of defendant in an action brought to enforce commissions for services in selling real estate. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. McDermott & Johnson and F. C. Johnson, for plaintiffs in error: The district court and the court of appeals erred in their judgment by deciding that the saving clause of the general statutes operates as a saving clause to a city ordinance. Kan. Gen. Stat. 1897, chap. 1, 88; 1 Beach, Pub. Corp. 526, note 4; Naylor v. Galesburg, 56 Ill. 285; Illinois & M. Canal V. Chicago, 14 Ill. 334. Where the consideration of the contract declared void by statute is morally good, a repeal of the statute will validate the contract. Little Rock v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 98 U. S. 308, 25 L. ed. 108; Cooley, Const. Lim. *Headnotes by SMITH, J. NOTE. For effect of failure to procure 11cense for business, on validity of contracts therein, see Buckley v. Humason (Minn.) 16 L. R. A. 423, and note; Fairly v. Wappoo Mills South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433, 35 L. ed. 937; Schoepflin v. Calkins, 5 Misc. 159, 25 N. Y. Supp. 696. The repeal of the city ordinance without a saving clause deprived the defendant in error of his defense. Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 325; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 79 Am. Dec. 236; Danville v. Pace, 25 Gratt. 1, 18 Am. Rep. 663; Mechanics' & W. M. Mut. Sav. Bank & Bldg. Asso. v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97; Andrews V. Russell, 7 Blackf. 474; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill. 331; Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309; Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; State use of Baltimore v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195; Estep v. Hutchman, 14 Serg. & R. 435; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, 24 L. ed. 521; Menard County v. Kincaid, 71 Ill. 588; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Cooley, Const. Lim. 373, 374, 378; Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 215; Harris v. Rutledge, (S. C.) 29 L. R. A. 215; Vermont Loan & T. Co. v. Hoffman (Idaho) 37 L. R. A. 509; Randali v. Tuell (Me.) 38 L. R. A. 143; and Smith v. Robertson (Ky.) 45 L. R. A. 510. 19 Iowa, 389, 87 Am. Dec. 441; Johnson v. Bentley, 16 Ohio, 97; Lycoming County v. Union County, 15 Pa. 166. On petition for rehearing. The decision is contrary to the law declared in the following actions decided by this court, which were not submitted to this court: Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan. 569; Jenness v. Cutler, 12 Kan. 500; State v. Boyle, 10 Kan. 113; State v. Crawford, 11 Kan. 32; Troy v. Atchison & N. R. Co. 11 Kan. 532; Challiss v. Parker, 11 Kan. 394; School Dist. No. 13 v. State, 15 Kan. 49; Gardenhire v. Mitchell, 21 Kan. 86; Jockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 113, 44 Am. Rep. 625; Gordon v. State ex rel. Boder, 4 Kan. 489; State v. Showers, 34 Kan. 269, 8 Pac. 474; Mason v. Spencer, 35 Kan. 512, 11 Pac. 402; Roberts v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 43 Kan. 103, 22 Pac. 1006; Gregory v. German Bank, 3 Colo. 332, 25 Am. Rep. 760; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 27 L. ed. 682, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408; Cooley, Const. Lim. 4th ed. 375, at note 1, p. 376; Sedgw. Stat. & Const. Law, 111; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 14 L. ed. 210; Gaul v. Brown, 53 Me. 496; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 152; Nichols v. Squire, 5 Pick. 168; Bay City & E. S. R. Co. v. Austin, 21 Mich. 391. Messrs. Pollock & Lafferty, for defendant in error: The law in this case, having been determined by this court upon its former hearing, is conclusive in this case, and is also, not only the law of this state, but is the law as laid down by the courts of last resort in oth er states. Buckley v. Humason, 50 Minn. 195, 16 L. R. A. 423, 52 N. W. 385. Where a contract is unlawful and void because made in violation of a positive ordinance or statute, no recovery can be had upon such contract; and the repeal of the ordinance or statute does not render the contract valid or permit a recovery to be had under such contract. It remains void. The repeal of the ordinance could not and did not affect the case at bar. If plaintiff's below did perform the services for which they claim commission and upon which they base their claim of recovery against the defendant, not having paid the tax and procured the license to so act, they acted in violation of this positive law, and their act in so doing was unlawful, and no recovery could be had upon the same; and such act cannot be made the basis of a valid claim. Jones v. Blacklidge, 9 Kan. 562, 12 Am. Rep. 503; Yount v. Denning, 52 Kan. 629, 35 Pac. 207; 2 Benjamin, Sales, 4th Am. ed. 818; Holt v. Green, 73 Pa. 198, 13 Am. Rep. 737; Dillon v. Allen, 46 Iowa, 299, 26 Am. Rep. 145; McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 845; Woods v. Armstrong, 54 Ala. 150, 25 Am. Rep. 671; Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Pa. 498, 49 Am. Rep. 131; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. N. S. 586, 16 Am. Dec. 189; Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242; Buckley v. Humason, 50 Minn. 195, 16 L. R. A. 423, 52 N. W. 385. The act, unlawful and void when done because done in violation of positive law, is not affected by the repeal of the law. