The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (S. 391) to enable Susan B. Anthony to pay a fine imposed upon her by the district court for the northern district of New York, and a petition praying for the remission of said fine, report:

That they are not satisfied that the action of the court was such as represented in the petition, and that, if it were so, the Senate could not legally take any action in the premises, and more that the committee be discharged from the further consideration of the petition and that the bill be postponed indefinitely.

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.

Mr. CARPENTER asked, and obtained, leave of the Senate to present the following as the views of the minority of

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which committee was referred the memorial of Susan B. Anthony, praying to be relieved from a certain judgment rendered against her by the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of New York:

Susan B. Anthony, a female citizen of the United States, in her memorial shows the following facts:

That prior to the late presidential election your petitioner applied to the board of registry in the Eighth ward of the city of Rochester, in which city she had resided for more than twenty-five years, to have her name placed upon the register of voters; and the board of registry, after consideration of the subject, decided that your petitioner was entitled to have her name placed upon the register, and placed it there accordingly.

On the day of the election your petitioner, in common with hundreds of other American citizens, her neighbors, whose names had also been registered as voters, offered to the inspectors of election her ballots for electors of President and Vice-President, and for members of Congress, which were received and deposited in the ballot-box by the inspectors. For this act of your petitioner an indictment was found against her by the grand jury, at the sitting of the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York, at Albany, charging your petitioner, under the nineteenth section of the act of Congress of May 31, 1870, entitled "An act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and for other purposes," with having "knowingly voted without having a lawful right to vote."

To that indictment your petitioner pleaded not guilty, and the trial of the issue thus joined took place at the circuit court in Canandaigua, in the county of Ontario, before the Hon. Ward Hunt, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, on the 18th day of June last.

Upon that trial the facts of voting by your petitioner, and that she was a woman, were not denied; nor was it claimed on the part of the Government that your petitioner lacked any of the qualifications of a voter, unless disqualified by reason of her sex.

It was shown on behalf of your petitioner, on the trial, that before voting she called upon a respectable lawyer and asked his opinion whether she had a right to vote, and he advised her that she had such right; and the lawyer was examined as a witness in her behalf, and tes tified that he gave her such advice, and that he gave it in good faith, believing that she ha such right.

It also appeared that when she offered to vote, the question whether, as a woman, she had a right to vote, was raised by the inspectors, and considered by them in her presence, and they decided that she had a right to vote, and received her vote accordingly.

It was shown on the part of the Government that, on the examination of your petitione before the commissioner on whose warrant she was arrested, your petitioner stated that she should have voted if allowed to vote, without reference to the advice of the attorney whose opinion she asked; that she was not induced to vote by that opinion; that she hai before determined to offer her vote, and had no doubt about her right to vote.

At the close of the testimony your petitioner's counsel proceeded to ad Iress the jury, and stated that he desired to present for consideration three propositions—two of law, and one of fact:

First. That your petitioner had a lawful right to vote.

Second. That whether she had a right to vote or not, if she honestly believed that she ha that right, and voted in good faith in that belief, she was guilty of no crime.

Third. That when your petitioner gave her vote she gave it in good faith, believing that it was her right to do so.

That the two first propositions presented questions for the court to decide, and the last a question for the jury.

When your petitioner's counsel had proceeded thus far, the judge suggested that the counse had better discuss, in the first place, the questions of law, which the counsel proceeded to do; and, having discussed the two legal questions at length, asked then to say a few words to the jury on the question of fact. The judge then said to the counsel that he thought that had better be left until the views of the court upon the legal questions should be made known.

The district attorney thereupon addressed the court at length upon the legal questions, and at the close of his argument the judge delivered an opinion adverse to the position of your petitioner's counsel upon both of the legal questions presented, holding that your petitioner was not entitled to vote; and that if she voted in good faith, in the belief in fact that she had a right to vote, it would constitute no defense; the ground of the decision on the last point being that your petitioner was bound to know that by the law she was not a legal voter and that even if she voted in good faith in the contrary belief, it constituted no defense t. the crime with which she was charged.

