The new Air Force Reserve program is, as a result, a complementary program rather than the supplementary program of past years. It is designed to flow smoothly in the event of emergency into a cohesive air order of battle calculated to produce air victory.

We have tried to profit from all of the lessons learned since the outbreak of war in Korea. The Air Reserve program will not be static but is designed with the flexibility essential to its continuing vitality. The emphasis is on the development of cohesive, integrated air power, every part of which is ready to meet a requirement of the Air Force mission.

NEW PERSONNEL STRUCTURE FOR AIR FORCE RESERVE

The Air Force is also establishing a new personnel structure for the Reserve forces by administrative action. This structure employs the categories of Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve as incorporated in the Reserve bill and will result in better cataloging of our Reserve resources for active duty. Enactment of the Reserve bill will give this structure the support of positive law. Also, the Air Force has conducted several personnel inventory surveys in certain areas of the United States and is planning a Nation-wide survey beginning July 1, 1952. This will give us the basic information necessary to bring our records up-to-date.

FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DESIGNING RESERVE PROGRAM

The Reserve program has been designed in full consideration of the following factors:

1. The units and personnel of the Reserve program are based upon approved mobilization and war plans.

2. The program is not contingent upon, but is based upon and is in complete accord with proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act.

3. The program is designed to assimilate a Universal Military Training system should it be enacted into law.

4. The disposition of planned facilities has been carefully calculated to maximize geographical coverage and population densities. 5. Portions of the program which require flying have been carefully studied with a view to exploiting already available airdrome facilities. 6. The final result has been repeatedly screened to assure the most economical budgetary requirement.

The new Air Reserve program is designed to meet three major categories of requirements:

First, there is and will continue to be a requirement for trained individuals to bring the active duty force-in-being up to war strength. Second, there will be an urgent requirement for a source of qualified replacements to maintain the effective strength of the force until mobilization can become effective.

Third, there is a requirement for units, trained and equipped to join with the force-in-being in either a combat or supporting role. To meet these requirements, the Air Reserve program is made up of six elements:

1. The Air Reserve Combat Training Center: Twenty-seven centers will be established to train reservists for assignment to a like number of combat-type units. Regular Air Force personnel will

administer the program which will provide 48 drills and 15 days' active duty training per annum.

2. The Air Reserve Combat Support Training Center: This program consists of two air depots wings and two technical reconnaissance squadrons. They will be located in leased, rented, or other Government facilities in areas of major population density; 48 drills and 15 days' active duty training per annum are provided.

3. Air Reserve Replacement Training Squadron: This program will not be implemented until fiscal year 1954 due to shortage of aircraft. It is similar to the Air Reserve Combat Training Center and is designed to achieve maximum utilization of available Reserve Training Center aircraft and allied equipment at no additional cost as regards procurement of such items; 24 drills and 15 days active duty training per annum are planned.

4. The Air Reserve Specialist Training Center: This program will constitute the major source for qualified and seasoned personnel. needed as fillers and replacements in event of war. There will be approximately 225 training centers geographically distributed so as to reach the greatest number of reservists in all 48 States. Active Air Force personnel will conduct the administration and training for this program at facilities rented, constructed, or occupied jointly with other military services; 24 drills and 15 days duty training per annum are provided.

5. Mobilization Assignment Program: This program is designed to train individual reservists with units of the active force in positions in which their services would be required under conditions of mobilization; 24 drills and 15 days active duty training are provided. 6. Individual trainee program: This program will provide training for that group of individuals who live in the remote areas where organized training cannot be economically furnished. Training will consist primarily of extension courses designed specifically for the air reservists and will include provision for active duty training at one of the technical training schools of the Air Training Command. Drill periods are not provided.

DELAY AND DEFERMENT POLICY OF AIR FORCE RESERVE

At this point, I should like to mention the delay and deferment policies employed by the Air Force in the recall of reservists to active duty. We have tried to meet our manning requirements to the maximum extent possible by volunteers and have been very liberal in our application of the deferement policies of the Department of Defense. We have made our Reserve calls to active duty on a selective basis with the least impact on the essential civilian economy as is consistent with military manning objectives. An indication of this can be gathered from the fact that of the sum of 35,000 reservists who requested delay when recalled, approximately 29,000 received deferments or delays based on the policies mentioned above.

In this connection, the Air Force considers it essential that control of Reserve force utilization, within the limits established by Congress, be exercised directly by the military departments concerned, under policies and standards established by the Department of Defense.

Present laws and congressional intent have clearly established the Reserve forces as an integral part of the Armed Forces. As such, they

represent a vital segment of the total military forces authorized by Congress. The emergency missions assigned to the Reserve forces mandate the retention of these forces under close supervision of the military departments and in a status of trained readiness and predictable utility for military deeds. It is of the utmost importance that the Air Reserve forces be immediately available to the Air Force when needed, if it is to fulfill its assigned mission. The immediacy of this relationship cannot be overemphasized. It is analogous in importance to the authority of a field commander to order his battle reserves into action whenever and wherever the military situation dictates. Relinquishing control of our military reserve to any agency outside the Department of Defense would jeopardize this well accepted principle of warfare.