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 501; Lawson, Contr. § 279; 2 Parsons, Contr. § 674: Sutherland, Stat. Constr. §§ 336, 480; Bishop, Statutory Crimes, § 1030; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 488; 5 Lawson, Rights, Rem. & Pr. § 2393; Clark, Contr. p. 507; Bishop, Contr. § 479; Roby v. West, 4 N. H. 285, 17 Am. Dec. 423; Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Denio, 60; Woods v. Armstrong, 54 Ala. 150, 25 Am. Rep. 671; Handy v. St. Paul Globe Pub. Co. 41 Minn. 188, 4 L. R. A. 466, 42 N. W. 872; Puckett v. Alexander, 102 N. C. 95, 3 L. R. A. 43, 8 S. E. 767; Hughes v. Boone, 102 N.. C. 137, 9 S. E. 286; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540. A valid city ordinance has within the city the same force and effect as statute law. Yount v. Denning, 52 Kan. 629, 35 Pac. 207; Buckley v. Humason, 50 Minn. 195, 16 L. R. A. 423, 52 N. W. 385; Johnson v. Simonton, 43 Cal. 242. The rule for the construction of city ordinances is the same as for the construction of state statutes. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 264; Re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 294, 58 Am. Rep. 12, 9 Pac. 139. Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Walter Denning and Mahlon E. Johnson brought suit against George W. Yount before a justice of the peace, alleging that. they were partners engaged in business as real-estate agents, and that defendant was indebted to them in the sum of $265 for commission on a sale of land negotiated by them. Defendant denied liability, and among other defenses set up an ordinance of the city of Winfield, by the provisions of which it was made unlawful for any person, firm, or company to carry on in that city the business of real-estate and loan agents or brokers without paying a semi-annual license tax of $10. It was conceded that the plaintiffs had not complied with such ordinance. They obtained judgment in that court, which was reversed here. Yount v. Denning, 52 Kan. 629, 35 Pac. 207. This court decided that the failure of Denning and Johnson to pay the license tax imposed by the municipality where they conducted the real-estate business rendered the prosecution of that calling by them unlawful, and that no recovery could be had for the commission claimed by them on the sale of said property. This decision was made at the January term, 1894, and the cause remanded to the district court for a new trial. After the case was docketed for another trial in the court below, the city ordinance above referred to was repealed, without any saving clause. Upon a second trial it was contended that such repeal gave the plaintiffs below the right to recover to the same extent as if the ordinance never existed. The trial court, however, did not take this view of the law, and plaintiff's were not permitted to recover, which judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, and the judgment of that court has been certified here for review. While the judgment of the district court must be affirmed, we cannot agree that the affirmance should be based upon the reasons given by the court of appeals. The syllabus of the case by that court is as follows: "(1) The repeal of a statute does not affect any right which accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, nor any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue of the statute repealed. See State v. Boyle, 10 Kan. 113; subdivision 1, § 8, chap. 1, Gen. Stat. 1897. (2) The rule for the construction of ordinances is the same as for the construction of statutes. See 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 264." [(Kan. App.) 59 Pac. 1092.] The section of the statute cited is applicable to legislative acts, and not to ordinances, which are mere by-laws of a municipal corporation. In Humboldt v. McCoy, 23 Kan. 249, it was held that the constitutional provision that "no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title," has no application to city ordinances. Again, in New Kioua v. Craven, 46 Kan. 114, 26 Pac. 426, it was decided that a section of the statute concerning county jails had no application to city prisons or jails. While the rules of construction of statutes and ordinances may be the same, yet it does not follow that a statutory provision concerning the effect of the repeal of a law can be extended to include city ordinances. The real-estate agents were engaged in an unlawful vocation at the time they made the sale of the real estate for which they claim a commission. There was no right of recovery of this commission at the time the sale of the land was made, and the authorities are almost unanimous to the effect that a subsequent repeal making the act lawful will not act retrospectively, so as to render that lawful which was done in violation of the law. Sutherland, Stat. Constr. §§ 336, 480. In Lawson, Contr. § 279, it is said: "Where a contract made in violation of a statute is void, the subsequent repeal of the statute does not make it valid." 