The decision of the judge upon those questions was read from a written document, an! at the close of the reading the judge said that the decisions of those questions disposed of the case and left no questions of fact for the jury, and that he should therefore direct the jury to find a verdict of guilty. The judge then said to the jury that the decision of the court had disposed of all there was in the case, and that he directed them to find a verdict of guilty; and he instructed the clerk to enter such a verdict.

At this time, before any entry had been made by the clerk, your petitioner's counse asked the judge to submit the case to the jury, and to give to the jury the following severa

instructions:

First. That if the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she had a right to vote, and voted in good faith in that belief, she was not guilty of the offense charged. Second. That in determining the question whether she did or did not believe that she had a right to vote, the jury might take into consideration, as bearing upon that ques tion, the advice which she received from the counsel to whom she applied.

Third. That they might also take into consideration, as bearing upon the same question. the fact that the inspectors considered the question and came to the conclusion that she had a right to vote.

Fourth. That the jury had a right to find a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, a they should believe that she had or had not been guilty of the offense described in the

statute.

The judge declined to submit the case to the jury upon any question whatever, and directed them to render a verdict of guilty against your petitioner.

Your petitioner's counsel excepted to the decision of the judge upon the legal questions, and to his direction to the jury to find a verdict of guilty, insisting that it was a direction which no court had a right to give in any criminal case.

The judge then instructed the clerk to take the verdict, and the clerk said, "Gentlemen

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of the jury, hearken to your verdict as the court hath recorded it. You say you find the defendant guilty of the offense charged; so say you all."

No response whatever was made by the jury, either by word or sign. They had not consulted together in their seats or otherwise. Neither of them had spoken a word, nor had they been asked whether they had or had not agreed upon a verdict.

Your petitioner's counsel then asked that the clerk be requested to poll the jury. The judge said, "That cannot be allowed. Gentlemen of the jury, you are discharged;" and the jurors left the box. No juror spoke a word during the trial, from the time when they were impaneled to the time of their discharge.

After denying a motion for a new trial, the judge proceeded, upon the conviction thus obtained, to pass sentence upon your petitioner, imposing upon her a fine of $100 and the costs of the prosecution.

What purports to be a short-hand report of this trial has been furnished to the committee, from which the following extract is made:

After the general charge to the jury upon the questions of law involved, the court said:

Upon this evidence I suppose there is no question for the jury, and that the jury should be directed to find a verdict of guilty.

Judge SELDEN. I submit that on the view which your honor has taken, the right to vote and the regulation of it is solely a State matter. That this whole law is out of the jurisdiction of the United Stated courts and of Congress. The whole law upon that basis, as I understand it, is not within the constitutional power of the General Government, but is one which applies to the States. I suppose that it is for the jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty of a crime or not. And I therefore ask your honor to submit to the jury these propositions:

First. If the defendant, at the time of vcting, believed that she had a right to vote and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not guilty of the offense charged.

Second. In determining the question whether she did or did not believe that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the counsel to whom she applied.

Third. That they may also take into consideration, as bearing upon that question, the fact that the inspectors considered the question, and came to the conclusion that she had a right to voté.

Fourth. That the jury have a right to find a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, as they shall believe that she has or has not committed the offense described in the statute. A professional friend sitting by has made this suggestion, which I take leave to avail myself of, as bearing upon the question: "The court has listened for many hours to an argument, in order to decide whether the defendant has a right to vote. The arguments show the same question has engaged the best minds of the country as an open question. Can it be possible that the defendant is to be convicted for acting upon such advice as she could obtain while the question is an open and undecided one?"

The COURT. You have made a much better argument than that, sir.

JUDGE SELDEN. As long as it is an open question, I submit that she has not been guilty of an offense. At all events, it is for the jury.

