ments in favour of the Jewish and Christian revelations; but they are discussed at large in several of my publications.* Especially the following: 1. "Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever," 3 Parts. 2. "Letters to the Philosophers and Politicians of France on the Subject of Religion," 2 Parts. 3. "Discourses relating to the Evidences of Revelation," 3 Vols. 4. "A Discourse on the Resurrection of Jesus." 5. "Observations on the Increase of Infidelity." AN OUTLINE, &c. SECTION I. Of the Nature of Evidence, as applicable to this EVIDENCE is of different kinds, according to the different objects of inquiry. When quantity, or numbers, is the subject, the evidence of the truth of any propositions is the perception of the perfect coincidence of the two terms of which they consist, as that 2 and 2 make 4, and that the three angles of a right-angled triangle are equal to two right angles. And it may be shewn, that the number denoted by the expression 2 and 2, is the very same with 4, and that the sum of the three angles in the triangle is the same with that of the two above-mentioned. The proof of a proposition of this kind is called a demonstration, and as the science of mathematics is conversant about numbers and quantity, it is often called mathematical demonstration. The contrary of a true proposition of this kind is an absolute impossibility, as that 2 and 2 should make 5, or any other number than 4, and such an assertion is said to be a contradiction. Another ground of belief is the constant observation of particular facts, as that of stones, and other bodies, when there is no impediment to their motion, falling to the ground; whence we infer, that though we do not know why they do so, it is in consequence of some invariable law of nature, and therefore we conclude that they always will do so. All our faith in the principles of natural philosophy and chemistry is of this kind. But to assert the contrary of propositions of this kind is not called a contradiction, because, antecedent to the observation of the fact, the contrary, for any thing that we could tell, might have been true. Also all general propositions of this kind, however well founded, are subject to limitation from farther and more accurate observations. Thus it is not true that all bodies, without exception, as at the first we naturally imagine, will fall to the ground, but only such as are heavier than the air of the atmosphere; and in certain circumstances even very heavy bodies mount upwards, as pieces of iron placed under a magnet, &c. And till we know the manner in which these events are produced, or the real causes of them, and the mode of their operation, it is impossible for us to say to what farther restrictions such general propositions may be subject. A person who had never seen water in any other form than that of a liquid, would be inclined to say, that it could not appear in any other; though we know by observation, but not from any reasoning à priori, that in a certain degree of cold, it becomes solid, and that in a certain degree of heat, it assumes the form of vapour or steam. All our faith in history, which relates to things too remote with respect to time or place to be the subject of our own observation, is of this kind; depending upon the knowledge and veracity of those who relate the facts. But we have found by our experience, that in certain circumstances the testimony of others has not deceived us, and therefore we presume that, in the same circumstances, it never will deceive us ; and, therefore, that it may be depended upon, even as much as that a stone, if left to itself, will fall to the ground. We have, in fact, no more doubt of the truth of facts of this kind, as that there exists such a city as Rome, or of the past existence of such men as Alexander the Great, and Julius Cæsar, than we have of that of a stone falling to the ground, or indeed than we have of the truth of the mathematical propositions above mentioned, the difference in the strength of our persuasion in these cases being altogether imper ceptible. But to assert the contrary would not be called a contradiction, the thing not being naturally impossible; since all historians, and all travellers, may have told a lie; and therefore all that, in strictness of speech, can be said, is, that the non-existence of such a city, and of such persons, is exceedingly improbable, considering the nature of the evidence in its favour. To prove what is a real contradiction, as that 2 and 2 make 5, no evidence whatever can be sufficient. But there is nothing within the bounds of possibility that may not be proved by sufficient testimony; that is, the evidence may be so circumstanced, as that the supposition of its being false shall be more improbable than the fact that is supported by it. In all cases of testimony, our backwardness to give our assent arises from a want of analogy in the fact that is asserted to be true, to what we have ourselves found to be so, or that, on any other evidence, we believe to be so. Thus, after having seen many stones, and other bodies, constantly fall to the ground, we not only readily believe that other stones, but that all other bodies which we call heavy, as wood, and even feathers, will fall downwards, when not supported by any thing. But having never seen any body whatever rise in the air, except when it was forced upwards for a short time by the power of the wind, we should not immediately believe the ac |