2 Parsons, Contr. 8 674, states the proposition thus: "But if one agrees to do what is at the time unlawful, a subsequent act making the act lawful cannot give validity to the agreement, because it was void at its beginning." See also Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, '§ 488; Clark, Contr. 507; Bishop, Contr. § 479; Roby v. West, 4 N. H. 285, 17 Am. Dec. 423. The case of Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Denio, 60–62, is in point. It is there said: "But, while the Revised Statutes were in force, he could not compel payment for his services as an unlicensed physician whatever remedies might have been prescribed and administered. Such was the law in 1840, when the services were rendered, and as to his case it was the same in 1845, when the cause was tried. The repeal of the previous prohibitory laws by the act of 1844 had no effect upon cases which arose before that act was passed." Woods v. Armstrong, 54 Ala. 150, 25 Am. Rep. 671; Handy v. St. Paul Globe Pub. Co. 41 Minn. 188, 4 L. R. A. 466, 42 N. W. 872; Puckett v. Alexander, 102 N. C. 95, 3 L. R. A. 43, 8 S. E. 767. Cases cited by counsel for plaintiffs in error, holding that no sentence can be pronounced for violation of a criminal statute which has been repealed without a saving clause, are not in point; nor decisions to the effect that procedure in pending actions must be governed by the law as it stands at the time of trial, not when the action is brought. In 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 942, and note, a large number of authorities are collected upon the principal question. The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be affirmed. All the Justices concur. KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS. tice, under Civ. Code Prac. § 276, amended by Laws 1894, p. 201, and cannot be sustained as a mere temporary restraining order. Irreparable injury that may result from the delay requisite to the giving of notice for an injunction will not be sufficient to justify the failure to give notice, when there is no excuse for not filing the suit earlier while there was time to give the notice. A faction of a political party, which is not, and does not claim to be, in itself a distinct political party, is not entitled to have inspectors at an election, under Stat. § 1481. The right to have an inspector at 2. A mandatory injunction order which grants the whole relief obtainable in the suit, and obedience to which will be the end of the litigation, is void if issued without no- 5. Nors. As to injunction to protect political | 4th C.) 30 L. R. A. 90: Fesler v. Brayton (Ind.) rights, see Fleming v. Guthrie (W. Va.) 3 L. R. 32 L. R. A. 578: State or rel. Cranmer v. A. 53: Alderson v. Kanawha County Ct. Comrs. Thorson (S. D.) 33 L. R. A. 582: Kearns v. (W. Va.) 5 L. R. A. 334; Fletcher v. Tuttle Howley (Pa.) 42 L. R. A. 235; and State er rel. (11.) 25 L. R. A. 143; Green v. Mills (C. C. A. McCaffery v. Aloe (Mo.) 47 L. R. A. 393. the polls, who is appointed by the executive chairman of the committee of the Honest committee of a political party, is a political Election Democratic party, and commanding right which caunot be enforced in a court of the mayor and board of safety not to give to equity. any policeman of the city any order to interfere with such inspectors, and commanding the chief of police to instruct the policethat such inspectors ETITION (December 9, 1899.) P Etrain for a writ of prohibition to fendants in a proceeding to compel the mission of inspectors to voting places contempt. Writ granted. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Kohn, Baird, & Spindle Zach Phelps for plaintiffs. Messrs. Helm, Bruce, & Helm for fendant. re-enter the voting places and withes ight to ad-spect the count. for Hazelrigg, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The orders thus obtained further recited that on November 14, 1899 (time and place stated), the plaintiff would move the court to grant an injunction purand suant to the prayer of his petition. Subsequent to the granting of the temporary de-writ, and prior to the day on which the injunction proper was to be asked, on complaint by certain inspectors of the party named in the order, who had been refused admittance to the voting places, rules of contempt were is sued by the judge who had issued the writ of the 7th against certain of the defendants in the Brown-Weaver action, and certain others, requiring them to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for disobeying the order of the 7th of November. Thereupon the persons so ruled, together with other defendant in the Brown-Weaver suit, filed their petition in this court on November 15 for an order prohibiting the judge of the court aforesaid or that court from proceeding further with the trials for contempt. A