The COURT. I cannot charge these propositions, of course. The question, gentlemen of the jury, in the form it finally takes, is wholly a question or questions of law, and I have decided as a question of law, in the first place, that under the 14th amendment, which Miss Anthony claims protects her, she was not protected in a right to vote. And I have decided also that her belief and the advice which she took does not protect her in the act which she committed. If I am right in this, the result must be a verdict on your part of guilty, and I therefore direct that you find a verdict of guilty."

Judge SELDEN. That is a direction no court has power to make in a criminal case.
The COURT. Take the verdict, Mr. Clerk.

The CLERK. Gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your verdict as the court has recorded it. You say you find the defendant guilty of the offense whereof she stands indicted, and 80 say you all.

JUDGE SELDEN. I don't know whether an exception is available, but I certainly must except to the refusal of the court to submit those propositions, and especially to the direction of the court that the jury should find a verdict of guilty. I claim that it is a power that is not given to any court in a criminal case. Will the clerk poll the jury? The COURT. No. Gentlemen of the jury, you are discharged.

From the opinion of Mr. Justice Hunt on the motion for a new trial, which he has kindiy furnished me, it appears that the court on the trial did in substance and effect direct a verdict of guilty.

The majority of the committee have determined that inasmuch as the

relief prayed for by the memorial cannot be granted, the committee will ask to be discharged from its further consideration, and will not express any opinion as to the correctness or incorrectness of the course pursued on the trial of Miss Anthony.

The House of Lords in England or the Senate of the United States may engage in any investigation looking to legislation, although, as an incident to, or a result of, such investigation, it may appear that some officer who is impeachable has been guilty of conduct for which he might be impeached. Then, surely, in a case like this, where there is neither suggestion nor suspicion of corrupt conduct on the part of the estimable judge before whom the trial was conducted, it cannot be improper for a committee of the Senate to inquire whether, in the trial of a citizen for alleged violation of the laws of the United States, a precedent daugerous to the liberties of every citizen has been set. Indeed, the inju rious effect of every judicial departure from sound principle is in propor tion to the eminence and purity of the judge by whom it is committed. The outrages perpetrated by Scroggs and Jeffreys in the administration of criminal justice were grievous upon the individuals unjustly or illegally convicted, but do no harm as precedents. A vicious precedent, set by an infamous judge, is harmless; while a similar violation of the law by a pure and upright magistrate is attended by far-reaching and detrimental consequences.

It is fashionable, we know, just now to heap contumely upon women who demand to be allowed to enjoy their civil political rights. Ridicule is the chief weapon employed against them, and is freely applied to all who advocate their cause. Gentlemen who would blush to be thought negligent in the offices of frivolous gallantry lack the manhood to accord to women their substantial rights. And, strange to say, ladies dwelling in luxurious ease join with the fops of society to cast contempt upon the earnest aspirations of woman for the possession of her just rights. We have acted upon the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, so far as to make all men equal before the law; but women, our mothers. our wives, our sisters, and our daughters, we condemn to inequalitymany to servitude. But the cry of women, who, in poverty and want. are driven from the employments of honest industry to indulgence in vice and to the haunts of shame, is rising on every hand, and appeals to the heart with as much power as the wailings of a slave beneath the lash of his master.

The wrongs of Martin Koszta in a foreign land touched the heart of the nation. But the denial of her rights to Miss Susan B. Anthony in a court of the Union is thought to be unworthy the attention of the American Senate.

To those who are indifferent whether a woman be deprived of or be permitted to enjoy even the rights which are secured to her by the Con stitution, it may be suggested that a bad precedent set in the trial of a woman who has presumed to express her choice as to those who should make laws for her, laws by which her rights are to be affected and her property be taxed, may stand in the way of some man's rights hereafter. It may yet happen, in the revolutions of time, that some one of the ma jority of your committee may be subjected to an unjust and false accusation, which must be submitted to the judgment of twelve men in the jury-box or of one man on the bench; twelve men fresh from the people and warmed with the instinctive sympathies of humanity, or one man, separated from the people by his station and by the habits of a life passed in seclusion and study. A jury-trial must be the same whether a man