The individual skill and qualification of reservists have been and will be a prime factor in the phasing of reservists to active duty. Only the military departments are in a position to determine and administer their requirements in this respect. When it is necessary to order reservists to active duty in sizable numbers, a situation of emergency prevails. The requirements for reservists on active duty necessarily become an expedient of the emergency situation existing at the time. The interposition of an intermediary agency between the military departments and their respective Reserve forces could not. do otherwise but impede this process.

POINT PLAN FOR RECALL OF RESERVISTS

Aside from this question, a number of proposals have been advanced from time to time concerning the recall of reservists based on a point plan similar to that used for separations at the close of World War II. The Air Force has consistently opposed these proposals. Despite theoretical advantages that appear to accrue to such plans, actual application reveals their flaws when related to military personnel requirements. Unfortunately, it is impossible to spread equality of service under all conditions to all personnel skills. It is the old supply and demand problem. With the ever-changing tactics and techniques of modern air warfare, it is impossible to keep the supply of certain skills in balance with the demand. Our requirements for aircrew personnel or electronics personnel in the Air Force is nearly always greater than for many other support skills. Therefore, personnel in these groups are required to man a particular program regardless of point credit. On the other hand, support skills having reservists available with few points may never be required for active duty in a limited emergency.

Administratively, the point system is an expensive monstrosity which requires individual posting of all Reserve records and monitorship of constant changes. It requires audits of the points for individual skills to determine what criteria will prevail at one particular point in time to effect recalls. It requires reporting systems and continual exchange of information to provide some semblance of equality between different geographical areas and different skill categories.

As a member of the War Department staff during the demobilization following World War II, I have a particular abhorrence to any point system in our personnel programs.

Senator LONG. The point system was rather popular with those who were discharged, particularly those who had the greater number of points, and thought they were entitled to be discharged ahead of the

others.

General PARKS. As Mr. Johnson mentioned it brought about a very confused and rapid demobilization. I am sure, if it were applied to mobilization it would provide for an equally confused mobilization and a much less rapid one.

All of the above are factors to be considered in any legislation dealing with the Reserve forces. The bill now before you is designed to provide a statutory framework within which the services may operate their Reserve programs with efficiency and with uniformity to the maximum extent possible. It provides many authorities which have been needed for some time such as the standard contract for active duty; uniform allowances for reserves; indefinite term commissions; common Federal appointment; and categories of vulnerability for future call to active duty. Enactment will strengthen and assist materially the Air Force Reserve program.

Senator LONG. I will put this chart in the record. I think it might be helpful.

General PARKS. Yes, sir.

(The chart submitted by the Air Force on Delays or Deferment of Air Force Reserve Personnel is as follows:)

ONE YEAR TRAINING PROVISION OF 1948 ACT

Senator LONG. It was my understanding that the 1948 act permitted a limited number of young men to be called in for 1 year of training, at the conclusion of which they would be funneled into the Reserves.

I have heard practically no testimony on that provision. Has the Air Force found that to be workable, or what is the reason nothing has been done about that?

General PARKS. I think you will find that almost all of the services found that rather unworkable. For that reason and because of the testimony presented by the Department of Defense and the military services on Public Law 51, that particular feature of the 1948 act was repealed.

Senator LONG. When was it repealed?

General PARKS. At the time of the revision of the Selective Service Act as reflected in Public Law 51, the Universal Military Training and Service Act.

Senator LONG. I wonder why that was not found practicable?

General PARKS. For many reasons. They were in for only 1 year. They could not be shipped overseas. They were completely unproductive to the active force. The entire year had to be spent primarily in their training. They did represent some value in the Reserve program, although in the case of the Air Force I do not believe the training we were able to give them in that year was adequate to put them into any of our critical skills. They did assume a 6-year Reserve obligation upon expiration and from that point of view they were of value in our Reserve program. However, they were in relatively small numbers.

Senator LONG. I didn't want to lead you into a difficult position, but the question in my mind was if that 1-year training at the conclusion of which a young man is added to the Reserves did not prove to be effective, how would we feel that 6 months' training under universal military training would be more effective or more successful?

General PARKS. In the case of the Air Force, in the universal military training program, about all we would be able to give him would be our basic military training and a limited amount of time in some of the lesser technical skills.

It is part of our plan for the implementation of universal military training to have by the time that outflow of universal military training product is available to our Reserve program a stronger organization in our Reserve, well equipped and trained so that it could pick up these 6 months' products and provide them with the necessary continuation training and higher skill training.

Senator LONG. I was curious about that. I would also be curious to have the other services comment on that particular provision. So I will ask the Army and the Navy to give us their experience with that provision.

I make that request for the record, and perhaps the Navy and the Army can give us their views on that subject too.