temporary stay was granted, and a day set for full hearing, which, having been had, after answer filed by the judge aforesaid, the case is now out for decision. At about midday of Monday, November 7, 1899, the day of the recent state election, --the Honorable John Young Brown, the gubernatorial candidate of the Honest Election Democratic party, filed his petition in equity in the Jefferson circuit court, law and equity division, against Charles P. Weaver, mayor of the city of Louisville: Lyons, Tierney, and Suter, members of the board of public safety; Jacob H. Haager, chief of police; and some 750 other defendants, who were officers of election at the various voting precincts in Louisville on the day in question. The purpose of the suit was to have an injunction commanding the election officers to admit to the voting places as soon The first question raised is as to the juas the polls should close, at 4 o'clock, one risdiction of this court to make the order. person as inspector at each voting place, as The case has been presented by counsel as representative of the Honest Election Dem- one involving solely the jurisdiction of the ocratic party. The vital ground of com- lower court to issue the mandatory order of plaint was that the county board of election the 7th of November, and for the present we commissioners for Jefferson county, acting shall so consider it. Assuming, then, preby a majority, had theretofore (that is, pri- liminarily, that the lower court had no juor to November 6, 1899, as the petition was risdiction to enter such an order, the quessworn to on that date) issued written in- tion remains, Has this court-admittedly one structions to the officers of election to the of appellate jurisdiction only-power to coneffect that inspectors or representatives of trol inferior courts when acting outside of the Honest Election Democratic party were their jurisdiction? In Preston v. Fidelity Trust not to be admitted to the polls, and that & Safety Vault Co. 94 Ky. 295, 22 S. W. unless controlled by the order of the court 318: Goldsmith v. Owen, 95 Ky. 420, 26 S. the officers of election would obey these in- . 8, and Louisville Sav. Loan & Bldg. Asso. structions. The plaintiff further averred that he feared and charged that the mayor, 787, the power of this court to issue writs v. Harbeson, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 278, 51 S. W. board of public safety, and chief of police of prohibition seems to have been assumed, be issued and enforced, unless restrained by rather than in terms asserted; the writs the court, instructions to the police not to sought being denied because it did not apallow such inspectors to enter the voting places, and to arrest any who attempted to It was further averred that irreparable injury would result to plaintiff from the delay in giving notice of the application for the injunction, and a temporary order was therefore prayed for, embodying the relief sought in the petition: the temporary order, indeed, embodying the whole of the relief sought. Such orders were thereupon at once issued, signed by the judge of the court mentioned, commanding the election officers to admit at the close of the polls the inspectors of the party named, provided they presented a certificate from one Wright, either had issued, or would issue or cause to do so. pear that the inferior courts were proceeding out of their jurisdiction. All these cases present very persuasive evidence in support of the jurisdiction. And in Hindman v. Toney, 97 Ky. 413, 30 S. W. 1006, this court expressly settled the question, and, on the petition of Hindman, granted a writ prohibiting one of the circuit judges of Jefferson county from passing on the case, which properly had been assigned to another division of that court. And the writ was awarded, it may be said here, although by express statute (Ky. Stat. § 1028) no proceedings in a case were to be invalid because prosecuted in the wrong branch of the Jef ferson circuit court. It was hardly a ques-is obeyed the end of the litigation is reached. tion of jurisdiction in the lower court, there- There is no mere temporary stay, with reserfore, but rather a question of preventing con- vation of the rights of parties until they can fusion and conflict in the conduct of busi- be heard. If a railroad is about to stop ness in the four branches of that court. It operating a road it is under a contract to was held in that case that this court, hav- operate, it may be enjoined from stopping, ing a discretion, ought not generally to issue and be commanded to continue the operation writs of prohibition, when adequate relief temporarily. This may result in some temcan be afforded complainants by resort to porary inconvenience or pecuniary loss, but the "revisory power," meaning the appel- the subject-matter of the litigation is left late jurisdiction of this court. In view of for future investigation, and the rights of these cases, it must be regarded as settled the parties are reserved. This is a fair illaw that in proper cases, where the inferior lustration of what this provision means. tribunal is proceeding out of its jurisdiction, And so it is further provided in the section the power of this court may be invoked to supra that the court or judge "shall set stay the exercise of such jurisdiction; and forth a reasonable time and place not to exit would also seem, in certain classes of cases, ceed ten days from the day upon which the that even where the inferior tribunal has ju-order is made, at which the applicant shall risdiction this court may likewise interfere, move the court or judge to grant the injuncif the remedy by appeal is not entirely ade- tion," etc. If we attempt to apply these quate, or if the court, in the exercise of its Code provisions to a case where the act comdiscretionary powers, shall deem it neces-manded to be done is not of a mere temposary to so interfere. rary matter, but is practically a finality, and the sum total of the relief sought by the applicant, we must appreciate at once the inapplicability of the section. Imagine the applicant in this case applying to the judge on November 14 for an injunction commanding the election officers to admit the Brown inspectors to the voting places on November 7! The order made to admit the inspectors is a peremptory mandamus, and "where a peremptory mandamus is granted without the service of notice the mandamus is void, and a respondent who has not been served with notice cannot be punished for contempt for not obeying the writ." 13 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 759, citing State ex rel. Nicolin v. Scott County Comrs. 42 Minn. 284, 44 N. W. 64; Jones v. McMahan, 30 Tex. 719; United States v. Labette County, 7 Fed. Rep. 318. "When a court of chancery is without authority, its injunction is a nullity, and it is not contempt of court to dis Looking at the case for the present in the light of the way it has been presented (that is, as involving the jurisdiction of the lower court), we find it to be contended first that that tribunal is without power to inflict punishment for disobedience of its order of the 7th of November, because that order was made without notice to any of the parties to be affected by it. It is conceded that the order was issued without notice, and it is clear that, if notice was necessary, disobedience of it would not be punishable contempt. That notice is necessary is, we think, equally clear; otherwise, there would be judgment entered, final in its character, and decisive of the whole question before the court, without citation or opportunity offered to the parties interested to resist the application. To proceed without notice would be a final adjudication upon and a deprivation of a right, without due process of law. Under general law, as well as un-regard it." Ex parte Wimberly (Miss.; der our statute, there must be notice in man- 1880) 1 Ky. L. Rep. 127. This so-called temdamus proceedings before such an order can porary restraining order is in substance imbe granted. And this is equally true when peratively mandatory, and we must look at the proceeding is for an injunction. The the substance, and not the shadow, of things. statute is explicit, and declares that "an in- In the second place, even the law authorjunction shall be granted only upon reason-izing a temporary restraining order withable notice, in writing, to the party sought out the service of notice, if irreparable into be enjoined, of the time and place of the jury may result from the delay of giving noapplication therefor, and of the court or of- tice, does not apply here, because no such fer to whom the application is to be made." condition of fact is shown to exist. The peCivil Code Prac. § 276, amended by Laws tition was sworn to on November 6, 1899, 1894, p. 201. Where, however, the court or and the averment is that the election comofficer to whom the application for an in- missioners had issued written instructions Junction is made "shall be satisfied by the to the precinct officers not to admit the facts set forth in the affidavit of the appli- Brown inspectors, and that unless restrained rant, or by other evidence, that irreparable the precinct officers would obey their instrucinjury will result to the applicant from the tions. Manifestly, on this showing, the apdelay of giving notice, the court or officer plicant, on November 6th, and even before may enter a temporary order restraining the that day, was as fully aware of the expected act or acts sought to be enjoined, or it may obedience of the precinct officers to the writbe mandatory in its nature, if the case so reten instructions of the commissioners as he quire." This provision for a temporary rewas at noon on the 7th: and he had the same straining order has no application to the grounds on the 6th, and before that day, for rase at hand. The order is not a mere tem- the belief that they would obey these instrucporary restraining order, mandatory in its tions, as he had on the 7th. He could not, nature. The relief sought and granted is therefore, wait, in order to get an ex parte the whole relief obtainable. When the order order, until he could technically and per |